scholarly journals Bank Resolution and Public Backstop in an Asymmetric Banking Union

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anatoli Segura ◽  
Sergio Vicente
Author(s):  
Kleftouri Nikoletta

The 2007–08 global financial crisis proved that the interests of bank depositors are inadequately protected. Although a vast expansion in deposit protection systems around the world followed, our understanding of the impact of those systems and their interaction with bank resolution is still in its infancy. The focus of bank resolution studies has been on the largest systemically important banks, which have wholesale creditors who would be bailed in, leaving retail depositors untouched. However, many banks rely mostly on deposits for financing, and the number of banks of this form is expected to increase. This book aims to explain and provide current material analysis of deposit protection and bank resolution regimes. The analysis is based on an examination of the traditional rationales for creating deposit insurance and bank resolution, and a specific study of the UK, EU, and US legal frameworks. It aims to offer an analysis of this topic and to cover all relevant regulations, from its origins to its most recent developments, in a systematic and thorough way. It approaches the much-desired objective of financial stability from a different angle: that of depositor protection. This book comprises ten chapters, analysing: the rationales for creating a deposit protection system; the limitations of deposit protection systems; the European deposit insurance framework; the European banking union; recent cases on deposit guarantee schemes; international standards on deposit insurance; the UK deposit insurance framework; international and European regulatory developments on bank resolution; the UK Special Resolution Regime; and the US paradigm.


ERA Forum ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kern Alexander
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 65 (2) ◽  
pp. 30-40
Author(s):  
Mejra Festić

AbstractThe purpose of the article is to present the possible regimes of bank resolution in the euro system and to highlight open questions concerning additional capital buffers and the valuation of assets according to the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). The bail-in tool is used to write down or to convert certain liabilities with the purpose of restoring the capital adequacy. The valuation exercise would determine the amount of loss absorbtion to restore viability of the institution and capital adequacy. The bridge bank tool offers deeper restructuring powers to the competent resolution authority. Sale of the business tool is actually a variation of the bridge bank tool, enabling the resolution authority to transfer assets and liabilities to investors. The asset separation tool always is combined with another tool. The write-down is not a resolution tool, as it affects equity, while a bail-in tool goes further to other subordinated debt and senior debt. It is possible to establish additional resolution tools in the national legislation, as long as these tools are compatible with the principles of directive and national legislation in order to support cross-border group resolution. The issue of bank overregulation and the ability to meet the requirements without negative effects on the economy is emphasized.


Author(s):  
Kleftouri Nikoletta

Having a multiplicity of financial regulators, supervisors, and resolution authorities in Europe can weaken supervision, heighten legal uncertainty, and impede effective resolution. European officials recently agreed that further steps are needed to tackle the specific risks in particular within the euro area, where pooled monetary responsibilities had increased the possibility of cross-border spillover effects in the event of bank crises. As a result, they created a union aimed to centralize bank supervision, deposit insurance, and bank resolution. This chapter sets out two components of the European banking union: single supervision, and single deposit insurance. Single resolution is separately discussed in Chapter 8, where international and European bank resolution frameworks are examined. The chapter concludes that deeper reforms are needed, in conjunction with effective cooperation arrangements.


Author(s):  
Hadjiemmanuil Christos

This chapter explores bank resolution financing in the Banking Union, a project launched in 2012 as a direct response to the euro area’s crisis that began in Spain. The Banking Union is a streamlined and highly centralized regime for the supervision and resolution of all banks in the euro area and beyond, based on a novel, complex institutional set-up. The Union relies on supranational decision-making, especially with regard to the largest and most important banking institutions. The chapter assesses the Banking Union’s two-pronged institutional construction: the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). It concludes by discussing how the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) affects resolution financing in the Banking Union.


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