Courts, the Law, and LGBT Politics in India

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saatvika Rai
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Reform ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Legal Rights ◽  
Lgbt Rights ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Lgbt Community ◽  
The Right ◽  
Hiv Aids

In India, Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) criminalized sodomy (penile nonvaginal sexual acts) in 1860 during British colonial rule. Under this law and the traditional cultural norms, the LGBT community faced harassment and violence from the police, medical establishment, religious and conservative organizations, and families. The Indian queer movement mobilized in the early 1990s, primarily through activism for legal reform. Criminalization of sodomy prevented the LGBT community from freely mobilizing in public spaces, reporting acts of violence and harassment, and coming forth for testing and treatment of HIV/AIDS, and therefore was an impediment to their health and well-being. LGBT rights groups challenged the constitutionality of Section 377 on the basis of violating the right to equity (Article 14), nondiscrimination (Article 15), freedom (Article 19), and life and privacy (Article 21). Decriminalization of Section 377 has been a long, three-decade battle in the courts involving multiple judicial rulings. In 2009, the Delhi High Court decriminalized sodomy and declared Section 377 unconstitutional. The ruling was challenged by conservative and religious groups in the Supreme Court for going against social norms, threatening the institution of marriage, and promoting homosexual practices that would increase the spread of HIV/AIDS. In 2013, the Supreme Court heard the case, overturned the High Court ruling, and recriminalized Section 377. The Court declared that Section 377 was constitutional and applied equally to all persons. Thereafter, the Supreme Court passed three other judgments that directly impacted Section 377: It expanded the rape laws under Section 375 of the IPC to include penile nonvaginal acts (2013), provided legal rights to the transgender community as a nonbinary third gender (2014), and established the right to privacy under the Constitution (2017). The Supreme Court reassessed its decision, and on September 6, 2018, decriminalized Section 377 in a historic judgment. Legalizing queer sexuality was a positive step forward., yet considerable legal reform is still needed. The LGBT community still lack civil rights such as marriage, adoption, tax benefits, inheritance, and protection in the workplace. LGBT rights mobilization through the Indian courts has evolved from a focus on HIV/AIDS and health to broader human rights and privileges as equal citizens.

scholarly journals Practise & Belief of Santhara: Right to Die

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-62
Author(s):  
Choudhary Niharika ◽  
Singh Divyansh
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Indian Subcontinent ◽  
Research Work ◽  
Right To Die ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Right ◽  
Western Perspective

The article seeks to assert that the ritual of Santhara practiced by the followers of Jainism is not a suicide and discerns from the view of the Rajasthan High Court. The authors have used various sources on Santhara for research work and have analysed various case laws on right to die with dignity. At the outset, the article discusses the eminence of Santhara in Jainism. Further, it discusses the foundation of the ‘essential practice’ doctrine through various landmark judgements. The Rajasthan High Court has erred in holding that Santhara is not an essential practice in Jainism, when the same has been proved by Jain ascetics and religious denominations. The High Court ruling also contravenes the Supreme Court judgment, which holds that the right to life includes the right to a dignified life up to the point of death and would also encompass a dignified procedure for death. The article attributes the raison-d'être of the court, to the western perspective, overlooking the religious diversity of the Indian subcontinent and the various practices associated with different religions. Lastly, the article concludes that the Supreme Court needs * Third Year, BBA LLB, National Law University, Jodhpur, India; [email protected]  Third Year, BSc LLB, National Law University, Jodhpur, India; [email protected] to lay emphasis on the difference between essentially religious and secular practices and re-affirm the right of religious freedom.

