Auditors' Communications with Audit Committees: The Influence of the Audit Committee's Oversight Approach

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krista Fiolleau ◽  
Kris Hoang ◽  
Bradley Pomeroy
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Level Of Detail ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Communication Style ◽  
Quality Audit ◽  
Resolution Process ◽  
Asking Questions

SUMMARY Policymakers have identified effective communications between the auditor and the audit committee (AC) as an indicator of a quality audit, but little is known about the factors auditors consider when deciding what to communicate about significant accounting issues. We propose auditors use the AC's oversight approach as a cue for the level of detail in their communications that is necessary to satisfy the AC's preferences for auditors' insights on issues that were resolved with management. In our experiment, auditors resolved an inventory obsolescence issue with a hypothetical CFO, and then wrote a communication about it for the AC. We manipulate the AC's preference for getting involved in the issue resolution process and its reputation for asking questions. Our results, supplemented by findings from audit partner interviews, suggest auditors tailor their communications to the AC's oversight approach, the AC's industry and accounting knowledge, and the AC chair's preferred communication style. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

Audit Committee Incentives and the Resolution of Detected Misstatements

2015 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 109-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marsha B. Keune ◽  
Karla M. Johnstone
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Analyst Forecast ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Option Compensation ◽  
Stock Option Compensation

SUMMARY We investigate the role of audit committee economic incentives in judgments involving the resolution of detected misstatements. The results reveal a positive association between audit committee short-term stock option compensation and the likelihood that managers are allowed to waive income-decreasing misstatements that, if corrected, would have caused the company to miss its analyst forecast. Complementary results reveal a positive association between the audit committee long-term stock option compensation and the likelihood that managers are allowed to waive income-increasing misstatements when the company reports just missing, meeting, or beating its analyst forecast. These findings illustrate agency conflicts that can arise when compensating audit committees with options. We obtain these results while controlling for CEO option compensation and audit committee characteristics, along with indicators of corporate governance, auditor incentives, and company characteristics. Data Availability: Data used in the study are available from public sources

Who's Really in Charge? Audit Committee versus CFO Power and Audit Fees

2014 ◽  
Vol 89 (6) ◽  
pp. 2057-2085 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Beck ◽  
Elaine G. Mauldin
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Economic Recession ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Negotiation Process ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Exogenous Shock ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
Recent Financial Crisis

ABSTRACT Although regulation makes audit committees responsible for determining and negotiating audit fees, researchers and practitioners express concerns that CFOs continue to control these negotiations. Thus, regulation may give investors a false sense of security regarding auditor independence. We utilize the recent financial crisis and economic recession as an exogenous shock that allows us to shed light on the relative influence of the audit committee and the CFO on fee negotiations. During the recession, we find larger fee reductions in the presence of more powerful CFOs, and smaller fee reductions in the presence of more powerful audit committees. We also find the CFO or the audit committee primarily influences fees when their counterpart is less powerful. Our findings suggest a more complex relationship between the CFO and the audit committee than current regulations recognize and cast doubt on the ability of regulation to force one structure on the negotiation process. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the text.

scholarly journals Do Gender Diversity Recommendations in Corporate Governance Codes Matter? Evidence from Audit Committees

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-197 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigar Sultana ◽  
Steven F. Cahan ◽  
Asheq Rahman
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Women Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Codes ◽  
Limited Supply ◽  
The Impact

SUMMARY Motivated by two opposing views, the limited supply view and the discrimination view, we examine the impact of gender diversity guidelines on the strength of the association between the presence of female audit committee members and audit quality. The limited supply view predicts that the effect of female audit committee members on audit quality would decrease after the guidelines were issued because they increased the demand for women directors without a commensurate increase in the supply of qualified women directors. The discrimination view predicts this relation would increase after the guidelines were issued since some firms would have abandoned their suboptimal hiring practices that favored men over better qualified women, resulting in higher quality firm-director matches as opportunities for women increase. Consistent with the limited supply view, we find that the positive association between audit committee gender diversity and audit quality weakened after gender diversity guidelines were introduced in Australia. JEL Classifications: G38; M42; M48. Data Availability: Data are available from the databases cited in the text.

