scholarly journals An Experimental Investigation of Risk Sharing and Adverse Selection

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franziska Tausch ◽  
Johannes (Jan) J. M. Potters ◽  
Arno Riedl
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Investigation ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Risk Sharing

scholarly journals An experimental investigation of risk sharing and adverse selection

2014 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franziska Tausch ◽  
Jan Potters ◽  
Arno Riedl
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Investigation ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Risk Sharing

scholarly journals An Experimental Investigation of Risk Sharing and Adverse Selection

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franziska Tausch ◽  
Johannes (Jan) J. M. Potters ◽  
Arno M. Riedl
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Investigation ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Risk Sharing

Risk sharing, adverse selection and market structure

1997 ◽  
pp. 1-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Biais ◽  
Jean Charles Rochet
Keyword(s):  
Market Structure ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Risk Sharing

scholarly journals Adverse Selection in Health Insurance

1998 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Cutler ◽  
Richard J. Zeckhauser
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Risk Adjustment ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Harvard University ◽  
Individual Choice ◽  
Insurance Policies ◽  
Efficiency Losses ◽  
Group Insurance ◽  
State And Local

Individual choice among health insurance policies may result in risk-based sorting across plans. Such adverse selection induces three types of losses: efficiency losses from individuals' being allocated to the wrong plans; risk-sharing losses, because premium variability is increased; and losses from insurers' distorting their policies to improve their mix of insureds. We discuss the potential for these losses and present empirical evidence on adverse selection in two groups of employees: Harvard University and the Group Insurance Commission of Massachusetts (serving state and local employees). In both groups, adverse selection is a signiacant concern. Harvard’s decision to contribute an equal amount to all insurance plans led to the disappearance of the most generous policy within three years. The Group Insurance Commission has contained adverse selection by subsidizing premiums proportionally and managing the most generous policy very tightly. A combination of prospective or retrospective risk adjustment, coupled with reinsurance for high-cost cases, seems promising as a way to provide appropriate incentives for enrollees and to reduce losses from adverse selection.

Overcoming Discount Window Stigma: An Experimental Investigation

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (12) ◽  
pp. 5630-5659 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Armantier ◽  
Charles A Holt
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Investigation ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Coordination Game ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
Discount Window

Abstract A core responsibility of the Federal Reserve is to ensure financial stability by acting as the “lender of last resort” through its discount window (DW). Historically, however, the DW has not been effective because its usage is stigmatized. In this paper, we develop a coordination game with adverse selection, and we test in the lab policies that have been proposed to mitigate DW stigma. We find that lowering the DW cost and making DW borrowing difficult to detect are ineffective, but regular random DW borrowing can overcome DW stigma. Implications for other forms of stigma in finance are discussed.

scholarly journals Optimal risk-sharing under adverse selection and imperfect risk perception

2005 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 955-978 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnold Chassagnon ◽  
Bertrand Villeneuve
Keyword(s):  
Risk Perception ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Optimal Risk Sharing

scholarly journals Agency theory problems behind the fall of shopping centers

2013 ◽  
pp. 54-68
Author(s):  
Melinda Reikli
Keyword(s):  
Agency Theory ◽  
Present Article ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Shopping Center ◽  
Economic Downturn ◽  
Shopping Centers ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Know How ◽  
Selection Problems

The present article assesses agency theory related problems contributing to the fall of shopping centers. The negative effects of the financial and economic downturn started in 2008 were accentuated in emerging markets like Romania. Several shopping centers were closed or sold through bankruptcy proceedings or forced execution. These failed shopping centers, 10 in number, were selected in order to assess agency theory problems contributing to the failure of shopping centers; as research method qualitative multiple cases-studies is used. Results suggest, that in all of the cases the risk adverse behavior of the External Investor- Principal, lead to risk sharing problems and subsequently to the fall of the shopping centers. In some of the cases Moral Hazard (lack of Developer-Agent’s know-how and experience) as well as Adverse Selection problems could be identified. The novelty of the topic for the shopping center industry and the empirical evidences confer a significant academic and practical value to the present article.

From ex ante to ex post risk sharing: cost-effectiveness, unfairness and adverse selection in mutual aid

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ze Chen ◽  
Runhuan Feng ◽  
Li Wei ◽  
Jiaqi Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Cost Effectiveness ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Mutual Aid ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante

scholarly journals Adverse Selection, Risk Sharing and Business Cycles

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcelo Veracierto
Keyword(s):  
Business Cycles ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Risk Sharing

Adverse Selection With Frequency and Severity Risk: Alternative Risk-Sharing Provisions

2008 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 825-846 ◽  
Author(s):  
James A. Ligon ◽  
Paul D. Thistle
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Risk Sharing
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