Revisiting the Case for a Fiscal Union: the Federal Fiscal Channel of Downside-Risk Sharing in the United States

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Rossi

Author(s):  
Mauricio Drelichman ◽  
Hans-Joachim Voth

Why do lenders time and again loan money to sovereign borrowers who promptly go bankrupt? When can this type of lending work? As the United States and many European nations struggle with mountains of debt, historical precedents can offer valuable insights. This book looks at one famous case—the debts and defaults of Philip II of Spain. Ruling over one of the largest and most powerful empires in history, King Philip defaulted four times. Yet he never lost access to capital markets and could borrow again within a year or two of each default. Exploring the shrewd reasoning of the lenders who continued to offer money, the book analyzes the lessons from this historical example. Using detailed new evidence collected from sixteenth-century archives, the book examines the incentives and returns of lenders. It provides powerful evidence that in the right situations, lenders not only survive despite defaults—they thrive. It also demonstrates that debt markets cope well, despite massive fluctuations in expenditure and revenue, when lending functions like insurance. The book unearths unique sixteenth-century loan contracts that offered highly effective risk sharing between the king and his lenders, with payment obligations reduced in bad times. A fascinating story of finance and empire, this book offers an intelligent model for keeping economies safe in times of sovereign debt crises and defaults.





2004 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 51
Author(s):  
Michael P.G. Stinziano

In response to problems associated with insuring against the risk of foreign terrorist attacks in the United States, Congress passed The Terrorist Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) to help solve an availability and affordability crisis in the private marketplace for terrorism risk insurance. TRIA established a temporary three-year federal program that created a risk-sharing mechanism to provide private insurance companies with a tool to manage the allocation of their risk resulting from foreign terrorist attacks. The role of government in helping to provide financial protection from losses not served by private markets is not new, but protecting against terrorism risk is. TRIA and its possible alternatives remain a topic of considerable discussion and debate as our country continues to address the threat of terrorism in the United States. One important element of this analysis is to determine what permanent role, if any, the government should play in providing terrorism risk insurance to address the market failure that occurred after September 11. Another is to explore possible alternatives to the current temporary program.



ICR Journal ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 561-563
Author(s):  
Abdul Karim Abdullah (Leslie Terebessy)

Several cases of sukuk defaults and near defaults have occurred recently. In Malaysia, according to the Securities Exchange Commission, seven sukuk with a combined value of more than RM740 million, have defaulted. Sukuk issued by the Saad Group of Saudi Arabia, Dar Investment Group, the International Investment Group of Kuwait, East Cameron Partners in the United States and others also defaulted. In December 2009, several sukuk issued by Dubai World and its subsidiaries nearly defaulted. Was the way the sukuk were structured among the reasons for the defaults, as alleged by some, or were the sukuk investors simply the victims of the larger global economic and financial crisis?



2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 137-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Werner Sinn

AbstractThis paper argues that the European fiscal union and the measures of the ECB constitute a policy of excessively loose budget constraints in the Eurozone. They will slow down or hold back the real devaluation necessary for the southern countries to regain competitiveness and continue to cause capital flight as long as the printing press underbids the capital markets. The paper shows that Europe has the choice between two models: (i) free access to Target credits and eurobonds and (ii) the US model, with annual Target debt redemption and self-liability for any funds borrowed in the market. It suggests creating the United States of Europe following the US model as closely as possible.





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