Corporate Governance, the Extent of Non-Audit Services and Auditor Independence: Evidence from Firms Issuing Financing

Author(s):  
Ling Chu ◽  
Ping Zhang
2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-29
Author(s):  
Dovi Septiari ◽  
Wirdani Atika Sari

Accounting conservatism is the precautionary principle to the profit recognition and one of the corporate governance to reduce the ability of the manager in manipulate and exaggerating the financial statements. Corporate governance is a internal control system which has its business objectives through securing company’s assets. This research is aiming to see the correlation among auditor independence and good corporate governance in accounting conservatism. Characteristics of good corporate governance in this are managerial ownership, profitability, company size and leverage. This research uses two measurements of conservatism non operating accrual and market to book ratio. This research as carried out at manufacture company in the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2010-2014. Sample selection do by purposive sampling method and obtained 49 companies in criteria accordingly. This research used data analysis and multiple liniear regression program eviews 9. The result showed that the effect of auditor independence is not significant in accounting conservatism in indonesia. Good corporate governance influential only the size of the company and ownership. The measurement of non operating accrual and market to book ratio show different results. Further research is expected to use another proxy for other variables to measure accounting conservatism.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaobo Hao

The rapid development of non-audit services (NAS) has jeopardized the independence of auditors, which has led many Western countries to enact regulations that restrict the provision of NAS. While in China, NAS have just emerged, and its development in China is far less mature than in Western countries. The purpose of this paper is to explore whether NAS in China have damaged auditor independence and whether Chinese regulators need to emulate Western countries and strongly limit the provision of NAS. In order to achieve this objective, 213 Chinese listed companies are selected in this study. The audit opinions issued by the auditors are used as substitute variables for auditor independence (dependent variables), and the ratio of non-audit service fees to the total of audit service fees and non-audit service fees as a substitute variable for the provision of NAS (independent variable), and meanwhile some suitable control variables are also selected. Analyse these data by building a binary logistic regression model. The results show that there is no evidence in China that NAS can undermine auditor independence and there is no need for China to enact regulations to prohibit the provision of NAS.


2003 ◽  
Vol 78 (4) ◽  
pp. 931-955 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hyeesoo Chung ◽  
Sanjay Kallapur

The economic theory of auditor independence (DeAngelo 1981b) suggests that auditors' incentives to compromise their independence are related to client importance. Using ratios of client fees and of nonaudit fees divided by the audit firm's U.S. revenues or a surrogate for the audit-practice-office revenues as measures of client importance, we investigate their association with Jones-model abnormal accruals. In a sample of 1,871 clients of Big 5 audit firms we do not find a statistically significant association between abnormal accruals and any of the client importance measures. Our theory development also suggests that auditor incentives to compromise independence should increase with the extent of client opportunities and incentives to manage earnings, and decrease with the strength of corporate governance and auditor expertise. We also do not find a statistically significant association between abnormal accruals and client importance in subsets of the samples partitioned by proxies for these factors.


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