The Right to Marry in Irish Law: Three Different High Court Approaches

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maebh Harding
Keyword(s):  
2002 ◽  
Vol 26 (6) ◽  
pp. 210-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Murjan ◽  
M. Shepherd ◽  
B. G. Ferguson

AIMS AND METHODWe conducted a questionnaire survey of all 120 health authorities and boards responsible for the commissioning of services for the assessment and treatment of transsexual people in England, Scotland and Wales, in order to identify the nature of the input offered and assess conformity to current international standards of care.RESULTSEighty-two per cent of the commissioning authorities responded and confirmed that most health authorities/boards provide a full service for the treatment of transsexuals, although this would be delivered at a local level in only 20% of cases. However, 11 commissioning authorities gave confused and inaccurate responses and three other health authorities appear to hold views on the commissioning of these specialist services that are not in keeping with the current legal situation and a recent High Court ruling, which establishes the right of transsexual people to NHS assessment and treatment.CLINICAL IMPLICATIONSThere are discrepancies in prioritisation and provision of clinical services for this group that are not standard across Great Britain.


2021 ◽  
Vol 138 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-114
Author(s):  
Thino Bekker

The summary judgment procedure in South African law provides for a speedy judgment in favour of a deserving plaintiff where it can be shown that the defendant does not have a triable defence. In 2019 the Rules Board made certain drastic amendments to the procedure of summary judgment in the high court. In this article the historical development of the procedure of summary judgment will be discussed, and the new amendments to rule 32 of the Uniform Rules of Court critically evaluated. It will be argued that the amendments to rule 32 were unnecessary and that it may diminish the right to access to justice in civil disputes. It will, however, also be argued that there are some merits in the critique raised by the Rules Board in relation to rule 32 and that the Rules Board missed a golden opportunity to overhaul the entire summary judgment procedure in a more sensible manner and in line with the core constitutional values of s 34 of the Constitution. It will be argued that rule 32 should be replaced in its entirety by a new, more streamlined procedure, and some recommendations for legal reform will be made in this regard.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi

Abstract Article 24(4) of the Constitution of Kenya qualifies the right to equality “to the extent strictly necessary for the application of” Islamic law “in matters relating to personal status, marriage, divorce and inheritance”. Section 3 of the Marriage Act provides that, although spouses have equal rights during marriage and at its dissolution, “the parties to an Islamic marriage shall only have the rights granted under Islamic law”. The Law of Succession Act states that it is generally not applicable to the estate of a deceased Muslim. In this article, the author examines case law from the Kadhi's Court, the High Court and the Court of Appeal on issues of Muslim marriages and inheritance. These cases illustrate, in some instances, the tensions between Islamic law and human rights.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1037969X2110240
Author(s):  
Asmi Wood

Whatever else may have been their shortcoming with respect to coloured people, the founding fathers clearly did not view Indigenous peoples as aliens. They made it clear that Indigenous peoples were a state issue and that their regulation was to be local. The founding fathers also did not (or probably could not) ethnically cleanse the continent and did not appear to attempt to do so. In seeking to deport two Aboriginal men the current executive are attempting to do what not even the most racist of their forebears did not dare. In Love, in a wafer‐thin majority, the High Court has created a wafer‐thin layer of protection for Indigenous persons in the class of the plaintiffs. This two part article calls on the non-Indigenous peoples, who now share this continent to shake off their apathy and force their recalcitrant leaders to ‘do the right thing by Blacks’ something they claim to have done for the immigrants to this continent.


1999 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-48
Author(s):  
Patrick Milne
Keyword(s):  

WHEN is a promise to benefit someone on one's death an enforceable promise? This was the question for the High Court in Gillett v. Holt and Another [1998] 3 All E.R. 917. As Carnwath J. recognised, the difficulty lies in reconciling proprietary estoppel with the principle that “[s]ubject to specific exceptions (such as for dependants), the right to decide, and change one's mind as to, the devolution of one's estate is a basic and well understood feature of English law”.


