Legal Aspects of the European Central Bank (ECB) - The ECB within the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christos Gortsos
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Legal Aspects ◽  
Financial Supervision ◽  
European Central ◽  
European System

The European Central Bank

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chiara Zilioli ◽  
Phoebus Athanassiou
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Monetary Union ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Central ◽  
European System ◽  
The Eu

The provisions on Monetary Union (MU), of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU or the Treaty), as well as the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (the Statute), are important in their own right, and are amongst those from which any student of the European Union (EU) can learn a great deal with regard to the EU.

scholarly journals The price stability oriented monetary policy of the European Central Bank

2010 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 5-15
Author(s):  
Wojciech Gasiński ◽  
Anna Misztal
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Primary Objective ◽  
Price Stability ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
European Central ◽  
Consumer Prices ◽  
European System

The aim of this paper is to present the price stability oriented monetary policy of the European Central Bank. The European Central Bank began activities in 1998 and the primary objective of the European System of Central Banks is to maintain price stability and the ESCB should also support the general economic policies in the Community. Monetary policy is a special tool that national governments and central banks uses to influence on its economy, especially to control the supply of money and to influence on the level of economic indicators. This paper investigates the assumed objective of the European System of Central Banks which is to maintain price stability. What is more, we would like to present the monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank and analysis of the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices.

scholarly journals Nepriklausomas centrinis bankas

Teisė ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 72 ◽  
pp. 198-208
Author(s):  
Vytautas Vaškelaitis
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
The Other ◽  
Economic And Monetary Union ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
European Central ◽  
European System ◽  
Independence Dimension ◽  
The Government

Straipsnyje analizuojama centrinio banko nepriklausomumo problema istoriniu, teoriniu ir taikomuoju požiūriais. Iškeliami nepriklausomumo argumentai, atskleidžiama jo esmė, apibrėžiamos nepriklauso­mumo ribos, aptariamas veiklos skaidrumas. Prieinama prie išvados, kad centrinis bankas turėtų būti nepriklausomas nuo vyriausybės, kartu jo veiklą derinant su įstatymų leidžiamuoju ir vykdomuoju vals­tybės institutais. Tyrimo kontekste nagrinėjami pokyčiai, susiję su Europos ekonominės ir pinigų sąjun­gos susikūrimu, nepriklausomumo dimensija Europos centrinių bankų sistemos formate. Nustatoma, kad šiomis sąlygomis kai kuriose srityse nacionaliniai centriniai bankai turi savarankiškumą, kitose – Eu­ropos centrinis bankas naudojasi nacionalinių centrinių bankų paslaugomis, be to, Europos centrinis bankas veikia visiškai savarankiškai. The article analyzes the problem of central bank independence a historical, theoretical, and practice terms. The independence of the arguments raised, disclosed in its essence, defines the limits of inde­pendence, the transparency of the operation in question. Accessible to the conclusion that the central bank should be independent from the government, while its activity in combination with the legislative and executive state institutions. The study examined the context of changes in European economic and monetary union within the independence dimension of the European System of Central Banks in format. Determined that under these conditions in some areas of the national central banks have independence, the other – the European Central Bank uses the services of national central banks, in addition to an­other – the European Central Bank is fully independent.

Article 338 TFEU

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Kellerbauer
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
European Central ◽  
European System ◽  
Legislative Procedure ◽  
Ordinary Legislative Procedure ◽  
Article 5

Article 285 EC Without prejudice to Article 5 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures for the production of statistics where necessary for the performance of the activities of the Union.

scholarly journals Unconventional monetary policy of the European Central Bank: A brief recapitulation

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Ilona Skibińska-Fabrowska
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Economic Crisis ◽  
Financial Market ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Unconventional Monetary Policy ◽  
European Central ◽  
National Bank

<p>The financial and economic crisis that has hit many economies in recent years has significantly increased the activity of central banks. After using the standard instruments of conducting monetary policy, in view of the obstruction of monetary impulse transmission channels, they reached for non-standard instruments. Among them, asset purchase programs played a signifciant role. The European Central Bank (ECB) launched the largest asset purchase programme (APP) of this type in 2014 and expired in December 2018. The aim of the undertaken activities was to improve the situation on the financial market and stimulate economic growth. The article reviews the literature and results of research on the effects of the program and indicates the possibility of using the ECB’s experience in conducting monetary policy by the National Bank of Poland.</p>

scholarly journals Comparison of the Approach of the Czech National Bank and the European Central Bank to the Effects of the Global Financial Crisis

