Do Investors' Perceptions Vary with Types of Nonaudit Fees? Evidence from Auditor Ratification Voting

2005 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 9-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suchismita Mishra ◽  
K. Raghunandan ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Support ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
The Other ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Single Measure ◽  
Nonaudit Services ◽  
Recent Initiative

In FRR No. 68, the SEC (2003b) updated the rules related to the disclosure of fees paid to the independent auditor by requiring more detailed information about nonaudit fees. The SEC (2002, 2003b) asserted that the partition of nonaudit fees into the categories of audit-related, tax, and other fees would be useful for investors in assessing the auditor's independence and in voting on ratifying the auditor. The SEC suggested that investors would view audit-related and tax services more favorably than “other” nonaudit services. In this paper we test the SEC's assertions by examining shareholder ratification votes, during 2003, at 248 of the S&P 1500 firms. Our results support the SEC's assertion that investors would view audit-related fees differently than the other two types of nonaudit fees. However, contrary to the SEC's assertion, both the tax fee ratio and the other fee ratio have a positive association with the proportion of votes against auditor ratification. The results related to tax fees provide empirical support to the PCAOB's recent initiative to examine the association between tax services and auditor independence. Our results can be useful for client managements and audit committees considering purchases of nonaudit services from auditors. Our findings also suggest that it may be useful to replicate some prior studies (that use a single measure of nonaudit fees) using the newer, more finely partitioned, fee data.

Audit and Nonaudit Fees and the Market's Reaction to Earnings Announcements

2006 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia L. Higgs ◽  
Terrance R. Skantz
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Earnings Announcements ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Continuous Variable ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Negative Association ◽  
Forecast Errors ◽  
Unexpected Earnings ◽  
Nonaudit Services

Effective February 05, 2001, publicly traded companies are required to disclose audit and nonaudit fees paid to their external auditors. These fee data have been used to test whether auditor independence is impaired when the external auditor provides nonaudit services to a client, usually by examining whether certain earnings characteristics are related to nonaudit fees in ways that suggest impairment. This paper follows in that tradition by testing whether the earnings response coefficient (ERC), a proxy for earnings quality, is associated with engagement profitability. Residual fees derived from a two-stage regression model that prices audit and nonaudit services simultaneously are used to proxy for engagement profitability. If the market perceives abnormally profitable engagements as a threat to auditor independence, then we would expect the ERC to be lower for firms with positive fee residuals. The paper examines the residual fee-ERC relation for annual earnings announcements immediately before and after first-time fee disclosure. We report results for alternative measures of unexpected earnings (I/B/E/S forecast errors and deviations from a seasonal random walk), different formulations of residual fees (as a dichotomous and continuous variable) and different samples. For total fees and audit fees, there is a positive association between ERCs and the level of residual fees. For nonaudit fees, there is only one combination of unexpected earnings and residual fee formulation where we observe a significantly negative association between ERCs and residual fees. The findings for audit fees are consistent with a market that interprets abnormally high audit fees as a signal of a firm's commitment to high earnings quality. The restrictive conditions under which we find a negative association between nonaudit fees and ERCs provide limited support for the contention that perceived auditor independence is impaired by abnormally high nonaudit fees.

Do Former Audit Firm Partners on Audit Committees Procure Greater Nonaudit Services from the Auditor?

2012 ◽  
Vol 88 (1) ◽  
pp. 297-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vic Naiker ◽  
Divesh S. Sharma ◽  
Vineeta D. Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Corporate Boards ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Nonaudit Services

ABSTRACT: To address potential threats to auditor independence, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) requires the audit committee to pre-approve nonaudit services (NAS) procured from the auditor. However, the presence of a former audit firm partner (FAP) affiliated with the current auditor on the audit committee could undermine the audit committee's due diligence over the NAS pre-approval process. To alleviate such concerns, the Securities and Exchange Commission approved a three-year “cooling-off” period for appointing audit firm alumni as independent directors. Our analyses show that the presence of both affiliated and unaffiliated FAPs on audit committees does not lead to greater NAS procured from the auditor; rather, FAPs reduce NAS procured from the auditor. Moreover, NAS decline significantly following the appointment of FAPs to the audit committee. Further tests suggest the three-year cooling-off period may not be warranted and deserves further investigation. Our study raises important implications for regulators, policy makers, corporate boards, and future research. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.

