Relations between metacognitive processes and differences in framing effect performance

In this paper we discuss the link between risky decisions and regret, uncertainty about choice and willing to change the chosen option. We used a classic and modified versions of “Asian disease” task. The modification consisted in adding a series of side effects to the sure option to decrease it's the preferability. An attempt to replicate framing effect, action effect and its inversion in certain and uncertain decision-makers was made. The estimation of utility through integration of information about alternatives and role of metacognitive processes in choice are discussed. Accordingly to results the uncertain decision-makers tend to feel regret about choosing safe option in loss domain. Action effect and its inversion were not found. The inversion of framing-effect in uncertain decision-makers in loss domain was shown. In conclusion, the absence of framing effect in loss domain can be explained by strong the differences between certain and uncertain decision-makers.

Inequality Biases Third-Party Evaluation of Decision-Making for Others

People often need to make risky decisions for others, especially in policymaking, where a single decision can affect the welfare of a number of people. Given that risky decisions can yield variable outcomes and that people often evaluate policies after knowing the outcomes, the same risky policy can be evaluated differently depending on its outcome. Nevertheless, very little is known about how people make third-party evaluations of risky policies. Because people are sensitive to inequality among others, we predicted that the same policy would be evaluated more negatively if it leads to inequality rather than other outcomes. To examine this, we conducted a scenario experiment on risky and sure policies and investigated whether people’s distributive preferences moderated policy evaluation. We show that participants rated the risky policy lower when it yielded unequal situations between the recipients. Interestingly, participants did not evaluate the risky policy higher than the sure policy even when the risky policy yielded more desirable outcomes. In addition, participants who preferred sure distributions as decision makers or recipients showed the inequality aversion, whereas participants who preferred risky distributions showed no such pattern. Our results suggest that policy evaluation may be susceptible to the risks and inequality of outcomes among recipients.

Self-Oriented Neural Circuitry Predicts Other-Oriented Adaptive Risks in Adolescence: A Longitudinal Study

Adolescence is marked by changes in decision-making and perspective-taking abilities. Although adolescents make more adaptive decisions with age, little is understood about how adolescents make adaptive decisions that impact others and how this behavior changes developmentally. Functional coupling between reward (e.g., VS) and “social brain” (e.g., TPJ/pSTS, mPFC) systems may be differentially shape adaptive risks for the self and other. A total of 173 participants completed between 1-3 sessions across three waves (a total of 433 behavioral and 403 fMRI data points). During an fMRI scan, adolescents completed a risky decision-making task where they made risky decisions to win money for themselves and their parent. The risky decisions varied in their expected value (EV) of potential reward. Results show that from the 6th through 9th grades, adolescents took increasingly more adaptive risks for themselves than for their parent. Additionally, greater VS-TPJ/pSTS and VS-mPFC connectivity that tracks EV when making risky decisions for themselves in 6th grade, but a lower VS-mPFC connectivity in 9th grade, predicted greater adaptive risk taking for their parent. This study contributes to our understanding of the self as a neural proxy for promoting adaptive social behaviors in youth.

How Goals Erase Framing Effects in Risky Decision Making

Evidence has shown that goals systematically change risk preferences in repeated decisions under risk. For instance, decision makers could aim to reach goals in a limited time, such as “making at least $1000 with ten stock investments within a year.” We test whether goal-based risky decisions differ when facing gains as compared to losses. More specifically, we examine the impact of outcome framing (gains vs. losses) and state framing (positive vs. negative resource states) on goal-based risky decisions. Our results (N=100) reveal no framing effects; instead, we find a consistently strong effect of the goal on risk preferences independent of framing. Computational modeling showed that a dynamic version of prospect theory, with a goal-dependent reference point, described 87% of participants best. This model treats outcomes as gains and losses depending on the state-goal distance. Our results show how goals can erase standard framing effects observed in risky choices without goals.