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 18-46
Author(s):  
Andrea Cecrdlova
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
European Central ◽  
National Bank ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

The latest global crisis, which fully erupted in 2008, can have a significant impact on central banks credibility in the long run. During the last crisis, monetary authorities encountered zero interest rate levels and, as a result, started to use non-standard monetary policy instruments. The Czech National Bank decided to use a less standard instrument in November 2013, when it started to intervene on the foreign exchange market in order to keep the Czech currency at level 27 CZK / EUR. However, the European Central Bank also adopted a non-standard instrument, when chose a path of quantitative easing in 2015 in order to support the euro area economy by purchasing financial assets. The question remains whether the approach of Czech National Bank or the approach of European Central Bank in the crisis and post-crisis period was a more appropriate alternative. With the passage of time from the global financial crisis, it is already possible to compare the approaches of these two central banks and at least partially assess what approach was more appropriate under the given conditions. When comparing the central banks approaches to the crisis, the Czech National Bank was better, both in terms of the rate of interest rate cuts and the resulting inflation with regard to the choice of a non-standard monetary policy instrument. The recent financial crisis has revealed the application of moral hazard in practice, both on behalf of the European Central Bank and the Czech National Bank, which may have a significant impact on their credibility and independence in the coming years.

scholarly journals Análisis de la integración y dependencia de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Europea

2013 ◽  
pp. 47
Author(s):  
María del Carmen González Velasco ◽  
Roque Brinckmann
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Uncovered Interest Parity ◽  
European Central ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Bank Of England ◽  
Interest Parity

En este artículo se efectúa un análisis de la integración y dependencia de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Europea y, en concreto, de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Económica yMonetaria y de la zona no euro para el periodo comprendido entre Enero de 1999 y Septiembre 2009. Se aplica la metodología de la cointegración de Engle y Granger (1987) y de Johansen(1988) para contrastar la hipótesis de la paridad de tipos de interés no cubierta y se llega a la conclusión de que ambas políticas están cointegradas porque mantienen una relación de equilibrio a largo plazo. También se deduce una dependencia de la política del Banco de Inglaterra de la política del Banco Central Europeo, lo que confirma la importancia y el liderazgo de la Unión Económica y Monetaria.<br /><br />This study is to investigate the long-run relationship and dependence between the UME´s monetary policy and non-euro zone´s monetary policy for the period from January 4, 1999 to September 30, 2009. We use cointegration methodology to test the Uncovered Interest Parity Hypothesis and the results indicate a long-run cointegration and empirical evidence testifies a leader-follower pattern between the two central banks. According to this pattern, the Bank of England does follow the European Central Bank.

Does politics drive conflict in central banks’ committees? Lifting the veil on the European Central Bank consensus

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-203
Author(s):  
Manuela Moschella ◽  
Nicola M Diodati
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Semantic Distance ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Political Factors ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Projected Image ◽  
European Central ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Central Bankers

This study investigates whether and to what extent political factors drive disagreement within the allegedly consensual monetary committee of the European Central Bank. Absent voting data, the article assesses disagreement based on the semantic distance between the policy positions publicly articulated by the European Central Bank President and the central banks of Eurozone member states. The empirical analysis shows that the disagreement articulated by national central bankers is affected by the ideological inclinations of the governments of the countries they represent. Our findings thus suggest that central bankers’ position-taking is shaped not only by economic conditions but also by domestic political considerations. This result challenges the European Central Bank’s projected image of itself as an institution whose members are impermeable to domestic political pressures as a way to defend the independence of the institution to which they belong.

Have central banks forgotten about money? The case of the European Central Bank, 1999–2014

2017 ◽  
pp. 101-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan E. Castañeda ◽  
Tim Congdon
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
European Central

Writing Clearly: The ECB’s Monetary Policy Communication

2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleš Bulíř ◽  
Martin Čihák ◽  
Kateřina Š Šmídkova
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Press Releases ◽  
Central Bank Communication ◽  
Additional Information ◽  
European Central ◽  
Policy Communication ◽  
Better Than

Abstract The article presents a novel methodology for measuring the clarity of central bank communication using content analysis, illustrating the methodology with the case of the European Central Bank (ECB). The analysis identifies the ECB’s written communication as clear in about 85-95% of instances, which is comparable with, or better than, similar results available for other central banks. We also find that the additional information on risk to inflation and especially projection risk assessment contained in the ECB’s Monthly Bulletins helps to improve communication clarity compared to ECB’s press releases. In contrast, the bulletin’s communication on monetary developments has a negative, albeit small, impact on clarity.

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