Ex-Post Incentive Compatible and Individually Rational Assignments in Housing Markets with Interdependent Values

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuji Fujinaka ◽  
Toshiji Miyakawa
Keyword(s):  
Housing Markets ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Interdependent Values

Robust Mechanism Design of Exchange

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pasha Andreyanov ◽  
Tomasz Sadzik
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Double Auction ◽  
Exchange Economies ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Interdependent Values ◽  
Robust Mechanism Design

Abstract In this article, we provide mechanisms for exchange economies with private information and interdependent values, which are ex post individually rational, incentive compatible, generate budget surplus, and are ex post nearly efficient, with many agents. Our framework is entirely prior-free, and we make no symmetry restrictions. The mechanisms can be implemented using a novel discriminatory conditional double auction, without knowledge of information structure or utility functions. We also show that no other mechanism satisfying the constraints can generate inefficiency of smaller order.

Monopoly Regulation Under Relaxed Pareto Efficiency

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 162-176
Author(s):  
Ismail Saglam
Keyword(s):  
Marginal Cost ◽  
Regulatory Environment ◽  
Pareto Dominance ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Monopoly Regulation ◽  
Dominance Relationships ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Pareto Axiom ◽  
Set Of Points

Baron and Myerson (BM; 1982, Econometrica, 50(4), 911–930) propose an incentive-compatible, individually rational and ex ante socially optimal direct-revelation mechanism to regulate a monopolistic firm with unknown costs. Their mechanism is not ex post Pareto dominated by any other feasible direct-revelation mechanism. However, there also exist an uncountable number of feasible direct-revelation mechanisms that are not ex post Pareto dominated by the BM mechanism. To investigate whether the BM mechanism remains in the set of ex post undominated mechanisms when the Pareto axiom is slightly weakened, we introduce the ∈-Pareto dominance. This concept requires the relevant dominance relationships to hold in the support of the regulator’s beliefs everywhere except for a set of points of measure ∈, which can be arbitrarily small. We show that a modification of the BM mechanism which always equates the price to the marginal cost can ∈-Pareto dominate the BM mechanism at uncountably many regulatory environments, while it is never ∈-Pareto dominated by the BM mechanism at any regulatory environment.

Determinants of house buyers’ expected holding periods in boom and bust markets in California

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 256-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ekaterina Chernobai ◽  
Tarique Hossain
Keyword(s):  
Rational Expectation ◽  
House Price ◽  
Housing Markets ◽  
Real Estate Market ◽  
Disposition Effect ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Financial Characteristics

Purpose This study aims to investigate the determinants of homeowners’ planned holding periods. Real estate market is known for displaying buying and selling behavior that does not conform to traditional economic theories such as rational expectation or expected utility. Mounting evidence of anomalous observations appear to be supported by other theories, such as prospect theory, which in particular helps explain the disposition effect – sellers are too quick to sell when prices are climbing and hold on to properties longer when prices are plummeting. While this evidence is widely documented in housing studies based on data on realized holding periods (i.e. ex post), this study explores factors that may motivate homeowners to alter their expected holding horizons (i.e. ex ante) to form new preferred holding periods that may be shorter or longer than those planned during house search. Design/methodology/approach The empirical study uses data collected from two cross-section surveys of recent homebuyers in rising and declining housing markets in Southern California in 2004-2005 and 2007-2008, respectively. Findings The empirical results demonstrate that in addition to the financial characteristics of the recent homebuyer, the characteristics of the buying experience – non-monetary, such as the realized search duration, and monetary, such as perception of negative or positive premium paid for the house relative to its market value – have a statistically significant effect on the holding horizon revision. The data strongly indicate that the perception of having overpaid increases the likelihood of upward revision of the original holding horizon. This effect is stronger in the declining than in the rising market – a crucial finding that mirrors the disposition effect. Originality/value This study sheds new light on what may contribute to the disposition effect in housing markets that has not yet been investigated in past literature. The novel approach here is to look at how different house price environments may affect homeowners’ holding periods ex ante when they begin, rather than ex post when already realized.

scholarly journals Obvious Ex Post Equilibrium

2017 ◽  
Vol 107 (5) ◽  
pp. 230-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shengwu Li
Keyword(s):  
Solution Concept ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Interdependent Values

I propose a new solution concept, obvious ex post (OXP) equilibrium. This is a formal standard of cognitive simplicity for mechanisms, in settings with interdependent values. Under some standard assumptions, the ascending auction has an efficient OXP equilibrium. I discuss a decision theoretic foundation for OXP mechanisms.

scholarly journals Ex-post IR Dynamic Auctions with Cost-per-Action Payments

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weiran Shen ◽  
Zihe Wang ◽  
Song Zuo
Keyword(s):  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Incentive Compatibility ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Dynamic Auctions ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Ad Auctions ◽  
The Cost ◽  
General Reduction

Motivated by online ad auctions, we consider a repeated auction between one seller and many buyers, where each buyer only has an estimation of her value in each period until she actually receives the item in that period. The seller is allowed to conduct a dynamic auction but must guarantee ex-post individual rationality. In this paper, we use a structure that we call credit accounts to enable a general reduction from any incentive compatible and ex-ante individual rational dynamic auction to an approximate incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational dynamic auction with credit accounts. Our reduction obtains stronger individual rationality guarantees at the cost of weaker incentive compatibility. Surprisingly, our reduction works without any common knowledge assumption. Finally, as a complement to our reduction, we prove that there is no non-trivial auction that is exactly incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational under this setting.

scholarly journals Multi-Unit Bilateral Trade

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 1973-1980
Author(s):  
Matthias Gerstgrasser ◽  
Paul W. Goldberg ◽  
Bart De Keijzer ◽  
Philip Lazos ◽  
Alexander Skopalik
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Finite Number ◽  
Bilateral Trade ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Specific Class ◽  
Single Item ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Strategy Incentive

We characterise the set of dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), strongly budget balanced (SBB), and ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for the multi-unit bilateral trade setting. In such a setting there is a single buyer and a single seller who holds a finite number k of identical items. The mechanism has to decide how many units of the item are transferred from the seller to the buyer and how much money is transferred from the buyer to the seller. We consider two classes of valuation functions for the buyer and seller: Valuations that are increasing in the number of units in possession, and the more specific class of valuations that are increasing and submodular.Furthermore, we present some approximation results about the performance of certain such mechanisms, in terms of social welfare: For increasing submodular valuation functions, we show the existence of a deterministic 2-approximation mechanism and a randomised e/(1 − e) approximation mechanism, matching the best known bounds for the single-item setting.

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