Client Importance and Earnings Management: The Moderating Role of Audit Committees

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 125-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vineeta D. Sharma ◽  
Divesh S. Sharma ◽  
Umapathy Ananthanarayanan
Keyword(s):  
Best Practices ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Economic Importance ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Inside Ownership

SUMMARY This study provides empirical evidence on how the association between the economic importance of a client to the auditor and earnings management is moderated by the audit committee. We employ city office-level client importance fee-based measures, both performance-adjusted discretionary total and current accruals as proxies for earnings management, and a measure of audit committee best practices. We document a positive association between client importance and our two proxies for earnings management. This association is stronger for income-increasing earnings management. However, the association between client importance and earnings management is more pronounced when the audit committee does not meet best practices. We infer that the economic importance of a client appears to threaten auditor independence and thus the quality of financial reporting, but only when the audit committee exhibits characteristics associated with the provision of weak oversight. We also find that the association between client importance and earnings management is conditional on inside ownership, growth, leverage, and firm size, which are moderated by the audit committee. This study is the first to demonstrate that audit committees can moderate threats to auditor independence thus protecting the quality of financial reporting. The study discusses potential implications for policy making and empirical research.

The Effects of Joint Provision and Disclosure of Nonaudit Services on Audit Committee Members' Decisions and Investors' Preferences

2006 ◽  
Vol 81 (4) ◽  
pp. 873-879 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Milici Gaynor ◽  
Linda S. McDaniel ◽  
Terry L. Neal
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Disclosure Requirement ◽  
Nonaudit Services ◽  
Public Disclosures ◽  
Joint Provision ◽  
Corporate Governance Reforms ◽  
Governance Reforms

Recent corporate governance reforms that require audit committees to pre-approve audit and nonaudit services increase audit committees' accountability to third parties for actual auditor independence and audit quality. Other SEC reforms mandate the disclosure of fees for auditor-provided services and are aimed at influencing investors' perceptions of auditor independence. These fee disclosures also reveal audit committees' pre-approval decisions, enhancing public accountability. Thus, audit committees may be less willing to hire auditors for nonaudit services to avoid fee disclosures, even when joint provision improves audit quality. One hundred experienced corporate directors, responding as audit committee members or investors, participated in an experiment in which we manipulated the effect of the auditor's provision of nonaudit services on audit quality and the fee disclosure requirement. We find that audit committee members are more likely to recommend joint provision if audit quality improves, consistent with investors' preferences. However, unlike investors, committee members are more reluctant to recommend joint provision when public disclosures are required, even at the expense of audit quality. These findings offer evidence about an indirect effect of recent reforms.

Audit Committee Composition and Shareholder Actions: Evidence from Voting on Auditor Ratification

2003 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Raghunandan ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Client Relationships ◽  
Audit Performance

Recent actions related to audit committees by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reflect the Commission's belief that the composition of audit committees can influence the monitoring of auditor-client relationships, and thereby influence shareholder perceptions about auditor independence and overall audit performance. The SEC has also suggested that shareholder perceptions about the auditor will influence shareholder actions, including voting on ratifying the auditor selected by management. This paper examines the association between audit committee composition and shareholder actions, using auditor ratification data from 199 companies. The results indicate that, in companies with high nonaudit fee ratios, shareholders are less likely to vote against auditor ratification if the audit committee has solely independent directors. These results provide empirical support to the assertions of the SEC and others that audit committee composition can impact investors' perceptions and actions. However, the low percent of votes against auditor ratification indicates that the results must be interpreted with caution.

Nonaudit Services and Earnings Management in the Pre-SOX and Post-SOX Eras

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 103-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jayanthi Krishnan ◽  
Lixin (Nancy) Su ◽  
Yinqi Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Significant Decline ◽  
Subsequent Reduction ◽  
Economic Dependence ◽  
Nonaudit Services ◽  
The Impact

SUMMARY Concerns about the impact of auditor-provided nonaudit services (NAS) on auditor independence arise because of (1) auditors' economic dependence on their clients, and (2) some specific types of NAS which the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) argues can harm auditor objectivity. The SEC's prohibition in 2003 of specific kinds of NAS led to a significant decline in NAS between 2000–2001 and 2004–2005. We argue that this decline in observed NAS fees can be used to identify firms that had a greater likelihood of impaired auditor independence in the pre-SOX period. Using discretionary accruals to proxy for earnings management, we find a positive association between discretionary accruals in the pre-SOX era and the subsequent reduction in NAS, but this was confined to income-decreasing accruals. Further, the association between downward earnings management and the decline in NAS was reduced in the post-SOX era.

