2013 State of the Law Regarding Internet Intermediary Liability for User-Generated Content

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine R. Gellis
Author(s):  
Dan Jerker B. Svantesson

This chapter seeks to set the scene and make some proposals for how we may make progress in the field of internet jurisdiction. For this purpose, the chapter will focus on three examples where the matter of internet jurisdiction is a major concern for internet intermediaries. The first relates to the validity of the terms of service that internet intermediaries typically impose on their users, and which typically contain important provisions regarding jurisdiction and applicable law. The second example relates to situations in which law enforcement agencies seek access to user data held by internet intermediaries. Such situations give rise to important matters of jurisdiction, not only where the requesting law enforcement agency and the internet intermediary are based in different countries, but may also—as was illustrated in the well-known Microsoft Warrant case—give rise to such issues where the requested data is stored outside the country in which both the law enforcement agency and the internet intermediary are based. The third example relates to the matter of geographical scope where an internet intermediary is required to remove, block, take down, delist, de-index, or de-reference content.


Author(s):  
Luiz Fernando Marrey Moncau ◽  
Diego Werneck Arguelhes

Between 2009 and 2014, Brazilian civil society groups and government engaged with and ultimately approved the Marco Civil da Internet (Civil Rights Framework for the Internet). The MCI, which has been considered by some as a ‘Constitution of the Internet’ or as an ‘Internet Bill of Rights’, created a broad set of principles and norms, as well as specific rules, that articulate rights and limitations on the exercise of power on the internet. But how does the MCI measure against the backdrop of global debates on digital constitutionalism? To what extent and in what ways can the enactment of the MCI be considered a landmark for the constitutionalization of the digital environment? This chapter, in order to address those questions, will review the intermediary liability regime before the MCI, the process of approval of the MCI, and how the law is being implemented in practice. Finally, it will analyse the MCI in the light of digital constitutionalism theories.


Author(s):  
Michael W. Carroll

Creating music often involves borrowing from preexisting sources. Copyright law applies to a range of common borrowing practices including sampling, remixing, linking, and creating user-generated content for online platforms. When analyzing musical borrowing, it is important to first establish what aspects of musical creativity copyright does and does not protect. A series of cases illustrate when the law identifies borrowing of unprotected aspects of prior works, such as musical ideas, common melodic sequences, and chord progressions. Other cases illustrate how the law also permits some borrowing of protected expression if the borrowing is fair use. Digital technology facilitates musical borrowing, and certain online practices such as posting hyperlinks to other musical sources are permitted unless the person posting the links knows that the link leads to infringing material, intends to encourage others to infringe or meets other requirements for secondary liability for copyright infringement.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J Madison

This Article addresses conservation, preservation, and stewardship of knowledge, and laws and institutions in the cultural environment that support those things. Legal and policy questions concerning creativity and innovation usually focus on producing new knowledge and offering access to it. Equivalent attention rarely is paid to questions of old knowledge. To what extent should the law, and particularly intellectual property law, focus on the durability of information and knowledge? To what extent does the law do so already, and to what effect? This article begins to explore those questions. Along the way, the article takes up distinctions among different types of creativity and knowledge, from scholarship and research to commercial entertainment and so-called “User Generated Content”; distinctions among objects, works of authorship, and legal rights accompanying both; distinctions among creations built to last (sometimes called “sustained” works), creations built for speed (including “ephemeral” works), and creations barely built at all (works closely tied to the authorial “self”); and distinctions between analog and digital contexts.


Legal Studies ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 348-368 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Oster

The legal framework concerning liability of communication intermediaries for defamation is under-conceptualised. The paper thus develops a holistic doctrinal approach to liability of speech intermediaries, such as Internet service providers (ISPs), booksellers and newspaper vendors, for defamation. It views intermediary liability for defamatory speech against the backdrop of communication theory and freedom of expression doctrine. If properly conceptualised, as suggested in this paper, the law of defamation can accommodate the cyberspace-specific legislation in Arts 12–15 of the e-commerce Directive and s 5 of the Defamation Act 2013, as well as the innocent dissemination defence in s 1 of the Defamation Act 1996, now to be read together with s 10 of the Defamation Act 2013. The paper establishes six tenets of intermediary liability for defamatory content. In particular, it argues that ‘publication’ is to be conceptualised as a merely factual requirement for defamation, whereas the defence of ‘innocent publication’, also known as ‘innocent dissemination’, is a fault-based concept. Communication intermediaries are thus to be considered ‘publishers’, even if they have a merely automatic role in the publication process, but they may avail themselves of the defence of ‘innocent publication’. This defence has to be applied in compliance with the human rights of the parties involved.


2007 ◽  
Vol 2 (5) ◽  
pp. 338-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Holmes ◽  
P. Ganley

2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 72-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paula Leslie ◽  
Mary Casper

“My patient refuses thickened liquids, should I discharge them from my caseload?” A version of this question appears at least weekly on the American Speech-Language-Hearing Association's Community pages. People talk of respecting the patient's right to be non-compliant with speech-language pathology recommendations. We challenge use of the word “respect” and calling a patient “non-compliant” in the same sentence: does use of the latter term preclude the former? In this article we will share our reflections on why we are interested in these so called “ethical challenges” from a personal case level to what our professional duty requires of us. Our proposal is that the problems that we encounter are less to do with ethical or moral puzzles and usually due to inadequate communication. We will outline resources that clinicians may use to support their work from what seems to be a straightforward case to those that are mired in complexity. And we will tackle fears and facts regarding litigation and the law.


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