O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center: Patients’ Right to Participate in Nursing Home Decertification

1982 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 469-492
Author(s):  
Susan Rosenfeld
Keyword(s):  
Nursing Home ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
State Government ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Alternative Methods ◽  
Legal Rights ◽  
Department Of Health ◽  
Nursing Home Patients ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right

AbstractA decertification action by the Department of Health and Human Services (formerly the Department of Health, Education and Welfare) substantially impacts on the lives of Medicaid patients who reside in the affected nursing home. Decertification means that the federal government, the state government, or both will no longer pay for the care of Medicaid patients in the decertified home. Thus, a decision to decertify necessitates the transfer of elderly and infirm Medicaid patients out of the decertified home. Since this transfer may threaten the lives and health of these patients, they should be granted the right to participate in pre-decertification proceedings.However, in O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, the Supreme Court decided that patients do not have the right to participate in predecertification proceedings. The Court rejected the patients’ due process arguments, finding: 1) that decertification does not deprive the patients of any constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty, or property; and 2) that any adverse consequences of decertification are only an “indirect and incidental” result of government action.This Comment analyzes the Supreme Court opinion and concludes that the patients have protectable property and life interests that entitle them to participate in some form of hearing prior to the decertification of the nursing home where they reside. In addition, this Comment suggests alternative methods for asserting nursing home patients’ legal rights.

scholarly journals Error Facti Pada Pembuktian Illegal Fishing Ditinjau Dari Hukum Islam

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 278-312
Author(s):  
Fifin Inbatun Hasanah
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Islamic Law ◽  
Public Prosecutor ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Real ◽  
Illegal Fishing ◽  
Legal Consideration ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right

Abstract: This article highlights the meanings of evidence used to describe the right in front of court in the form of either testimony, witness, or variety of indications that can be used as a guideline by judge to restore the right to its owner. In line with the decision No. 84 PK/Pid/2005 that legal consideration of judex facty of the Court of Gresik, the High Court and the Supreme Court of Surabaya did not consider the result of evidence revealed at the first hearing in the Court of Gresik. A public prosecutor also could not prove who is the real shipowner based on the vessel proofs. This ruling is not appropriate because in term of proof at trial, a public prosecutor should be able to bring witnesses of the shipowner used by the defendant. This is, of course, to determine whether or not anyone who asked or ordered the defendant to do something illegal fishing by transferring, loading, and purchasing the illegal fishing. This is not in accordance with al-Qur’an chapter al-Baqarah verse 282, and al-Talâq verse 2.Keywords: Islamic law, verdict, evidence, illegal fishing. Abstrak: Pembuktian merupakan segala sesuatu yang dapat digunakan untuk menjelaskan yang hak (benar) di depan majelis hakim, baik berupa keterangan, saksi, dan berbagai indikasi yang dapat dijadikan pedoman oleh majelis hakim untuk mengembalikan hak kepada pemiliknya. Dalam kasus putusan Nomor: 84 PK/Pid/2005, bahwa pertimbangan hukum judex facty Pengadilan Negeri Gresik, Pengadilan Tinggi Surabaya dan Mahkamah Agung sama sekali tidak mempertimbangkan hasil pembuktian yang terungkap di persidangan tingkat pertama (Pengadilan Negeri Gresik), termasuk Jaksa Penuntut Umum sama sekali tidak dapat/tidak sanggup membuktikan siapa pemilik kapal yang sesungguhnya sesuai surat-surat bukti. Putusan ini kurang tepat, karena dalam hal pembuktian di Persidangan, seorang Jaksa Penuntut Umum seharusnya dapat menghadirkan saksi pemilik kapal yang dipakai oleh terdakwa, untuk mengetahui benar tidaknya siapa yang menyuruh dan atau memerintahkan terdakwa untuk melakukan perbuatan illegal fishing dengan mentransfer, pemuatan, dan pembelian ikan yang tidak sah. Hal ini tidak sesuai dengan al-Qur’an Surat al-Baqarah ayat 282, dan surat al-Thalaq ayat 2.Kata Kunci: Hukum Islam, putusan, pembuktian, illegal fishing 

scholarly journals One step forward, two steps back: A review of Mushoriwa v City of Harare in view of Zimbabwe's constitutional socio-economic rights

