scholarly journals The price stability oriented monetary policy of the European Central Bank

2010 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 5-15
Author(s):  
Wojciech Gasiński ◽  
Anna Misztal

The aim of this paper is to present the price stability oriented monetary policy of the European Central Bank. The European Central Bank began activities in 1998 and the primary objective of the European System of Central Banks is to maintain price stability and the ESCB should also support the general economic policies in the Community. Monetary policy is a special tool that national governments and central banks uses to influence on its economy, especially to control the supply of money and to influence on the level of economic indicators. This paper investigates the assumed objective of the European System of Central Banks which is to maintain price stability. What is more, we would like to present the monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank and analysis of the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices.

Author(s):  
Marcus Klamert ◽  
Manuel Kellerbauer ◽  
Jonathan Tomkin

Article 282 provides for the ESCB, consisting of the ECB together with the NCBs (NCBs). Within the ESCB, the Eurosystem, comprised of the ECB and the NCBs of MS whose currency is the euro, conducts the Union’s monetary policy. The primary objective of the ESCB is to maintain price stability. The ECB is charged with authorizing the use of the euro and is independent in all respects.


Author(s):  
Ilona Skibińska-Fabrowska

<p>The financial and economic crisis that has hit many economies in recent years has significantly increased the activity of central banks. After using the standard instruments of conducting monetary policy, in view of the obstruction of monetary impulse transmission channels, they reached for non-standard instruments. Among them, asset purchase programs played a signifciant role. The European Central Bank (ECB) launched the largest asset purchase programme (APP) of this type in 2014 and expired in December 2018. The aim of the undertaken activities was to improve the situation on the financial market and stimulate economic growth. The article reviews the literature and results of research on the effects of the program and indicates the possibility of using the ECB’s experience in conducting monetary policy by the National Bank of Poland.</p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 18-46
Author(s):  
Andrea Cecrdlova

The latest global crisis, which fully erupted in 2008, can have a significant impact on central banks credibility in the long run. During the last crisis, monetary authorities encountered zero interest rate levels and, as a result, started to use non-standard monetary policy instruments. The Czech National Bank decided to use a less standard instrument in November 2013, when it started to intervene on the foreign exchange market in order to keep the Czech currency at level 27 CZK / EUR. However, the European Central Bank also adopted a non-standard instrument, when chose a path of quantitative easing in 2015 in order to support the euro area economy by purchasing financial assets. The question remains whether the approach of Czech National Bank or the approach of European Central Bank in the crisis and post-crisis period was a more appropriate alternative. With the passage of time from the global financial crisis, it is already possible to compare the approaches of these two central banks and at least partially assess what approach was more appropriate under the given conditions. When comparing the central banks approaches to the crisis, the Czech National Bank was better, both in terms of the rate of interest rate cuts and the resulting inflation with regard to the choice of a non-standard monetary policy instrument. The recent financial crisis has revealed the application of moral hazard in practice, both on behalf of the European Central Bank and the Czech National Bank, which may have a significant impact on their credibility and independence in the coming years.


Author(s):  
María del Carmen González Velasco ◽  
Roque Brinckmann

En este artículo se efectúa un análisis de la integración y dependencia de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Europea y, en concreto, de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Económica yMonetaria y de la zona no euro para el periodo comprendido entre Enero de 1999 y Septiembre 2009. Se aplica la metodología de la cointegración de Engle y Granger (1987) y de Johansen(1988) para contrastar la hipótesis de la paridad de tipos de interés no cubierta y se llega a la conclusión de que ambas políticas están cointegradas porque mantienen una relación de equilibrio a largo plazo. También se deduce una dependencia de la política del Banco de Inglaterra de la política del Banco Central Europeo, lo que confirma la importancia y el liderazgo de la Unión Económica y Monetaria.<br /><br />This study is to investigate the long-run relationship and dependence between the UME´s monetary policy and non-euro zone´s monetary policy for the period from January 4, 1999 to September 30, 2009. We use cointegration methodology to test the Uncovered Interest Parity Hypothesis and the results indicate a long-run cointegration and empirical evidence testifies a leader-follower pattern between the two central banks. According to this pattern, the Bank of England does follow the European Central Bank.


Author(s):  
Chiara Zilioli ◽  
Phoebus Athanassiou

The provisions on Monetary Union (MU), of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU or the Treaty), as well as the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (the Statute), are important in their own right, and are amongst those from which any student of the European Union (EU) can learn a great deal with regard to the EU.