Nonaudit Services and Shareholder Ratification of Auditors

2003 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Raghunandan
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Support ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Large Majority ◽  
Fortune 1000 ◽  
External Auditor ◽  
Nonaudit Services ◽  
Voting Decisions

The SEC changed its rules recently and required companies to disclose information about audit and nonaudit fees, asserting that such data would be useful for shareholders in making their investment and voting decisions. An analysis of shareholder votes at 172 of the Fortune 1000 companies indicates that the proportion of shareholders voting against or abstaining from ratification of the external auditor is positively associated with the level of the nonaudit fee ratio. The results provide empirical support to the SEC's assertion that disclosure of fees paid to the auditor can influence shareholders' voting decisions. However, even in companies with very large nonaudit fee ratios (exceeding 4.0), the average shareholder ratification rate was about 97 percent. This suggests that a large majority of shareholders did not perceive auditor independence to be impaired, even in the presence of relatively high nonaudit fees.

Auditor Independence in the United States: Cornerstone of the Profession or Thorn in Our Side?

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 145-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryan K. Church ◽  
J. Gregory Jenkins ◽  
Jonathan D. Stanley
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
The United States ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Systematic Evaluation ◽  
Client Relationships ◽  
Reporting Process ◽  
Regulatory Approach

SYNOPSIS The objective of this paper is to provide a systematic evaluation of independence as a foundational element of the auditing profession. We maintain that while independence is a theoretically appealing construct, it is fraught with practical problems surrounding its implementation, monitoring, and regulation. We analyze the current oversight of auditor independence and evaluate the need for auditor independence from the perspective of information users and information producers. In the process, we discuss important implications and intractable challenges that affect one or more parties involved in the financial-reporting process. Finally, we carefully evaluate alternatives to the current regulatory approach for managing auditor independence (i.e., proscribing various auditor-client relationships). We conclude that increasing audit committees' responsibilities for monitoring the auditor's independence—along with additional disclosure about threats and safeguards to auditor independence—is worthy of further consideration and debate as a path toward addressing the auditor independence conundrum.

Does AICPA Accreditation of Nonaudit Services Add Value? The Case of Personal Financial Planning

2000 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Shawn Mauldin ◽  
Mark Wilder ◽  
Morris H. Stocks
Keyword(s):  
Financial Planning ◽  
The Other ◽  
Differential Effects ◽  
Relative Value ◽  
Professional Attributes ◽  
Financial Planners ◽  
The Future ◽  
Financial Planner ◽  
Nonaudit Services ◽  
Personal Financial Planning

The AICPA has taken the position that accreditation of CPAs in specific areas of practice is an important aspect of repositioning the CPA profession for the future. The AICPA currently offers two designations exclusively to CPAs, one of which is the Personal Financial Specialist (PFS) designation. However, the issue of accrediting CPAs by granting official AICPA designations is a complex and highly debated issue with opposing sides having compelling arguments supporting their positions. CPAs and other professionals specializing in personal financial planning have opportunities to obtain designations other than the PFS. This paper examines the relative value of these alternative options for financial planners. Specifically, the research was designed to examine the differential effects of alternative financial-planning accreditations on users' perceptions. These perceptions relate to various professional attributes of a financial planner such as their knowledge and expertise, objectivity, and level of trust and ethics possessed. In addition, these perceptions relate to fees charged and the influence that the designation has on the public's choice of a financial planner. Our results indicate that the CPA designation used in conjunction with the PFS designation is generally perceived to signal a higher level of professional attributes than the other designations examined in the study. In addition, a CPA with a PFS designation has a significantly greater influence on the public's choice of a financial planner than do the other designations. These results suggest that important benefits may accrue to CPAs from holding the PFS specialty accreditation.

Audit Committee Incentives and the Resolution of Detected Misstatements

2015 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 109-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marsha B. Keune ◽  
Karla M. Johnstone
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Analyst Forecast ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Option Compensation ◽  
Stock Option Compensation

SUMMARY We investigate the role of audit committee economic incentives in judgments involving the resolution of detected misstatements. The results reveal a positive association between audit committee short-term stock option compensation and the likelihood that managers are allowed to waive income-decreasing misstatements that, if corrected, would have caused the company to miss its analyst forecast. Complementary results reveal a positive association between the audit committee long-term stock option compensation and the likelihood that managers are allowed to waive income-increasing misstatements when the company reports just missing, meeting, or beating its analyst forecast. These findings illustrate agency conflicts that can arise when compensating audit committees with options. We obtain these results while controlling for CEO option compensation and audit committee characteristics, along with indicators of corporate governance, auditor incentives, and company characteristics. Data Availability: Data used in the study are available from public sources

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