Internal Corporate Governance, Investment Opportunity Set and Firm Performance in South Africa

Author(s):  
Balachandran Muniandy ◽  
John R. Hillier ◽  
Suvan Naidu
2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-90
Author(s):  
Dedi Rusdi ◽  
Indri Kartika ◽  
Maya Indriastuti

Abstract: This study examined the role of good corporate governance and investment opportunity set in maintaining firm performance. This study's sample population comprised 240 manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2016 to 2019. The research sample was selected using a purposive sampling method. The data were analyzed by using structural equation modeling analysis (SEM). The results showed that good corporate governance in terms of board size had a negative effect on firm performance. Meanwhile, good corporate governance in terms of board independence and investment opportunity set had a positive effect on firm performance.Keywords: good corporate governance, investment opportunity set, firm performance Menuju Kinerja Perusahaan di Indonesia: Peran Good Corporate Governance dan Investment Opportunity Set Abstrak: Studi ini menguji peran good corporate governance dan investment opportunity set dalam menjaga kinerja perusahaan. Populasi sampel penelitian terdiri dari 240 perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia dari tahun 2016 hingga 2019. Sampel penelitian dipilih dengan menggunakan metode purposive sampling. Analisis data menggunakan analisis structural equation modeling (SEM). Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa good corporate governance ditinjau dari ukuran dewan komisaris berpengaruh negatif terhadap kinerja perusahaan. Sedangkan good corporate governance ditinjau dari independensi dewan komisaris dan investment opportunity set berpengaruh positif terhadap kinerja perusahaan.Kata kunci: good corporate governance, investment opportunity set, kinerja perusahaan


2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 135-148
Author(s):  
Ruey-Dang Chang ◽  
Yeun-Wen Chang ◽  
Ching-Ping Chang ◽  
Fiona Hu

This study uses investment opportunity set (IOS) as an environmental factor, and investigates its moderating effect on the relationships between corporate governance mechanisms (including internal and external corporate governance mechanisms) and firm performance. The empirical results using regression analysis show: (1) The IOS does not have a moderating effect on audit quality and firm performance. (2) The negative relationship between institutional investor ownership and firm performance is stronger for firms with higher investment opportunities. (3) When CEO is the chairman of the board, high growth firms can lead to better firm performance. (4) The relationship between the IOS and pledged shares ratio of directors and supervisors has positive influence on firm performance


2014 ◽  
Vol 40 (5) ◽  
pp. 454-468 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerry Sun ◽  
George Lan ◽  
Zhenzhong Ma

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on high growth firms’ corporate governance. Specially, the study examines whether there is a negative impact of SOX on the interactive effect of board independence and investment opportunity set on firm performance. Design/methodology/approach – Sample firms were selected from the Investor Responsibility Research Center Directors’ database. Both accounting- and market-based firm performance measures are used. Regressions are run to test the hypothesis. Findings – It was found that the impact of SOX on the interaction effect of board independence and investment opportunity set on firm performance is negative. Originality/value – The results suggest that the impact of SOX in corporate governance and regulatory environment mitigates the effect of board independence on the relationship between investment opportunity set and firm performance, consistent with the notion that the enactment of SOX increases monitoring costs of board governance especially for high-growth firms.


2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonty Tshipa ◽  
Thabang Mokoaleli-Mokoteli

Using both Return On Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q as proxies for performance, the study seeks to explore if better governed firms exhibit greater financial performance than poorly governed firms. The paper employs a panel study methodology for a sample of 137 Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listed firms between 2002 and 2011. The results show that the compliance levels to corporate governance in South Africa (SA) has been improving since 2002 when King II came into force. However, the compliance level in large firms appears to be higher than in small firms. Further, the findings show that the market value of large firms is higher than that of small firms. These results largely support the notion that better governed firms outperforms poorly governed firms in terms of financial performance. Notably, the empirical results indicate that board size, CEO duality and the presence of independent non-executive directors positively impact the performance of a firm, whereas board gender diversity, director share-ownership and frequency of board meetings have no impact on firm performance. This suggests that greater representation of independent non-executive director, a larger board size and the separation of CEO and Chairman should be encouraged to enhance firm performance. Unexpectedly, the presence of internal key board committees, such as remuneration, audit and nomination, negatively impact firm performance. Similar to UK, South Africa has a flexible approach to corporate governance, in which listed firms are required to apply or explain non-conformance to King recommendations. This study has policy implications as it determines whether the flexible corporate governance approach employed by SA improves corporate governance compliance than the mandatory corporate governance approach as employed by countries such as Sri Lanka and US, and whether compliance translates into firm performance. The significant finding of this study is that compliant firms enjoy a higher firm performance as measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q. This implies that compliance to corporate governance code of practice matters, not just as box ticking exercise but as a real step change in the governance of South African listed firms. This paper fulfils an identified need of how compliance to corporate governance influences firm performance in South Africa. The findings have implications to JSE listing rules, policy, investor confidence and academia.