Author(s):  
María del Carmen González Velasco ◽  
Roque Brinckmann

En este artículo se efectúa un análisis de la integración y dependencia de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Europea y, en concreto, de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Económica yMonetaria y de la zona no euro para el periodo comprendido entre Enero de 1999 y Septiembre 2009. Se aplica la metodología de la cointegración de Engle y Granger (1987) y de Johansen(1988) para contrastar la hipótesis de la paridad de tipos de interés no cubierta y se llega a la conclusión de que ambas políticas están cointegradas porque mantienen una relación de equilibrio a largo plazo. También se deduce una dependencia de la política del Banco de Inglaterra de la política del Banco Central Europeo, lo que confirma la importancia y el liderazgo de la Unión Económica y Monetaria.<br /><br />This study is to investigate the long-run relationship and dependence between the UME´s monetary policy and non-euro zone´s monetary policy for the period from January 4, 1999 to September 30, 2009. We use cointegration methodology to test the Uncovered Interest Parity Hypothesis and the results indicate a long-run cointegration and empirical evidence testifies a leader-follower pattern between the two central banks. According to this pattern, the Bank of England does follow the European Central Bank.


Teisė ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 72 ◽  
pp. 198-208
Author(s):  
Vytautas Vaškelaitis

Straipsnyje analizuojama centrinio banko nepriklausomumo problema istoriniu, teoriniu ir taikomuoju požiūriais. Iškeliami nepriklausomumo argumentai, atskleidžiama jo esmė, apibrėžiamos nepriklauso­mumo ribos, aptariamas veiklos skaidrumas. Prieinama prie išvados, kad centrinis bankas turėtų būti nepriklausomas nuo vyriausybės, kartu jo veiklą derinant su įstatymų leidžiamuoju ir vykdomuoju vals­tybės institutais. Tyrimo kontekste nagrinėjami pokyčiai, susiję su Europos ekonominės ir pinigų sąjun­gos susikūrimu, nepriklausomumo dimensija Europos centrinių bankų sistemos formate. Nustatoma, kad šiomis sąlygomis kai kuriose srityse nacionaliniai centriniai bankai turi savarankiškumą, kitose – Eu­ropos centrinis bankas naudojasi nacionalinių centrinių bankų paslaugomis, be to, Europos centrinis bankas veikia visiškai savarankiškai. The article analyzes the problem of central bank independence a historical, theoretical, and practice terms. The independence of the arguments raised, disclosed in its essence, defines the limits of inde­pendence, the transparency of the operation in question. Accessible to the conclusion that the central bank should be independent from the government, while its activity in combination with the legislative and executive state institutions. The study examined the context of changes in European economic and monetary union within the independence dimension of the European System of Central Banks in format. Determined that under these conditions in some areas of the national central banks have independence, the other – the European Central Bank uses the services of national central banks, in addition to an­other – the European Central Bank is fully independent.


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Hochstein

Abstract There are strong indications that actual consumer inflation in the euro area is understated by official price measures. The exclusion of homeowner shelter costs and inadequate quality adjustments for certain basket items are among the reasons for a potential downward bias in Eurostat's Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices, which would have widespread ramifications not only for consumers but also for the broader economy and financial markets. By focusing on the HICP as a yardstick for its primary objective of medium-term price stability, the European Central Bank relies on a too narrowly defined and error-prone inflation concept.


2017 ◽  
Vol 62 (01) ◽  
pp. 57-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
AD VAN RIET

Since the start of the global financial crisis, the European Central Bank (ECB) has faced exceptional challenges in fulfilling its price stability mandate, marking the start of a new era of monetary policy-making for the eurozone. This paper reviews the ECB’s evolving response from mid-2007 to early-2015, showing how it combined the standard tool of adjusting its policy interest rates with non-standard passive and active balance-sheet measures, accompanied by a forward guidance of its intended monetary stance. Altogether, the ECB stayed focused on price stability while fulfilling the two classical roles of lender of last resort to resolve money market tensions and market maker of last resort to repair monetary transmission. Addressing the many challenges was complicated by the nexus between fragile banks and vulnerable governments, the ensuing financial fragmentation and the complex institutional and political structure of the eurozone. Looking ahead, the new reinforced European financial architecture could make the ECB’s monetary policy task of maintaining price stability for the eurozone easier to accomplish.


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