Do Former Audit Firm Partners on Audit Committees Procure Greater Nonaudit Services from the Auditor?

2012 ◽  
Vol 88 (1) ◽  
pp. 297-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vic Naiker ◽  
Divesh S. Sharma ◽  
Vineeta D. Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Corporate Boards ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Nonaudit Services

ABSTRACT: To address potential threats to auditor independence, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) requires the audit committee to pre-approve nonaudit services (NAS) procured from the auditor. However, the presence of a former audit firm partner (FAP) affiliated with the current auditor on the audit committee could undermine the audit committee's due diligence over the NAS pre-approval process. To alleviate such concerns, the Securities and Exchange Commission approved a three-year “cooling-off” period for appointing audit firm alumni as independent directors. Our analyses show that the presence of both affiliated and unaffiliated FAPs on audit committees does not lead to greater NAS procured from the auditor; rather, FAPs reduce NAS procured from the auditor. Moreover, NAS decline significantly following the appointment of FAPs to the audit committee. Further tests suggest the three-year cooling-off period may not be warranted and deserves further investigation. Our study raises important implications for regulators, policy makers, corporate boards, and future research. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.

The Impact on Auditor Judgments of CEO Influence on Audit Committee Independence

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 129-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey R. Cohen ◽  
Lisa Milici Gaynor ◽  
Ganesh Krishnamoorthy ◽  
Arnold M. Wright
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Undue Influence ◽  
Management Incentives ◽  
Auditor Judgments ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Selection Of

SUMMARY Despite the importance of audit committee independence in ensuring the integrity of the financial reporting process, recent research suggests that even when audit committees meet regulatory independence requirements, certain factors, such as undue influence by the CEO over the selection of the audit committee, may diminish the ability of its members to be substantively independent. This study investigates whether auditors consider CEO influence over audit committee independence when making audit judgments where management's incentives to manage earnings differ. In an experiment, we find that audit partners and managers waive a larger amount of a proposed audit adjustment when management's incentives for earnings management are low than when incentives are high. However, when management incentives are high, auditors are less likely to waive as much of an adjustment when the CEO has less influence over the audit committee's independence than when the CEO's influence is greater. In all, the results support our expectations that auditors consider CEO influence on audit committee independence in the resolution of contentious accounting issues. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

The Impact of Audit Committee Information Technology Expertise on the Reliability and Timeliness of Financial Reporting

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (5) ◽  
pp. 23-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Musaib Ashraf ◽  
Paul N. Michas ◽  
Dan Russomanno
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Other Information ◽  
High Quality Information ◽  
The Impact

ABSTRACT We examine whether information technology expertise on audit committees impacts the reliability and timeliness of financial reporting. We find a reduction in the likelihood of material restatement, a reduction in the likelihood of information technology-related material weaknesses (which account for 55 percent of all reported material weaknesses), and more timely earnings announcements at firms with audit committee information technology expertise. These findings are robust to controlling for a firm's other information technology attributes, as well as when using entropy balanced samples, and we mitigate endogeneity concerns with evidence that our findings hold in a subsample of firms that all possess overall high-quality information technology. Finally, a difference-in-differences analysis, inclusion of firm fixed effects, and a falsification test largely support our assertion that the quality of financial reporting is significantly improved by the presence of an audit committee information technology expert. JEL Classifications: M41; M15. Data Availability: All data used in the study are publicly available.