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tinashe Kondo ◽  
Shadreck Masike ◽  
Brian Chihera ◽  
Bright Mbonderi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The State ◽  
Economic Rights ◽  
High Court ◽  
Court Judge ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
One Step ◽  
The Right

SUMMARY In 2013 Zimbabwe enacted a new Constitution, introducing a raft of new changes, among them, the introduction of constitutional socio-economic rights. Not soon thereafter socio-economic rights were tested in the case of Mushoriwa v City of Harare in 2014. The High Court made a finding in favour of the applicant, a decision which enforced the right to water in section 77 of the Constitution. The ruling offered the view that the water bylaws used were unconstitutional and contrary to the enabling statute. This judgment was welcomed as a 'first true test' of socio-economic rights under the 2013 Constitution. In Hove v City of Harare the High Court judge agreed with the reasoning of the Court in Mushoriwa v City of Harare that, in the event of a genuine dispute of a water bill, there should be a recourse to the courts for remedies. In 2018, however, the Supreme Court overturned the decision in the Mushoriwa case. It declared that water disconnections in terms of the water bylaw are above board. This raises questions as to the constitutional obligation to protect the right to water imposed upon all organs of the state. It is against this background that this article reviews the case of Mushoriwa and makes comments on the effects of this judgment, specifically about the enforcement of socio-economic rights in Zimbabwe. Keywords: constitutionality; right to water; Mushoriwa; socio-economic rights

Coming of Age: Devising Legislation for Adolescent Medical Decision-Making

2002 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 409-453
Author(s):  
Rhonda Gay Hartman
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Coming Of Age ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Industrial Society ◽  
Medical Decision ◽  
Legal Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Health And Well Being

A substantial segment of the American population consists of adolescents. Adolescents, defined as persons between the ages of fourteen and eighteen, have traditionally been regarded as “minors” by law. Minors, as a group, are legally disabled, meaning they are presumed to lack the skills necessary for capable decision-making. Capable decision-making is requisite to the exercise of legal rights. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has extended federal constitutional guarantees to minors, including the liberty right for decision-making in intimate, personal matters, the Supreme Court has observed that vulnerability impairs their decision-making capability. Accordingly, the law regulates decision-making liberties of minors far more extensively than those of adults.The underlying tenet of law governing adolescents—that they lack the skills required for capable decision-making—seems well-settled. It is an artifact from an industrial society that spawned legislation authorizing governmental regulation of adolescents for education and labor in order to protect and promote their health and well-being.

A Note on Mandela v Executors, Estate Nelson Mandela 2018 (4) SA 86 (SCA) and the Conundrum around the Customary Marriage between Nelson and Winnie Mandela

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sipho Stephen Nkosi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Eastern Cape ◽  
High Court ◽  
Nelson Mandela ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The note is about the appeal lodged by the late Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela to the SCA against the decision of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, dismissing her application for review in 2014. In that application, she sought to have reviewed the decision of the Minister of Land Affairs, to transfer the now extended and renovated Qunu property to Mr Mandela and to register it in his name. Because her application was out of time, she also applied for condonation of her delay in making the application. The court a quo dismissed both applications with costs, holding that there had been an undue delay on her part. Mrs Mandela then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal, for special leave to appeal the decision of the court a quo. Two questions fell for decision by the SCA: whether there was an unreasonable and undue delay on Mrs Mandela’s part in instituting review proceedings; and whether the order for costs was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The SCA held that there was indeed an unreasonable delay (of seventeen years). Shongwe AP (with Swain, Mathopo JJA, Mokgothloa and Rodgers AJJA concurring) held that the fact that there had been an undue delay does not necessarily mean that an order for costs should, of necessity, particularly where, as in this case, the other litigant is the state. It is the writer’s view that two other ancillary points needed to be raised by counsel and pronounced on by the Court: (a) the lawfulness and regularity of the transfer of the Qunu property to Mr Mandela; and (b) Mrs Mandela’s status as a customary-law widow—in relation to Mr Mandela.

