Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons

1988 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-225 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis McKerlie
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
The Other ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Moral View ◽  
Moral Importance ◽  
Separateness Of Persons

Different people live different lives. Each life consists of experiences that are not shared with the other lives. These facts are sometimes referred to as the ‘separateness of persons.’ Some writers have appealed to the separateness of persons to support or to criticize moral views. John Rawls thinks that the separateness of persons supports egalitarianism, while Robert Nozick believes that it supports a rights view. I will call the claim that the separateness of persons counts in favor of a particular moral view the ‘positive connection.’ Both these writers think that utilitarianism is objectionable because it ignores the moral importance of the separateness of persons. I will call the claim that the separateness of persons counts against a moral view the ‘negative connection.’In this paper I will discuss several different attempts at explaining the connection between the separateness of persons and specific moral views. I will begin by describing how egalitarianism, unlike utilitarianism, treats individual lives as morally important units. I will discuss the kind of egalitarianism that aims at equality, but the same points could be made about egalitarian views that give priority to helping the worst off or require that everyone should receive at least a specified minimum share of resources or happiness.

F.H. Bradley: An Unpublished Note on Christian Morality

1983 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon Kendal
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Clear Understanding ◽  
Christian Belief ◽  
Moral View ◽  
Christian Morality ◽  
Moral Importance ◽  
Unpublished Note

At some time between 1907 and 1912, probably very much nearer the earlier date, Bradley produced the first draft of an article on Christian morality. He did this in response to criticism that his moral ideas were anti-Christian. This charge was based mainly on the content of two articles that he published during 1894 in the International Journal of Ethics, one called ‘Some Remarks on Punishment’ and the other ‘The Limits of Individual and National Self-Sacrifice’. In these Bradley had maintained that the conventional ‘Christian’ belief in the sacredness of life undermined any sensible approach to punishment and any clear understanding of the moral importance of self-assertion (in contrast to self-sacrifice). It encouraged a squeamishness about retribution and ‘social surgery’. It devalued proper human ends and interests, and the rights and duties founded on them. There was needed ‘a correction of our moral view, and a return to a non-Christian and perhaps a Hellenic ideal’, one that would recognize the unlimited right of the moral organism (i.e. virtually the state) to dispose of its members and to use force internationally in defence of right. Bradley pulled no punches and had this to say about the self-styled ‘Christian’ party:

The Social Contract (Contract of Government)

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johann Sommerville
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Thomas Hobbes ◽  
The Other ◽  
Political Society ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
The Social ◽  
The One

Social-contract theories flourished in Europe in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, had roots extending far further back, and continue to be influential today. John Rawls revived one type of contract theory in the mid-twentieth century, while another featured in the work of Robert Nozick. One kind of theory centers on a real or hypothetical contract between individuals to establish a political society—a contract of society. Another focuses on a contract between the society or people, on the one hand, and the ruler or government, on the other—a contract of government. In the heyday of theorizing about the social contract, it was the contract of government that received most attention. When people joined together to form political societies, they proceeded, authority must at first have been in the hands of the whole community, since no one had any greater right to exercise it than anyone else. Some contractualists have used the social contract to cast light on what must always and everywhere be true about states. They include Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and Rawls.

scholarly journals Mencermati Teori Keadilan Sosial John Rawls

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-192
Author(s):  
A. Khudori Soleh
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
John Locke ◽  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
The Other ◽  
Social Injustice ◽  
First Principle ◽  
Justice Theory ◽  
Basic Concepts ◽  
Principles Of Justice

Rawls' justice theory is based on three basic concepts: concept of property from John Locke, social contract from Rousseau, and imperative categories from Kant. This Rawls' justice conception itself emerges as a respond for social injustice in society as well as i nequitable behavior affected by the ethics of utilitarianism. Furthermore, according to Rawls, justice is fairness. The principles of justice are, (1) equal and maximum feasible liberty for all, (2) power and wealth to be distributed equally, except where inequalities; would work for the adage of all and where all would have equal opportunity to attain the higher position. The first principle supposes as permanent principle and, which cannot be interpreted. On the other hand, the second principle degrades two formulas: (a) everyone’s  advantage (b) equally open. So forth, from formula (a) can be degraded two possibilities: principle of efficiency and principle of differentiation, whereas from formula (b) also can be degraded two possibilities: equality as careers open to talents and equality as equality of fair opportunity): Hencefonh, from possibility of (a) and (b) yielded four possibilities of justice interpretation: natural freedom, free equality, free aristocracy and the equality democratize.  

scholarly journals Hak Atas Kebebasan Beragama/Berkeyakinan: Sebuah Upaya Pendasaran Filosofis

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 94
Author(s):  
Iqbal Hasanuddin
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Nations ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
The Self ◽  
Freedom Of Religion ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Philosophical Foundation ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Moral Foundation ◽  
The World