2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 151
Author(s):  
Agustina Ratna Dwiati ◽  
Muhammad Bisyri Effendi

AbstractThe aim of this study is to test the impact of corporate governance and investment opportunity set toward dividend policy with earnings management as intervening variable. The sample of this study is non-financial firms listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange and also a member of Corporate Governance Perception Index on 2012 and 2013. The method that used in this study is multiple regression. The results showed that company with strong corporate governance really cared about shareholders interests by giving high dividend for them. Meanwhile, earnings management has no impact toward dividend policy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-173
Author(s):  
Moh. Firman Ardiansyah ◽  
Norita Citra Yuliati ◽  
Rendy Mirwan Aspirandi

Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk mengetahui apakah terdapat pengaruh Price Earnings Ratio (PER) dan Good Corporate Governance (GCG) dengan proksi (komite audit, komisaris independen, kepemilikan institusional dan kepemilikan manajerial) terhadap nilai perusahaan. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode deskriptif dengan jumlah populasi yang diamati sebanyak 174 perusahaan di Bursa Efek Indonesia periode 2016-2018. Metode pengambilan sampel yang digunakan adalah teknik purposive sampling. Teknik analisis data yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah analisis regresi linier berganda. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa variabel Price Earning Ratio (PER) secara parsial berpengaruh terhadap nilai perusahaan dan variabel Good Corporate Governance (GCG) yang diproksikan oleh komite audit, komisaris independen, kepemilikan institusional dan kepemilikan manajerial tidak berpengaruh secara parsial terhadap nilai perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Simpulan, berdasarkan analisis PER, semakin baik kualitas Investment Opportunity Set (IOS) akan selalu diikuti dengan kenaikan nilai perusahaan. Sedangkan semakin baik kualitas GCG tidak selalu diikuti dengan kenaikan nilai perusahaan. Kata Kunci: Good Corporate Governance, Nilai Perusahaan, Price Earning Ratio


Author(s):  
Abdullah Taman ◽  
Bily Agung Nugroho

Objective of this paper is to analyze determinant of implementation quality ofcorporate governance in companies listing in Indonesian Stock Exchange during period 2004-2008.Population in this study is entire listed companies in Indonesia Capital Market amountto 389 companies. Purposive samping is used to determine sample usage. The samples arefifty companies but one company is relaxed because of outlier. Analysis method used in thisstudy is multiple regression.This study concludes that determinants of implementation quality of corporategovernance are ownership concentration, investment opportunity set, and leverage.Simultaneously, they affect significantly to implementation quality of corporate governancewith F-value is 3.301 (sig. 0.029). Meanwhile, individually variable leverage affectssignificantly to implementation quality of corporate governance with t-value is 2.694 (sig.0.016).Key words: corporate governance, ownership concentration, investment opportunity set,leverage.


Author(s):  
Fransisca Listyaningsih

This study aims to examine the effect of good corporate governance mechanisms (consisting of institutional ownership and managerial ownership) and investment opportunity set (IOS) on earnings quality. The population in this study are companies with types of manufacturing industries listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the period 2013 to 2017. The sample was obtained using a purposive random sampling method. Data analysis uses multiple linear regression. The results showed that the mechanism of good corporate governance did not affect earnings quality, and investment opportunity set (IOS) affected earnings quality. KEYWORDS: Good Corporate Governance, Investment Opportunity Set and Earnings Quality


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