Are Campus Sex Tribunals Fair?: The Need for Judicial Review and Additional Due Process in Light of New Case Law

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily D. Safko
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Carol Harlow ◽  
Richard Rawlings

In this chapter, we argue that administrative procedure has become a central organising concept for administrative law. Our first theme is the steady proceduralisation of public administration experienced in recent years, in the framework of a relationship between courts and administration which we present as a two-way, non-hierarchical process. We look first at internal drivers to proceduralisation emanating from administration, notably the managerial reforms of the 1980s and the rise of regulation as a standard governance technique. We then turn to the contemporary case law of judicial review, focussing on the judicial response to, and stimulus for, administrative proceduralism. Our second theme is the idea of procedures as a repository for values and of values as an important, though often subliminal, driver of administrative procedure. We look at the potential for exchange as well as dissonance between public administration and administrative law. Our third theme concerns challenges to administrative law from the technological revolution currently under way. The impact of automation on public administration was at first rather modest; today, however, technology is taking great leaps forward—from computerisation to artificial intelligence and beyond. The innovations have so far been welcomed as beneficial—faster and more consistent administration, swifter and less costly courts and tribunals. It is time to recognise that we are facing a paradigm change, in which key values and procedures of administrative law, such as transparency, accountability, individuation, and due process, will need to be supported and sustained.



2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuks Okpaluba

‘Accountability’ is one of the democratic values entrenched in the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. It is a value recognised throughout the Constitution and imposed upon the law-making organs of state, the Executive, the Judiciary and all public functionaries. This constitutional imperative is given pride of place among the other founding values: equality before the law, the rule of law and the supremacy of the Constitution. This study therefore sets out to investigate how the courts have grappled with the interpretation and application of the principle of accountability, the starting point being the relationship between accountability and judicial review. Therefore, in the exercise of its judicial review power, a court may enquire whether the failure of a public functionary to comply with a constitutional duty of accountability renders the decision made illegal, irrational or unreasonable. One of the many facets of the principle of accountability upon which this article dwells is to ascertain how the courts have deployed that expression in making the state and its agencies liable for the delictual wrongs committed against an individual in vindication of a breach of the individual’s constitutional right in the course of performing a public duty. Here, accountability and breach of public duty; the liability of the state for detaining illegal immigrants contrary to the prescripts of the law; the vicarious liability of the state for the criminal acts of the police and other law-enforcement officers (as in police rape cases and misuse of official firearms by police officers), and the liability of the state for delictual conduct in the context of public procurement are discussed. Having carefully analysed the available case law, this article concludes that no public functionary can brush aside the duty of accountability wherever it is imposed without being in breach of a vital constitutional mandate. Further, it is the constitutional duty of the courts, when called upon, to declare such act or conduct an infringement of the Constitution.



2014 ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Przemysław Florjanowicz-Błachut

The core function of the judiciary is the administration of justice through delivering judgments and other decisions. The crucial role for its acceptance and legitimization by not only lawyers, but also individulas (parties) and the hole society plays judicial reasoning. It should reflect on judge’s independence within the exercise of his office and show also judicial self-restraint or activism. The axiology and the standards of proper judicial reasoning are anchored both in constitutional and supranational law and case-law. Polish Constitutional Tribunal derives a duty to give reasoning from the right to a fair trial – right to be heard and bring own submissions before the court (Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution), the right to appeal against judgments and decisions made at first stage (Article 78), the rule of two stages of the court proceedings (Article 176) and rule of law clause (Article 2), that comprises inter alia right to due process of law and the rule of legitimate expactation / the protection of trust (Vertrauensschutz). European Court of Human Rights derives this duty to give reasons from the guarantees of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of European Convention of Human Rights. In its case-law the ECtHR, taking into account the margin of appreciation concept, formulated a number of positive and negative requirements, that should be met in case of proper reasoning. The obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions is also anchored in European Union law. European Court of Justice derives this duty from the right to fair trial enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Standards of the courts reasoning developed by Polish constitutional court an the European courts (ECJ and ECtHR) are in fact convergent and coherent. National judges should take them into consideration in every case, to legitimize its outcome and enhance justice delivery.



Author(s):  
Maria José Rangel de Mesquita

The article addresses the issue of judicial control of the implementation of Common Foreign and Security Policy at international regional level within the framework of the relaunching of the negotiation in view of the accession of the EU to the ECHR. Considering the extent of jurisdiction of the CJEU in respect of Common Foreign and Security Policy field in the light of its case law (sections 1 and 2), it analyses the question of judicial review of Common Foreign and Security Policy within international regional justice by the ECtHR in the light of the ongoing negotiations (section 3), in the perspective of the relationship between non-national courts (section 3.A), having as background the (2013) Draft Agreement of accession (section 3.B.1). After addressing the relaunching of the negotiation procedure (section 3.B.2) and the issue of CFSP control by the ECtHR according to the recent (re)negotiation meetings (section 3.B.3), some concrete proposals, including for the redrafting of the accession agreement, will be put forward (section 3.B.4), as well as a conclusion (section 4).



2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 356-370
Author(s):  
Maria José Rangel de Mesquita

The article addresses the issue of judicial control of the implementation of Common Foreign and Security Policy at international regional level within the framework of the relaunching of the negotiation in view of the accession of the EU to the ECHR. Considering the extent of jurisdiction of the CJEU in respect of Common Foreign and Security Policy field in the light of its case law (sections 1 and 2), it analyses the question of judicial review of Common Foreign and Security Policy within international regional justice by the ECtHR in the light of the ongoing negotiations (section 3), in the perspective of the relationship between non-national courts (section 3.A), having as background the (2013) Draft Agreement of accession (section 3.B.1). After addressing the relaunching of the negotiation procedure (section 3.B.2) and the issue of CFSP control by the ECtHR according to the recent (re)negotiation meetings (section 3.B.3), some concrete proposals, including for the redrafting of the accession agreement, will be put forward (section 3.B.4), as well as a conclusion (section 4).



2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inga Daukšienė ◽  
Arvydas Budnikas

ABSTRACT This article analyzes the purpose of the action for failure to act under article 265 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The statements are derived from the analysis of scientific literature, relevant legislation, practice of the European Union Court of Justice (CJEU) and the European Union General Court (EUGC). Useful information has also been obtained from the opinions of general advocates of the CJEU. The article of TFEU 265, which governs the action for failure to act, is very abstract. For this reason, a whole procedure under the article 265 TFEU was developed by the EU courts. The original purpose of the action for failure to act was to constitute whether European Union (EU) institution properly fulfilled its obligations under the EU legislation. However, in the course of case-law, a mere EU institution’s express refusal to fulfill its duties became sufficient to constitute that the EU institution acted and therefore action for failure to act became devoid of purpose. This article analyzes whether the action for failure to act has lost its purpose and become an ineffective legal remedy in the system of judicial review in the EU. Additionally, the action for failure to act is compared to similar national actions.





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