The Influence of Audit Committee Expertise on Firms' Internal Controls: Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 193-211
Author(s):  
Mikhail Sterin
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
First Year ◽  
Opt Out ◽  
Indirect Path ◽  
Control Decision

SYNOPSIS This study examines how audit committee expertise influences firms' key internal control scoping decisions. Using a unique merger and acquisition (M&A) setting where the internal control audit is voluntary, I study whether audit committee expertise is associated with the deferral of internal control testing for acquired firms. I also examine whether this internal control decision provides a channel through which audit committee expertise leads to positive financial reporting outcomes. I find that audit committees with greater specialized expertise (industry and legal) are less likely to opt-out of first-year target internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) integration. In my second analysis, I find that target ICFR integration provides an indirect path through which industry and legal expertise reduce the likelihood of misstatement. This study contributes to the audit committee and internal controls literature by providing evidence on audit committee influence over firms' internal control decisions and related financial reporting outcomes. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; M48. Data Availability: The data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.

An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Accounting Expertise in Audit Committees on Non-GAAP Earnings Exclusions

2013 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ananth Seetharaman ◽  
Xu (Frank) Wang ◽  
Sanjian (Bill) Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Financial Information ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Stock Exchanges ◽  
Financial Measures ◽  
Accounting Expertise ◽  
Jel Classifications

SYNOPSIS U.S. stock exchanges and lawmakers rely on audit committees to help safeguard the accuracy and reliability of corporate GAAP and non-GAAP financial information. However, there are gaps in our knowledge of how audit committees perform, especially with respect to companies' non-GAAP financial information. Unlike companies' GAAP-based financial measures, non-GAAP numbers are voluntary, not well defined, and unaudited. Non-GAAP measures thus provide a particularly rich setting to examine the efficacy of audit committee performance. In this study we examine the association between audit committee appointments of accounting experts (relative to appointments of nonaccounting experts) and the company's non-GAAP earnings numbers. We find a larger decline in non-GAAP earnings exclusions following the appointment of accounting (rather than nonaccounting) experts to audit committees. We also find that accounting experts are associated with higher-quality post-appointment non-GAAP earnings exclusions. JEL Classifications: M4; G30. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources indicated in the paper.

Board Risk Committees and Audit Pricing

2015 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 59-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher S. Hines ◽  
Adi Masli ◽  
Elaine G. Mauldin ◽  
Gary F. Peters
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Wall Street ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Risk Oversight

SUMMARY Conditions leading up to and surrounding the global financial crisis prompted an increasing number of firms to create board-level risk oversight committees (RCs). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (U.S. House of Representatives 2010) even legislates RCs for certain large banks. Distinct from audit committees, RCs present a unique setting to extend our understanding of the relation between emerging governance mechanisms and auditing. Using a sample of 3,980 U.S.-listed banks from 2003–2011, we find that on average, the presence of RCs is associated with higher audit fees. Our results are robust to multiple specifications, including self-selection and propensity score matched samples. For a reduced sample of 458 firms that employ an RC we also examine RC characteristics. We find RC independence and audit committee overlaps are associated with lower audit fees and RC size, relative to board size, is associated with higher audit fees. Supplemental analysis provides discussion of the potential audit environment implications of mandatory versus voluntary risk management controls. Data Availability: The data used are publicly available from the sources cited in the text.

scholarly journals AUDIT QUALITY, AUDIT COMMITTEE, INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR ON EARNING MANAGEMENT

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-50
Author(s):  
Ni Putu Desy Cristiana Yanthi ◽  
Dudi Pratomo ◽  
Kurnia Kurnia
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Earning Management ◽  
Independent Director ◽  
Observation Data ◽  
Manufacturing Companies ◽  
Quality Audit

This study aims to analyze audit quality, audit committees, institutional ownership and independent director on earnings management at manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2012-2016. The sampling method use purposive sampling for 5 years so its obtained 160 observation data samples. The results in this study indicate that earnings management that occur is the type of income decreasing. Simultaneously audit quality, audit committee, institutional ownership and independent directors significantly influence on income decreasing. Partially, audit quality and independent director variables have a negative effect on income decreasing. While audit committee independence has a positive effect on income decreasing. Furthermore, audit quality, audit committees, and institutional ownership have no effect on earning management type income decreasing.

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