Who You Know Matters: Evidence of Fee Discounts for Clients with Well-Connected Audit Committees

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brant E. Christensen ◽  
Thomas C. Omer ◽  
Nathan Y. Sharp ◽  
Paul A. Wong
Keyword(s):  
2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 145-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryan K. Church ◽  
J. Gregory Jenkins ◽  
Jonathan D. Stanley

SYNOPSIS The objective of this paper is to provide a systematic evaluation of independence as a foundational element of the auditing profession. We maintain that while independence is a theoretically appealing construct, it is fraught with practical problems surrounding its implementation, monitoring, and regulation. We analyze the current oversight of auditor independence and evaluate the need for auditor independence from the perspective of information users and information producers. In the process, we discuss important implications and intractable challenges that affect one or more parties involved in the financial-reporting process. Finally, we carefully evaluate alternatives to the current regulatory approach for managing auditor independence (i.e., proscribing various auditor-client relationships). We conclude that increasing audit committees' responsibilities for monitoring the auditor's independence—along with additional disclosure about threats and safeguards to auditor independence—is worthy of further consideration and debate as a path toward addressing the auditor independence conundrum.


2017 ◽  
Vol 92 (6) ◽  
pp. 187-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seil Kim ◽  
April Klein

ABSTRACT In December 1999, the SEC instituted a new listing standard for NYSE and NASDAQ firms. Listed firms were now required to maintain fully independent audit committees with at least three members. In July 2002, the U.S. Congress legislated these standards through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Our research question is whether all investors benefited from the 1999 new rule. Using both an event study and a difference-in-differences methodology, we find no evidence of higher market value or better financial reporting quality resulting from this rule.


2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krista Fiolleau ◽  
Kris Hoang ◽  
Bradley Pomeroy

SUMMARY Policymakers have identified effective communications between the auditor and the audit committee (AC) as an indicator of a quality audit, but little is known about the factors auditors consider when deciding what to communicate about significant accounting issues. We propose auditors use the AC's oversight approach as a cue for the level of detail in their communications that is necessary to satisfy the AC's preferences for auditors' insights on issues that were resolved with management. In our experiment, auditors resolved an inventory obsolescence issue with a hypothetical CFO, and then wrote a communication about it for the AC. We manipulate the AC's preference for getting involved in the issue resolution process and its reputation for asking questions. Our results, supplemented by findings from audit partner interviews, suggest auditors tailor their communications to the AC's oversight approach, the AC's industry and accounting knowledge, and the AC chair's preferred communication style. Data Availability: Contact the authors.


2005 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 9-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suchismita Mishra ◽  
K. Raghunandan ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama

In FRR No. 68, the SEC (2003b) updated the rules related to the disclosure of fees paid to the independent auditor by requiring more detailed information about nonaudit fees. The SEC (2002, 2003b) asserted that the partition of nonaudit fees into the categories of audit-related, tax, and other fees would be useful for investors in assessing the auditor's independence and in voting on ratifying the auditor. The SEC suggested that investors would view audit-related and tax services more favorably than “other” nonaudit services. In this paper we test the SEC's assertions by examining shareholder ratification votes, during 2003, at 248 of the S&P 1500 firms. Our results support the SEC's assertion that investors would view audit-related fees differently than the other two types of nonaudit fees. However, contrary to the SEC's assertion, both the tax fee ratio and the other fee ratio have a positive association with the proportion of votes against auditor ratification. The results related to tax fees provide empirical support to the PCAOB's recent initiative to examine the association between tax services and auditor independence. Our results can be useful for client managements and audit committees considering purchases of nonaudit services from auditors. Our findings also suggest that it may be useful to replicate some prior studies (that use a single measure of nonaudit fees) using the newer, more finely partitioned, fee data.


2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 153-167
Author(s):  
John R. Lauck ◽  
Stephen J. Perreault ◽  
Joseph R. Rakestraw ◽  
James S. Wainberg

SYNOPSIS Auditing standards require external auditors to inquire of client-employees regarding their knowledge of actual or suspected fraud (PCAOB 2010b; AICPA 2016). However, the extant literature provides little guidance on practical methods that auditors can employ to increase the likelihood of fraud disclosure and improve audit quality. Drawing upon best practices in the whistleblowing literature and psychological theories on self-regulation, we experimentally test the efficacy of two practical strategies that auditors can employ during the fraud inquiry process: actively promoting statutory whistleblower protections and strategically timing their fraud inquiries. Our results indicate that auditors are more likely to elicit client-employee fraud disclosures by actively promoting statutory whistleblower protections and strategically timing the fraud inquiry to take place in the afternoon, when client-employee self-regulation is more likely to be depleted. These two audit inquiry strategies should be of considerable interest to audit practitioners, audit committees, and those concerned with improving audit quality. Data Availability: From the authors by request.


The first book to address the links between sovereign debt and human rights. Authors are renowned jurists, economics, historians and social scientists, all of which examine the links between debt and human rights from a variety of angles. The book is structured around five basic parts. The first sets out the historical, political and economic context of sovereign debt. Indeed, without understanding how debt accumulates, why it is necessary and to whom it is owed, it is impossible to fully comprehend the full range of arguments about its impact on human rights. The second part effectively addresses the human rights dimension of the three types of sovereign lenders, namely inter-governmental financial institutions (IFIs) (chiefly those from the World Bank group and those within the EU framework), sovereigns and private lenders. Part II examines also debt-influencing mechanisms, and with the exception of vulture funds that will be analysed in Part V, here we examine the role of export credits, credit rating agencies and bilateral investment treaties. Part III goes on to make the link between debt and the manner in which the accumulation of sovereign debt violates human rights. From there, Part IV examines some of the conditions imposed by structural adjustment programs on debtor states with a view to servicing their debt. All of these conditionalities have been shown to exacerbate the debt itself at the expense also of economic sovereignty. It is thus explained in Part IV that such measures are not only injurious to the entrenched rights of peoples, but that moreover they exacerbate the borrower’s economic situation. Finally, Part V addresses the range of practical responses to sovereign debt, such as odious debt claims, unilateral repudiation, establishment of debt audit committees and others.


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