scholarly journals Bitcoin Trace-Net: Formal Contract Verification at Signing Time

Author(s):  
James Chiang
Keyword(s):  
2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 92-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaakko Kujala ◽  
Soili Nystén-Haarala ◽  
Jouko Nuottila

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to increase the understanding of the main challenges of the contracting process and project contracts in the context of project business characterized by a high level of complexity and uncertainty. The authors argue that understanding contracting as a flexible process and as a business tool will contribute to creating more value in projects which are implemented in constantly changing circumstances or which require gradual and iterative development. Design/methodology/approach – This is a conceptual paper with illustrative examples from the software industry. Findings – A prevailing approach for both managing contracts and the contracting process focuses on careful planning and drafting of contracts that protect each party in the case of conflicts and disagreements. The underlying assumption is that all activities can be planned and documented in a formal contract. According to this approach, the contracting process is seen only as a bargaining negotiation and the project contract as a detailed agreement of the responsibilities and safeguarding clauses to protect one’s position in the event of conflicts and failures. However, in the context of project business characterized by complexity and uncertainty, there is a need for flexible project contracts. The authors suggest that there are two fundamentally different approaches to implementing flexibility in both the contracting process and the project contract: postponing the decision until there is adequate information for decision making or making decisions that allow flexible adaptation to changes during the project lifecycle. Practical implications – The authors suggest that organizations in project business should pay closer attention to how contracts are formed and how flexibility is introduced to projects. Organizations are encouraged to see contracts as a business tool, not as rigid documents which are taken into use in case something goes wrong. Originality/value – This paper contributes to the understanding of how to adapt the contracting process to overcome challenges related to uncertainty, especially during the early phases of the project lifecycle. The authors provide a novel perspective on contracting as a process that extends over the lifecycle of a project and on the project contract as an agreement between parties formed during the contracting process. This perspective includes formal contract documents as well as various other documents, oral communication, commitments, actions and incidents.


2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (5) ◽  
pp. 1188-1204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manda Broekhuis ◽  
Kirstin Scholten

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate purchasing practices in service triads by exploring the link between ex ante contracting and ex post contract management and how these practices influence the satisfaction of buyers and suppliers (in concessionary arrangements) with their relationship in terms of meeting the needs of the buyer’s customers. Design/methodology/approach An in-depth exploratory multiple case study was carried out in a shop-in-shop context. Multi-method and multi-source data collection included interviews, documents and the contracts between buyer and supplier, providing evidence of the formal and relational structures in both the contracting and contract management stages. Findings The case findings provide evidence that behavioural standards established in a social contract are important prerequisites for the establishment and subsequent management of a formal contract. Second, this study shows that, when outsourcing core services in a service triad, a combination of performance-oriented and behavioural-oriented contract terms, covering a mix of topics related to both the customer-experience and to buyer-supplier-oriented aspects, contribute to aligning the buyer’s, suppliers’ and customers’ interests. The main findings are presented in a causal model and formulated as propositions. Originality/value This paper is one of the first studies to explore how core services are outsourced in a service triad. It provides evidence that the social contract between buyer and supplier influences the establishment of the formal contract as well as contract management, and a mix of contract topics, some related to the customers’ experience and others purely buyer-supplier oriented, contribute to the alignment of buyer’s, suppliers’ and customers’ interests.


2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 651-676 ◽  
Author(s):  
KARTHIKEYA NARAPARAJU

AbstractIn developing countries, lack of formal contract enforcement mechanisms is compensated by informal governance enforced through trust, kinship, reputation, etc. This paper focuses on one such setting in India's urban informal economy: the ‘day labour’ market for casual labour. We survey seven such markets in Navi Mumbai (a city on the outskirts of Mumbai), and find considerable incidence of contract enforcement problems in the form of employers reneging on wage payments to labourers. We find that payments to labourers with access to social networks and a record of work done are less likely to be reneged. Further, consistent with the literature on the limits of informal enforcement, we find that labourers in large markets, with greater linguistic and caste-based diversity, are more likely to be reneged. We argue that interventions aimed at facilitating access to formal mechanisms might help overcome some of the limitations with informal enforcement.