The Right to Housing: Challenges Associated with the ‘Waiting List System’ Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality V Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 5 2014 3 SA 23 (SCA)

2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-121
Author(s):  
Shamier Ebrahim
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Waiting Lists ◽  
The State ◽  
Waiting List ◽  
Allocation Process ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The right to adequate housing is a constitutional imperative which is contained in section 26 of the Constitution. The state is tasked with the progressive realisation of this right. The allocation of housing has been plagued with challenges which impact negatively on the allocation process. This note analyses Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 51 which dealt with a situation where one of the main reasons provided by the Supreme Court of Appeal for refusing the eviction order was because the appellants subjected the unlawful occupiers to defective waiting lists and failed to engage with the community regarding the compilation of the lists and the criteria used to identify beneficiaries. This case brings to the fore the importance of a coherent (reasonable) waiting list in eviction proceedings. This note further analyses the impact of the waiting list system in eviction proceedings and makes recommendations regarding what would constitute a coherent (reasonable) waiting list for the purpose of section 26(2) of the Constitution.

Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel. Case No. HCJ 769/02

2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 459-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Bodansky ◽  
Orna Ben-Naftali ◽  
Keren Michaeli
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
International Law ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Direct Part ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
High Court ◽  
Additional Protocol ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Supreme Court

Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel. Case No. HCJ 769/02. At <http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf>.Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, December 13, 2006.In Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel1 Targeted Killings) the Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, examined the legality of Israel's “preventative targeted killings” of members of militant Palestinian organizations. The Court's unanimous conclusion reads:The result of the examination is not that such strikes are always permissible or that they are always forbidden. The approach of customary international law applying to armed conflicts of an international nature is that civilians are protected from attacks by the army. However, that protection does not exist regarding those civilians “for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities” (§51(3) of [Additional Protocol I]). Harming such civilians, even if the result is death, is permitted, on the condition that there is no less harmful means, and on the condition that innocent civilians are not harmed. Harm to the latter must be proportional. (Para. 60)

Roe v. Wade and the History of Abortion Regulation

1989 ◽  
Vol 15 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 227-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Benjamin Linton
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Personal Privacy ◽  
Personal Liberty ◽  
Personal Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Right Of Privacy ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Right Of Privacy ◽  
The Right ◽  
Roe V Wade

In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that “[the] right of privacy … founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty … is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” The Court acknowledged that “[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.” Nevertheless, the Court held that a “right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.” However, “only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ … are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.”

Constitutional Law in 1942–1943: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1942

1944 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 266-288
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
West Coast ◽  
The United States ◽  
Japanese American ◽  
Circuit Court ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The Right

On February 15, 1943, Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr., a judge of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, took the seat on the Supreme Court vacated by the resignation in October, 1942, of Mr. Justice Byrnes. There were no other changes in the Court's personnel. Disagreement among the justices abated somewhat. In only a dozen cases of importance did either four or three justices dissent, as against some thirty cases in the last term. The Court overruled two earlier decisions, both recent; and the reversal in each case was made possible by the vote of Mr. Justice Rutledge.A. QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL POWER1. WAR POWER-CIVIL VERSUS MILITARY AUTHORITYWest Coast Curfew Applied to Japanese-American Citizens. In February, 1942, the President issued Executive Order No. 9066, which authorized the creation of military areas from which any or all persons might be excluded and with respect to which the right of persons to enter, remain in, or leave should be subject to such regulations as the military authorities might prescribe. On March 2, the entire West Coast to an average depth of forty miles was set up as Military Area No. 1 by the Commanding General in that area, and the intention was announced to evacuate from it persons of suspected loyalty, alien enemies, and all persons, aliens and citizens alike, of Japanese ancestry.

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