scholarly journals Has the Stability and Growth Pact Impeded Political Budget Cycles in the European Union?

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakob de Haan ◽  
Mark Mink
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Stability And Growth Pact ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Political Budget Cycles ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Budget Cycles

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITALY RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF SUPRANATIONAL FISCAL REGULATION

2021 ◽  
pp. 208-221
Author(s):  
Dmitrii О. Mikhalev ◽  
◽  
Egor’ A. Sergeev ◽  
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Budget Deficit ◽  
Stability And Growth Pact ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Internal Factors ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
Discretionary Fiscal Policy ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Eu

The article presents a retrospective analysis of relations between the government of Italy and the European Union institutions in the context of supranational fiscal regulation in 2002–2019. The authors analyze the influence of external and internal factors on the state of public finance in Italy, note the reasons that made it difficult to meet the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact, study the main issues on the agenda in the EU-Italy relations and their evolution. The authors also come to conclusion that unlike the earlier discussions about correcting budget deficit in Italy, current focus of supranational fiscal governance is shifted to preventing it, what challenges the economic sovereignty of Italy and country’s opportunities to conduct a discretionary fiscal policy.

Explaining deviations from the Stability and Growth Pact: power, ideology, economic need or diffusion?

2015 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 477-504 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael A. Hansen
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Large Impact ◽  
Stability And Growth Pact ◽  
Relative Power ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Economic Need

AbstractWhy do some countries deviate from European Union law? More specifically, why do countries violate the Stability and Growth Pact, which is a cornerstone piece of legislation for the shared economy? Is it that violators simply have no other choice due to economic need? Are the violators intentional deviators that are simply able to violate the Stability and Growth Pact because of their power in the European Union? This article answers these questions and identifies those factors that are most likely to impact a country’s deviation from the two main clauses of the Stability and Growth Pact. The major finding is that it is economic need, not a country’s relative power, governing ideology or diffusion, that has a large impact on which clause will be violated.

scholarly journals Political Budget Cycles in the European Union: New Evidence of Fragmentation

2019 ◽  
Vol 69 (4) ◽  
pp. 523-547
Author(s):  
Milan Bednář
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Voter Turnout ◽  
Principal Component ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Political Budget Cycles ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Potential Gdp ◽  
Structural Budget ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Budget Cycles

This paper deals with the possible existence of political budget cycles (PBCs) within the European Union (EU). I use panel data for 28 EU countries from 1995 to 2016 and provide estimates based on dynamic panel regressions. I employ a system-GMM estimator complemented by the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to limit the number of instruments. The specifications include structural budget balances related to the potential GDP, thereby limiting the initial endogeneity. These measures capture the true motivation behind fiscal policies. The results suggest that the EU member states exhibit PBCs: (i) the intervention occurs in the year before elections and (ii) the structural budget balance to the potential GDP ratio is lower by −0.41 percentage points a year before elections. In addition, I have investigated the EU fragmentation in terms of the PBCs and selected 8 countries’ characteristics correlating to the existence of these cycles. These include lower GDP per capita, post-communist background, low tax burden, high perceived corruption, low levels of media freedom and internet usage, lower number of directly voted-in legislative officials, and a low parliamentary voter turnout.

Economic Policy Coordination in the European Union

2003 ◽  
Vol 183 ◽  
pp. 66-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain Begg ◽  
Dermot Hodson ◽  
Imelda Maher
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Economic Policy ◽  
Policy Coordination ◽  
Stability And Growth Pact ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Formal Rules

There are differing views about the need for economic policy coordination in the EU and about the adequacy of the system that has evolved under EMU. This article examines the case for such policy coordination, then describes and assesses the current arrangements for both ‘hard’ coordination — epitomised by the much-maligned Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) — and the ‘soft’ forms of coordination that have evolved in the EU to complement formal rules. Although the system achieves more than is sometimes recognised, it is shown to have weaknesses. Options for reforming the SGP and other facets of the system are discussed.

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