scholarly journals Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hideshi Itoh
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

scholarly journals Group Reputations, Stereotypes, and Cooperation in a Repeated Labor Market

2007 ◽  
Vol 97 (5) ◽  
pp. 1751-1773 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul J Healy
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Infinite Time ◽  
Time Horizons ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
Finite Horizons ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
Reputation Effects ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

Reputation effects and other-regarding preferences have both been used to predict cooperative outcomes in markets with inefficient equilibria. Existing reputationbuilding models require either infinite time horizons or publicly observed identities, but cooperative outcomes have been observed in several moral hazard experiments with finite horizons and anonymous interactions. This paper introduces a full reputation equilibrium (FRE) with stereotyping (perceived type correlation) in which cooperation is predicted in early periods of a finitely repeated market with anonymous interactions. New experiments generate results in line with the FRE prediction, including final-period reversions to stage-game equilibrium and noncooperative play under unfavorable payoff parameters. (JEL C72, C73, C78, J41)

In evolutionary games, enlightened self-interests are still ultimately self-interests

2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Getty
Keyword(s):  
Human Behavior ◽  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Analytical Tool ◽  
Behavioral Sciences ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

Evolutionary theory provides a firm foundation for the unification of the behavioral sciences, and the beliefs, preferences, and constraints (BPC) model is a useful analytical tool for understanding human behavior. However, evolutionary theory suggests that if other-regarding preferences expressed by humans have evolved under selection, they are ultimately, if not purely, in the constrained, relative self-interests of individuals who express them.

Going Far by Going Together: James M. Buchanan’s Economics of Shared Ethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Art Carden ◽  
Gregory W. Caskey ◽  
Zachary B. Kessler
Keyword(s):  
Business Ethics ◽  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Public Capital ◽  
The Public ◽  
Economic Progress ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Ethical Communication ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

We explore themes in Nobel Prize–winning economist James M. Buchanan’s work and apply his Ethics and Economic Progress to problems facing individuals and firms. We focus on Buchanan’s analysis of the individual work ethic, his exhortations to “pay the preacher” of the “institutions of moral-ethical communication,” and his notion of law as “public capital.” We highlight several ways people with other-regarding preferences can contribute to social flourishing and some of the ways those who have “affected to trade for the public good” might want to redirect their efforts. We show how Buchanan’s work has considerable implications for business ethics. Just as his economic analysis of politics changed how we understand government, we think his economic analysis of ethics can (and should) change how we understand business.

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