2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 81
Author(s):  
Lovisa Näslund

In the archive, the materialized traces of theatrical organization and performances remain. In this paper, we focus on the employment contract, as a type of source material commonly found but rarely studied in theatre studies. Empirically, the paper is based on a study of contracts from Albert Ranft’s Stockholm theatres, 1895-1926. Ranft built his commercially funded theatrical empire in Stockholm in a period when the competition from subsidized theatre was minimal, and for a time dominated the Stockholm theatres. The study demonstrates how the study of employment contracts allows us to form an understanding of power relations between managers on the one hand, and artists and directors on the other, and also the formal and social aspects of the employment contracts. In the case of Albert Ranft, the contracts bear evidence of his dominant position in Stockholm theatre, which in turn a orded him an unusually powerful position in relation to his employees. The relationship between the formal and social contract is explored, and it is suggested that the formal contract could be seen as a photographic negative of the social contract: if there is an extensive social contract, the formal contract will be more elaborate, and vice versa. The extensive formal contracts of the studied period might therefore be seen as evidence of a relatively thin social contract, implying that industry norms were, at the time, not institutionalized enough to be taken for granted.


1910 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 608 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harold D. Hazeltine

2021 ◽  
pp. 002085232110596
Author(s):  
Rui Mu ◽  
Peiyi Wu ◽  
Maidina Haershan

In the literature on relational governance, it is often assumed that relational governance emerges primarily after formal contracting and acts as a functional supplement to a formal contract. In this article, we show that especially facing deep uncertainties, relational governance can emerge before the start of formal partnerships, in the form of trust-building, exchanging resources, and fostering flexibility. Based on a case study of a smart city outsourcing project, this article introduces a forward-extended framework of relational governance that captures the pre-contractual dimensions of relationship cultivation and their role in facilitating formal contracting. The study finds that pre-contractual relational governance facilitates formal contracting by reducing substantive, evaluative, technological, and procedural uncertainties in the project and helps the partners to design an elaborative contract, undergo an easy negotiation, adopt short-term contracts, and use simple monitoring and evaluation methods. The article thus argues that only understanding post-contractual relational governance is insufficient for exploring the relation between formal contracting and relational governance; facing deep uncertainties, it is necessary to understand how public and private parties develop their pre-contractual relationship and reduce the uncertainties before a formal contract can be signed. Points for practitioners Practitioners should realize that there is much room for relational governance in the pre-contractual phase of PPP projects when the projects are rife with various uncertainties. Public and private parties can take measures to build trust, foster flexibility, and create interdependence before a formal contract is signed. These ex-ante relational governance measures can facilitate formal contracting by reducing the various uncertainties, making a formal contract designable, making negotiation smooth and easy, and reducing the need for contract supervision.


1973 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iliya Harik

The single-party system of Nasser's Egypt belongs to a political genre widespread in Africa. It is a collaboration movement in which a nationally dominant leader enters into an “alliance” with regionally and locally influential persons; the party organization serves as a kind of “formal contract” between them. As a rule, the alliance is tacit in nature, based on each side's reading of political realities, and therefore tending both to be ad hoc and to involve a limited degree of direct interaction. The collaboration movement may be described as a transcendental organization with which individuals willing to deal with and support the regime may affiliate without necessarily making a total commitment to the movement.


2009 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 2-9
Author(s):  
Aileen Moreton-Robinson

Citizenship is more than a status associated with a bundle of rights; it is also the formal contract by which the sovereignty of a nation is extended to the individual in exchange for being governed. Who can and who cannot contract into this status and what rights are able to be exercised is also shaped by who possesses the nation. In this article it is argued that citizenship operates discursively to contain Indigenous people’s engagement with the economy through social rights. This containment precludes consideration of Indigenous sovereign rights to our lands and resources, to enable Indigenous economic development within a capitalist market economy.


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