On Climate Change and Cyber Attacks: Leveraging Polycentric Governance to Mitigate Global Collective Action Problems

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Shackelford
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Polycentric Governance ◽  
Collective Action Problems

scholarly journals Influencing Attitudes and Preferences Toward Climate Change using a Multi-Player, Transportation Themed Board Game

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandra Xiaoyi Kjorven
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Board Game ◽  
Life Choices ◽  
Board Games ◽  
Effective Combination ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Game Board

Traditional tabletop board games have soared in popularity in recent years, and used often as tools for education and entertainment. Board games are an especially engaging format for studying themes of collective-action problem solving. This study looks at one of the most complex collective-action problems of this generation, climate change, and evaluates how individual attitudes and preferences may be altered by playing a board game specifically designed to influence how people relate to an issue. The board game Wheels was introduced and taught to 18 participants, who engaged in five separate playtesting sessions where observation, survey and interview data were collected. The study evaluates participants' attitudes and preferences toward certain transportation and climate change topics before and after playing the game. The game showed promise in changing players' preferences toward certain modes of transportation - increasing preferences toward electric vehicles and cycling, and decreasing preference towards gas powered cars. These findings indicate that the effective combination of select climate change game mechanics in a highly personalized theme may produce an engaging and entertaining experience that has the potential to transcend the game board and impact players' outlook upon real life choices.

scholarly journals Return to the Isle of Ted: Simulating the Collective Action Problem of Climate Change

2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 547-555
Author(s):  
Jocelyn Sage Mitchell
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Active Learning ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Common Pool Resource ◽  
Global Inequality ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Unequal Distribution ◽  
Road Map ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
The Commons

ABSTRACTThis article modifies the classic “Isle of Ted” simulation to teach students about the collective action problems associated with climate change. Modifications include the introduction of a common-pool resource (i.e., fish) and increased pirate attacks to model rising climate threats and unequal distribution of risk. A return to the Isle of Ted enables a deeper engagement with specific collective action problems of climate change, including the tragedy of the commons and issues of global inequality. This article provides a road map for the incorporation of this modified simulation into active-learning classrooms.

Motivating a “Thinkable Politics”

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-181
Author(s):  
Tim Christion ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Cultural Barriers ◽  
Class Consciousness ◽  
Climate Response ◽  
The Social ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Climate Action ◽  
Dialectical Phenomenology

Climate change is one of the greatest collective action problems ever faced. The social and cultural barriers to intersubjectively motivating concern and agency are sweeping. It seems all but impossible to imagine politically viable solutions commensurate with the realities of the problem, and likewise find visionary ways of framing this problem to inspire meaningful solutions. One therefore perceives an abyss between ‘problem’ and ‘solution,’ as expressed in irreconcilable debates between problem-driven and solution-driven strategies for motivating climate action. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s dialectical phenomenology of motivation and class consciousness in particular, I argue that his call for a “thinkable politics” can help activists bring problem-driven and solution-driven motives for climate response into productive relation.

scholarly journals Influencing Attitudes and Preferences Toward Climate Change using a Multi-Player, Transportation Themed Board Game

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandra Xiaoyi Kjorven
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Board Game ◽  
Life Choices ◽  
Board Games ◽  
Effective Combination ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Game Board

Traditional tabletop board games have soared in popularity in recent years, and used often as tools for education and entertainment. Board games are an especially engaging format for studying themes of collective-action problem solving. This study looks at one of the most complex collective-action problems of this generation, climate change, and evaluates how individual attitudes and preferences may be altered by playing a board game specifically designed to influence how people relate to an issue. The board game Wheels was introduced and taught to 18 participants, who engaged in five separate playtesting sessions where observation, survey and interview data were collected. The study evaluates participants' attitudes and preferences toward certain transportation and climate change topics before and after playing the game. The game showed promise in changing players' preferences toward certain modes of transportation - increasing preferences toward electric vehicles and cycling, and decreasing preference towards gas powered cars. These findings indicate that the effective combination of select climate change game mechanics in a highly personalized theme may produce an engaging and entertaining experience that has the potential to transcend the game board and impact players' outlook upon real life choices.

scholarly journals Can Dangerous Climate Change Be Avoided?

1970 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Darrel Moellendorf
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Climate Change Policy ◽  
Economic Research ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Change Policy ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Procedural Safeguard ◽  
Dangerous Climate Change ◽  
The Right

This article discusses obstacles to overcoming dangerous climate change. It employs an account of dangerous climate change that takes climate change and climate change policy as dangerous if it imposes avoidable costs of poverty prolongation. It then examines plausible accounts of the collective action problems that seem to explain the lack of ambition to mitigate. After criticizing the merits of two proposals to overcome these problems, it discusses the pledge and review process. It argues that pledge and review possesses the virtues of encouraging broad participation and of providing a procedural safeguard for the right of sustainable development. However, given the perceptions of the marginal short term costs of mitigation, pledge and review is unlikely, at least initially, to issue in an agreement to make deep reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Because there is no rival approach that seems likely to better instantiate the two virtues, pledge and review may be the best available policy for mitigation. Moreover, recent economic research suggests that the co-benefits of mitigation may be greater than previously assumed and that the costs of renewable energy may be less than previously calculated. This would radically undermine claims that the short term mitigation costs necessarily render mitigation irrational and produce collective action problems. Given the circumstances, pledge and review might be our best hope to avoid dangerous climate change. 