ABSTRACT: This paper tries to give a philosophical foundation to the rights to freedom of religion/belief. So far, the rights to freedom of religion/belief have been considered legitimated because resulted in General Assembly of the United Nations as mutual consensus of all nations around the world. Although, the normativity of the rights to freedom of religion/belief based on that mutual consensus is not ethical-philosophical, but political. By the justice argument of John Rawls and the self-ownership argument of Robert Nozick, this paper tries to give a moral foundation to the guarantee of respect and protection of the freedom of religion/belief. KEYWORDS: freedom of religion/belief, human rights instruments, forum internum, forum eksternum, justice, slef-ownership.ABSTRAK: Tujuan makalah ini adalah memberikan pendasaran filosofis bagi hak atas kebebasan beragama/berkeyakinan. Sejauh ini, hak atas kebebasan beragama/berkeyakinan (KBB) dipandang sebagai sesuatu yang bersifat normatif, karena dihasilkan dalam sidang-sidang Majelis Umum Perserikatan Bangsa-bangsa (PBB) sehingga telah menjadi konsensus bersama bangsa-bangsa di seluruh dunia. Namun demikian, normativitas hak atas KBB yang didasarkan pada konsensus bersama itu masih bersifat politis, belum memiliki dasar etis-filosofis. Melalui argumen keadilan yang didasarkan pada pemikiran John Rawls dan argumen kepemilikan-diri yang didasarkan pada pemikiran Robert Nozick, makalah ini mencoba memberikan landasan moral bagi jaminan penghormatan dan perlindungan bagi kebebasan beragama/berkeyakinan. KATA-KATA KUNCI: kebebasan beragama/berkeyakinan, instrumen-instrumen HAM, forum internum, forum eksternum, keadilan, kepemilikan-diri.

Democracy

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Norton
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Political Philosophy ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Jacques Derrida ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Other ◽  
Left And Right ◽  
Anglo American

This chapter examines how the Muslim question is tied to the question of democracy. In his book Voyous (translated as Rogues), Jacques Derrida referred to the United States and Islam as the enemies of democracy. In particular, he called Islam “the other of democracy.” Only Islam, Derrida insisted, refuses democracy. Derrida was not the only scholar to have made that claim. His account echoes Samuel Huntington. John Rawls thought Islam so alien that he was obliged to treat it separately. There are countless scholars, left and right, Anglo-American and Continental, who have insisted that Islam is the other of democracy. The chapter suggests that political philosophy in the Muslim (but not simply Muslim) tradition offers visions of democracy, cosmopolitanism, immigration, and integration that are remarkably familiar.

Rights and Risk

1986 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis McKerlie
Keyword(s):  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Moral View

Robert Nozick has suggested that risky actions are a problem for a moral view based on rights. We ordinarily think that some actions are too dangerous to be permissible, taking into account both the harm risked and the degree of the risk. Other actions, although they run some risk of serious harm, are thought permissible. The problem is to draw this distinction in a principled way by looking to rights.I think that Nozick's argument about risk can be answered but a different argument has convinced me that the rights view cannot handle risk in a satisfactory way. The inability is a function of the basic nature of the view.

Newcomb's Paradox and the Direction of Causation

1977 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 213-225 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. L. Mackie
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Direction Of Causation

Newcomb's paradox was first presented by Robert Nozick and has been discussed by a considerable number of writers. You are playing a game with a Being who seems to have extraordinary predictive powers. Before you are two boxes, in one of which you can see $1,000. The other is closed and you cannot see what it contains, but you know that the Being has put a million dollars into it if he has predicted that you will take it only, but nothing if he has predicted that you will take both boxes; you may take either both boxes or the closed one only. The Being has correctly predicted the choices of all who have so far played with him. What should you do?Let us call the Being the seer, and his opponent the player. I should also like to reduce the amount that may, or may not, be in the closed box to $10,000. Nearly everyone could make good use of $1,000 and better use of $10,000 or $11,000, but it is hard to say whether a million dollars would be a blessing or a curse.

Entitlement Theories of Justice: From Nozick to Roemer and Beyond

1985 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert J. van der Veen ◽  
Philippe Van Parijs
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Entitlement Theory ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Principle Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The One ◽  
Alternative Theories

In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick contrasts entitlement theories of justice and “traditional” theories such as Rawls', utilitarianism or egalitarianism, and advocates the former against the latter. What exactly is an entitlement theory (or conception or principle) of justice? Nozick's book offers two distinct characterizations. On the one hand, he explicitly describes “the general outlines of the entitlement theory” as maintaining “that the holdings of a person are just if he is entitled to them by the principles of justice in acquisition and transfer, or by the principle of rectification of injustice (as specified by the first two principles of just acquisition and transfer)” (Nozick, 1974, p. 153). On the other hand, his famous “Wilt Chamberlain” argument against alternative theories is first said to apply to (all) “non-entitlement conceptions” (p. 160), and later to any “end-state principle or distributional patterned principle of justice” (p. 163) — which amounts to an implicit characterization of an entitlement conception (theory, principle) as a conception of justice which is neither end-state nor patterned.

PROCEDURAL VERSUS SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE: RAWLS AND NOZICK

2006 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 164-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lewis Schaefer
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Free Society ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Political Justice ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Liberal Societies ◽  
Substantive Justice ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Just Society

This paper critically assesses the “procedural” accounts of political justice set forth by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1971) and Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). I argue that the areas of agreement between Rawls and Nozick are more significant than their disagreements. Even though Nozick offers trenchant criticisms of Rawls's argument for economic redistribution (the “difference principle”), Nozick's own economic libertarianism is undermined by his “principle of rectification,” which he offers as a possible ground in practice for the application of something like the difference principle. Both Rawls's and Nozick's accounts of justice fail because of their abstraction from human nature as a ground of right. At the same time the libertarianism on which they agree in the non-economic sphere would deprive a free society of its necessary moral underpinning. Rawls and Nozick err, finally, by demanding that the policies pursued by a just society conform to theoretical formulas concocted by philosophy professors, rather than leaving room (as Lockean liberalism does) for the adjustment of policies to particular circumstances based on statesmen's prudential judgment and the consent of the governed. Particularly troubling from the perspective of a citizen seriously concerned with the advancement of justice and freedom is both thinkers' shrill denunciations of existing liberal societies for failing to conform to their particular strictures.

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