Author(s):  
Saatvika Rai

In India, Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) criminalized sodomy (penile nonvaginal sexual acts) in 1860 during British colonial rule. Under this law and the traditional cultural norms, the LGBT community faced harassment and violence from the police, medical establishment, religious and conservative organizations, and families. The Indian queer movement mobilized in the early 1990s, primarily through activism for legal reform. Criminalization of sodomy prevented the LGBT community from freely mobilizing in public spaces, reporting acts of violence and harassment, and coming forth for testing and treatment of HIV/AIDS, and therefore was an impediment to their health and well-being. LGBT rights groups challenged the constitutionality of Section 377 on the basis of violating the right to equity (Article 14), nondiscrimination (Article 15), freedom (Article 19), and life and privacy (Article 21). Decriminalization of Section 377 has been a long, three-decade battle in the courts involving multiple judicial rulings. In 2009, the Delhi High Court decriminalized sodomy and declared Section 377 unconstitutional. The ruling was challenged by conservative and religious groups in the Supreme Court for going against social norms, threatening the institution of marriage, and promoting homosexual practices that would increase the spread of HIV/AIDS. In 2013, the Supreme Court heard the case, overturned the High Court ruling, and recriminalized Section 377. The Court declared that Section 377 was constitutional and applied equally to all persons. Thereafter, the Supreme Court passed three other judgments that directly impacted Section 377: It expanded the rape laws under Section 375 of the IPC to include penile nonvaginal acts (2013), provided legal rights to the transgender community as a nonbinary third gender (2014), and established the right to privacy under the Constitution (2017). The Supreme Court reassessed its decision, and on September 6, 2018, decriminalized Section 377 in a historic judgment. Legalizing queer sexuality was a positive step forward., yet considerable legal reform is still needed. The LGBT community still lack civil rights such as marriage, adoption, tax benefits, inheritance, and protection in the workplace. LGBT rights mobilization through the Indian courts has evolved from a focus on HIV/AIDS and health to broader human rights and privileges as equal citizens.


1967 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 159-174
Author(s):  
H. F. Morris

The Entebbe Secretariat archives contain two interesting sets of reports on native courts compiled by district officers at the request of the Government in 1909 and 1926 respectively. The interest of the 1909 reports lies principally in the high degree of development and formalisation of the courts in the kingdoms of Buganda, Ankole and Toro, which they reveal at this early stage in the administration of the Protectorate. The Agreements of 1900 and 1901 with Buganda, Toro and Ankole had implicitly recognised the existence and jurisdiction of the indigenous courts of these kingdoms. The Buganda Agreement stated that the Kabaka should exercise direct rule over the natives of Buganda administering justice through the Lukiko and his officials. No limitation was placed on the jurisdiction of the Kabaka's courts over Buganda save in so far as appeal lay to the High Court where sentences of more than five years’ imprisonment or a fine of over £100 were imposed, whilst if other sentences were imposed, which seemed to the Commissioner to be disproportionate or “inconsistent with humane principles”, he had the right of remonstrance with the Kabaka who would then have to reconsider the sentence. Moreover, the death sentence could not be carried out without the sanction of the Commissioner. Under the Ankole and Toro Agreements “justice as between natives of the district” was to be administered by the county chiefs with appeal to the Ruler's court and a further appeal in serious cases to the officer administering the district.


1995 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Dickenson

The are two common replies to the question of whether carriers of genetic disorder should have children. The first simply ends any argument by claiming that everyone has an inalienable right to have children. In many ways this view is quite attractive. The right is said to be universal as well as inalienable. It avoids odious comparisons and applies to everyone, including those whom society has deemed unfit for the flimsiest reasons.In the United Kingdom, for example, a High Court judge recently upheld the decision by Sheffield Health Authority to refuse IVF treatment to Julie Seale, who was then 36, on the grounds of her advanced age. This latest salvo in what one writer has called “the fertility war” follows on from the Grand Peninsular Campaign against IVF treatment for post-menopausal women and the recurrent guerilla battle over enforced sterilisation. As this author remarks, “What has happened without our really noticing it is that, with every new skirmish in the fertility war, we are becoming more and more comfortable with the idea that some people deserve to be parents more than others” [1]. And in an age of what is essentially payment by results, there is a great temptation for healthcare providers to think that those who deserve to be parents are those with the best clinical chances.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-24
Author(s):  
Nizmah Nizmah

The noble Qur'an has explained the laws of inheritance, the conditions of each heir with a sufficient explanation, where no one among humans escapes the inheritance or inheritance. Because the Qur'an is the backing in establishing the law and the extent of its parts. And very few are determined based on Sunnah or ijma. there is no position of nonMuslim children on inheritance in compilation of Islamic law. While the Religious Court is a court that has the authority to examine and try inheritance disputes for people who are Muslim. Thus, if there is a dispute over inheritance issues between children of Muslims and non-Muslims, it must be resolved through the Religious Courts. Formulation of the problem in this study is how the position of non-Muslim children on the inheritance of Islamic heirs is reviewed from the Compilation of Islamic Law. with literature analysis it means that the author takes data based on existing literature. Based on the results of the study, according to the Compilation of Islamic Law dividing inheritance to the entitled heirs is the obligation of heirs to the heir to be implemented after the heirs have carried out other obligations as contained in. The position of nonMuslim children on the inheritance of Islamic heirs based on Islamic law does not obtain inheritance from the inheritance of their parents. According to the Compilation of Islamic Law as in the case of the Religious Court, it shows that the position of non-Islamic children on inheritance from the inheritance of the property of their parents does not receive the right inheritance, but based on the Religious High Court, get a section called "Wasiah Wajibah".


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