Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Fleurbaey ◽  
Alex Voorhoeve
2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 210-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryan Garsten

In his account of how each of us deliberates about what to do, Aristotle remarks that we do not always trust ourselves on important matters and so sometimes take counsel from others. Taking counsel from others is, in some ways, merely an expansion of the internal activity of deliberation; the suggestions come from other people rather than from our ownminds, but the judgment about them remains our own. In other ways, however, taking counsel is quite different from deliberating with oneself. These differences are the subject matter of the art of rhetoric, as Aristotle understands it. The paper compares the political relationship at work in deliberative rhetoric with slavery, which collapses the separateness of persons, and with friendship, which preserves it. And suggests that the importance of anger in Aristotle’s treatment of rhetoric can be understood as a reflection on the implications of human separateness.


2020 ◽  
pp. 155-175
Author(s):  
Barbara H. Fried

Rawls’s Theory of Justice has had two parallel lives in political theory. The first—the version Rawls wrote—is a response to utilitarianism’s failure to take seriously the separateness of persons. The second—the unwritten version “received” by its general audience—is a response to libertarianism’s failure to take seriously our moral obligations to the well-being of our fellow citizens. This chapter explores how, had he written the second version, Rawls might have dealt with libertarians’ critique of “justice as fairness” as fundamentally illiberal, and how his two principles might have been transformed in the process.


Author(s):  
Albert Weale

Social contract theory arose as a response to the twilight of utilitarianism. For many years utilitarianism had been seen as a political philosophy of human emancipation. Like social contract theory, utilitarianism was a critical and rationalistic morality. However, it was judged incapable of recognizing the separateness of persons, the claim by each person to be treated with justice. Utilitarianism defined the good in terms of pleasure, conceived in a naturalistic way. It regarded pleasure as the guide to choice. It promised to provide an intellectual framework within which everyday intuitive morality could be rendered consistent. And it sought to ground action in practical reasoning about the promotion of the good. However, these distinctive elements came under challenge. With the rise of modern utility theory, pleasure was no longer thought of as the guide to choice. Pleasure was no longer conceived as the sole good. Doubts were raised about the extent to which the principle of utility could explicate the principle of justice. And even utilitarianism had to concede the dualism of practical reason. One response was the rise of intuitionism in the early part of the twentieth century. Another response was the rise of social contract theory, as discussed in this book.


2018 ◽  
Vol 69 (274) ◽  
pp. 142-155
Author(s):  
Shlomi Segall

1988 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-225 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis McKerlie

Different people live different lives. Each life consists of experiences that are not shared with the other lives. These facts are sometimes referred to as the ‘separateness of persons.’ Some writers have appealed to the separateness of persons to support or to criticize moral views. John Rawls thinks that the separateness of persons supports egalitarianism, while Robert Nozick believes that it supports a rights view. I will call the claim that the separateness of persons counts in favor of a particular moral view the ‘positive connection.’ Both these writers think that utilitarianism is objectionable because it ignores the moral importance of the separateness of persons. I will call the claim that the separateness of persons counts against a moral view the ‘negative connection.’In this paper I will discuss several different attempts at explaining the connection between the separateness of persons and specific moral views. I will begin by describing how egalitarianism, unlike utilitarianism, treats individual lives as morally important units. I will discuss the kind of egalitarianism that aims at equality, but the same points could be made about egalitarian views that give priority to helping the worst off or require that everyone should receive at least a specified minimum share of resources or happiness.


1984 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-107
Author(s):  
James Fishkin

Rather than respond to Gibbard, point by point, I will comment on what I take to be the general spirit of his argument. The old consensus on some form or another of utilitarianism, a consensus that dominated discussions in moral and political theory only a few years ago, has now largely evaporated before the heat of distributional objections founded on justice, the “separateness of persons,” and other concerns for the severe sacrifices that utilitarianism might require of some for the sake of greater gains to others (or for the sake of gains to a greater number of others).


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