scholarly journals Multilevel Environmental Governance in the European Union and United States

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Provost
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
United States ◽  
European Union ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Local Level ◽  
The United States ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Regulatory Policies ◽  
Regulatory Standards ◽  
Collective Action Problems

Managing the risks of climate change partly involves setting and implementing regulatory standards that help to diminish the causes of climate change. This means setting regulatory standards that require businesses to emit fewer pollutants, most notably carbon dioxide. In large federalist systems like the United States and the European Union, this regulation is produced by a variety of institutional structures and policy instruments as well. In the United States, federal regulations often encompass stricter standards with less flexibility; these standards have direct impacts on the relevant regulated interests, but they also influence the content and structure of non-governmental regulations, such as those promulgated by NGOs or industry trade associations. This influential “shadow of hierarchy” can be witnessed in both the U.S. and E.U. However, at a more local level, businesses and governments do not solely operate within the confines of strict, hierarchical regulation. Both sets of organizations join together horizontally to form compacts and regulatory networks that are often characterized more by guidance, soft law and collaborative efforts. While such institutions can be a welcome and effective complement to stricter, hierarchical regulation, such networks require high levels of trust and goal congruence to overcome the potential collective action problems that are inherently possible in such networks. Finally, the conditions under which networks and hierarchies both develop to construct environmental regulatory policies will depend on the dynamics of the policy process as well. Under ordinary circumstances, diverging preferences and collective action problems may create the foundation for more incremental and weaker regulatory standards, whereas an environmental disaster might create a groundswell of support for strict, judicially binding legislation. In this way, policy processes affect the structure of hierarchies and networks and ultimately the shape of regulations designed to mitigate the effects of climate change.

Individual Moral Responsibility and the Problem of Climate Change

2014 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Galvin ◽  
John R. Harris
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Anthropogenic Climate Change ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Moral Responsibilities

AbstractThe problems caused by anthropogenic climate change threaten the lives and well-being of millions, yet it seems that we, as individuals, are powerless to prevent or worsen these problems. In this essay we consider the difficulty of assigning moral responsibility in cases of collective action problems like the problem of anthropogentic climate change. We consider two promising solutions, the expected utility and rights based solution, and argue that both are incapable of explaining why individuals have moral obligations to address collective action problems. We believe, however, that this result does not justify inaction, instead it reveals a failure of moral philosophy to adequately address collective action problems. More work must be done to address the moral responsibilities that arise in cases of collective action problems and we close by pointing in the direction of some promising work in this area.

scholarly journals A polycentric approach for pandemic governance: nested externalities and co-production challenges

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Pablo Paniagua ◽  
Veeshan Rayamajhee
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Social Distancing ◽  
Institutional Conditions ◽  
Preventative Measures ◽  
Production Processes ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Micro Level ◽  
Different Levels

Abstract Political economists assume that global externalities, such as pandemics and climate change, require global or multi-national solutions. Yet, many aspects of these externalities can be addressed at the micro-level. As Elinor Ostrom pointed out, what scholars perceive as global externalities are in fact nested externalities that are organized in multiple, overlapping scales. By drawing on Ostrom's oeuvre, we explore the notions of nested externalities, polycentricity, and co-production in the context of pandemic governance. We highlight two crucial features of pandemics: first, preventative measures such as social distancing are co-production processes that cannot be provided by governments alone. Second, pandemics, much like climate change, pose nested externalities problems at different levels. Thus, pandemic externalities are better viewed as collective action problems arranged at multiple, nested, and/or overlapping scales. Finally, we propose an alternative institutional take that considers the nestedness of pandemic externalities and the diversity in institutional conditions across jurisdictions.

scholarly journals Norm-Based Governance for Severe Collective Action Problems: Lessons from Climate Change and COVID-19

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Leigh Raymond ◽  
Daniel Kelly ◽  
Erin P. Hennes
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Behavior Change ◽  
Global Climate ◽  
Individual Behavior ◽  
The Social ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Norm Internalization ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
Political Governance

The world has surpassed three million deaths from COVID-19, and faces potentially catastrophic tipping points in the global climate system. Despite the urgency, governments have struggled to address either problem. In this paper, we argue that COVID-19 and anthropogenic climate change (ACC) are critical examples of an emerging type of governance challenge: severe collective action problems that require significant individual behavior change under conditions of hyper-partisanship and scientific misinformation. Building on foundational political science work demonstrating the potential for norms (or informal rules of behavior) to solve collective action problems, we analyze more recent work on norms from neighboring disciplines to offer novel recommendations for more difficult challenges like COVID-19 and ACC. Key insights include more attention to 1) norm-based messaging strategies that appeal to individuals across the ideological spectrum or that reframe collective action as consistent with resistant subgroups’ pre-existing values, 2) messages that emphasize both the prevalence and the social desirability of individual behaviors required to address these challenges, 3) careful use of public policies and incentives that make individual behavior change easier without threatening norm internalization, and 4) greater attention to epistemic norms governing trust in different information sources. We conclude by pointing out that COVID-19 and climate change are likely harbingers of other polarized collective action problems that governments will face in the future. By connecting work on norms and political governance with a broader, interdisciplinary literature on norm psychology, motivation, and behavior change, we aim to improve the ability of political scientists and policymakers to respond to these and future collective action challenges.

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