Why Do Federal Loans Crowd out the Private Market? Evidence from Graduate Plus Loans

Author(s):  
Monica Bhole
Author(s):  
Stephen H. Long ◽  
M. Susan Marquis

This paper examines how varying the level of subsidies affects participation in a public insurance program, crowd-out of private insurance, and adverse selection. We study the experience in Washington's Basic Health program in 1997. Findings show that adverse selection is not a problem in voluntary public programs. Increasing subsidies have only modest effects on participation in subsidized programs, though the gains are not at the expense of the private market. Overall participation in the subsidized plan is also modest, even though participants benefit from it. The challenge to policymakers is to find program design characteristics, beyond subsidies, that attract the uninsured.


2011 ◽  
pp. 66-77
Author(s):  
O. Vasilieva

Does resource abundance positively affect human capital accumulation? Or, alternatively, does it «crowd out» the human capital leading to the deterioration of economic growth? The paper gives an overview of the relevant literature and discusses both theoretical and empirical results obtained regarding the connection between human capital accumulation and resource abundance. It shows that despite some theoretical predictions about the harmful effect of resource abundance on human capital accumulation, unambiguous evidence of such impact that would be robust with respect to the change of resource abundance parameter has not been obtained yet.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaowei Ke ◽  
Yao Lu ◽  
Xinzheng Shi ◽  
Yeqing Zhang

Author(s):  
Yochai Benkler ◽  
Robert Faris ◽  
Hal Roberts

This chapter presents a model of the interaction of media outlets, politicians, and the public with an emphasis on the tension between truth-seeking and narratives that confirm partisan identities. This model is used to describe the emergence and mechanics of an insular media ecosystem and how two fundamentally different media ecosystems can coexist. In one, false narratives that reinforce partisan identity not only flourish, but crowd-out true narratives even when these are presented by leading insiders. In the other, false narratives are tested, confronted, and contained by diverse outlets and actors operating in a truth-oriented norms dynamic. Two case studies are analyzed: the first focuses on false reporting on a selection of television networks; the second looks at parallel but politically divergent false rumors—an allegation that Donald Trump raped a 13-yearold and allegations tying Hillary Clinton to pedophilia—and tracks the amplification and resistance these stories faced.


Author(s):  
Vito Tanzi

This book deals with practical or real life aspects of public finance. It focuses on the growth in the activities of governments, in a world that expects more than in the past from governments. The book focuses on the growing complexity in both the work of the private market and that of the public sector. It stresses that part of the growing complexity is due to the more ambitious role that governments tried to play today, while part is due to choices made by governments, so that complexity may be partly avoidable. This was important in the different pursuit of social welfare by different countries. Complexity has increased opportunities for abuses, for rent seeking, and for mistakes in policies. It may also have increased the attraction of populist policies that claim to offer magical or easy solutions to problems. A major conclusion of the book is that the objective of simplicity in laws and in policies should be given more importance by both economists and governments.


2014 ◽  
Vol 129 (3) ◽  
pp. 1141-1219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raj Chetty ◽  
John N. Friedman ◽  
Søren Leth-Petersen ◽  
Torben Heien Nielsen ◽  
Tore Olsen

Abstract Using 41 million observations on savings for the population of Denmark, we show that the effects of retirement savings policies on wealth accumulation depend on whether they change savings rates by active or passive choice. Subsidies for retirement accounts, which rely on individuals to take an action to raise savings, primarily induce individuals to shift assets from taxable accounts to retirement accounts. We estimate that each $1 of government expenditure on subsidies increases total saving by only 1 cent. In contrast, policies that raise retirement contributions if individuals take no action—such as automatic employer contributions to retirement accounts—increase wealth accumulation substantially. We estimate that approximately 15% of individuals are “active savers” who respond to tax subsidies primarily by shifting assets across accounts; 85% of individuals are “passive savers” who are unresponsive to subsidies but are instead heavily influenced by automatic contributions made on their behalf. Active savers tend to be wealthier and more financially sophisticated. We conclude that automatic contributions are more effective at increasing savings rates than subsidies for three reasons: (i) subsidies induce relatively few individuals to respond, (ii) they generate substantial crowd-out conditional on response, and (iii) they do not increase the savings of passive individuals, who are least prepared for retirement.


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