The Role of Naval Aviation in Modern Naval Warfare

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (002) ◽  
pp. 69-79
Author(s):  
I.S. KOZHIN
Keyword(s):  
Vulcan ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 110-129
Author(s):  
Frode Lindgjerdet

The Norwegian army and navy built their separate air arms around a few flimsy aircraft acquired from 1912. During the interwar period, the Army Air Force desired independence while its smaller naval counterpart fought tenaciously to remain part of the navy. The battle was carried out in the national military journals. Army aviation officers seduced by the air power theories of Giulio Douhet advocated independent operations; they maintained that challenges of air war and the skills required were independent of the surface over which it was fought. They also expected economic benefits from a unified service that could acquire fewer types of aircraft and unify technical services and education. Naval aviation officers maintained that naval air operations required knowledge of naval warfare, seamanship, tight naval integration, and specialized aircraft. What’s more, they resented the very idea that air power could win wars independently.


MCU Journal ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 35-50
Author(s):  
Andrew Rhodes

American officers considering the role of the sea Services in a future war must understand the history and organizational culture of the Chinese military and consider how these factors shape the Chinese approach to naval strategy and operations. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 remains a cautionary tale full of salient lessons for future conflict. A review of recent Chinese publications highlights several consistent themes that underpin Chinese thinking about naval strategy. Chinese authors assess that the future requires that China inculcate an awareness of the maritime domain in its people, that it build institutions that can sustain seapower, and that, at the operational level, it actively seeks to contest and gain sea control far from shore. Careful consideration of the Sino-Japanese War can support two priority focus areas from the Commandant’s Planning Guidance: “warfighting” and “education and training.”


2020 ◽  
Vol XIII ◽  
pp. 1-1
Author(s):  
Andrzej Olejko

The outbreak of the Second World War showed from 1 September 1939 an extremely important role of aviation. On the first day of military operations, however, not only the Luftwaffe units operated on the Baltic Sea, but also units of the German naval aviation, giving seriously to the defenders of the Coast. This article presents the activities of these individuals in the light of previously unknown archives


Itinerario ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-24
Author(s):  
Yomi Akinyeye

The colonial military history of British and French West Africa has received copious attention from historians and soldiers. The role of the region in the two world wars has also been discussed in one way or the other. However, in the discussion of West Africa's colonial military history and the role of the colonies in the two world wars, hardly any reference is made to the air factor. While discussions of colonial military history concentrate on infantry and naval exploits, those on the role of the colonies in the world wars concentrate on their importance as sources of raw materials and manpower for British and French war efforts in other theatres of the wars. The wrong impressions thus given are that the air factor was alien to West Africa's colonial defence and that the region was largely outside the strategic manoeuvres of the two world wars. This is understandable in that the Maxim gun and the gunboat had largely been responsible for the conquest and policing of West Africa. Moreover, while infantry and naval warfare had been the mode of combat in all societies from time immemorial the air as a factor of warfare is largely a phenomenon of the twentieth century. Lastly, strategists in British West Africa ignored the air factor for a very long time because of its capital intensity.


Author(s):  
Jason W. Smith

The epilogue tracks the evolution of naval science and its relationship to the broader scientific world into the Twentieth and Twenty-First centuries with attention to the growing strategic role of cartography, oceanography, and marine science within the Cold War national security state, the emergence of submarine warfare, and the militarization of science in weaponizing nature itself. The epilogue argues that while science became even more central to strategic discourse and naval warfare more generally, it continued to have a fraught place within the Navy’s ranks and its significance was not continuously appreciated among naval leaders even as the U.S. Marine Corps in the interwar period placed strategic knowledge of the natural world at the foundation of its emerging amphibious assault doctrine. Finally, the epilogue makes some general claims about the significance of the marine environment to naval affairs in the present day by linking the Navy’s strategic visions to a marine environment made more violent and dynamic by the influence of climate change as well as the renewed importance of hydrographers historic methods and data as baselines from which to understand the degree of change in the world’s oceans.


Author(s):  
Stephen Conway

This chapter ranges over the full period considered in the book to exemplify a number of central themes in the relationship between economic activity and naval warfare. It looks particularly at the British experience, as Britain was the major naval power for much of these three centuries. The chapter examines matters such as the role of the Navigation Acts, naval blockades, convoy systems, and the stimulation to industry and agriculture provided by shipbuilding, naval armaments, and the supply of foodstuffs to ships’ crews.


2016 ◽  
Vol 98 (902) ◽  
pp. 635-638 ◽  

From early history, people have used the sea, lakes and rivers for trade and commerce, for adventure and discovery. Despite these close ties, our survival on water depends on man-made objects such as ships, navigation systems and oxygen tanks. If we get injured or sick on water, or if our ships sink, we are vulnerable and our lives are in immediate danger.


2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Ashley Roach

The law of naval warfare as it existed in 1899 and as it is understood in 1999 exhibits a few similarities but many differences. The fundamental similarity is that the law of naval warfare can be seen, then as now, as consisting primarily of customary international law. The many differences in this law have been caused by the major changes in war at sea and the law of the sea. In 1899 war at sea meant combat primarily by gunfire between surface warships, control of maritime commerce, and shore bombardment. Today, war at sea also involves nuclear-powered aircraft carriers; supersonic aircraft, helicopters and tilt-rotor aircraft; submarines; high-speed patrol craft; ballistic, cruise, and other guided missiles; long-range secure communications for command, control, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; radar; underwater sound technology; electronic and information warfare; satellites in space; unmanned aerial and undersea vehicles; and stealth and computer technology; as well as expeditionary and amphibious capabilities. Nevertheless, the fundamental role of navies continues to be to establish control at sea or to deny it to the enemy, linking that control to broad political and economic issues ashore. In view of these constants and changes, this article reviews the state of the law of naval warfare at the end of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and assesses its future prospects.


2018 ◽  
Vol 97 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara Caputo

With few exceptions, existing research in British social and maritime history has never focused on the presence and role of Scotsmen in the Royal Navy of the French Wars era (1793–1815), on their identification and self-presentation within this institution, and on attitudes towards naval warfare in Scotland more generally. Situating the problem within current debates on ‘four nations’ history and the development of British identity, this article aims to fill this gap. It will consider, in turn, the Navy's institutional language and practices, individual experiences, and, chiefly employing as a case study the 1797 victory of Camperdown, achieved by the Scottish Admiral Duncan, public representations in the Scottish press. This will help to illustrate the often ambiguous relationship that Scots in the Navy—and particularly on the quarterdeck—could have with their homeland, and the powerful attraction, reinforced by the naval environment and administrative structures, which Englishness exerted on them. More broadly, it will be shown how the late Hanoverian Navy, as a markedly Anglocentric institution, acted as a key instrument of cultural, social and political assimilation of Scots into Britain, thus offering a valuable case study for an investigation of patterns of British integration.


JAMA ◽  
1966 ◽  
Vol 195 (12) ◽  
pp. 1005-1009 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. J. Fernbach
Keyword(s):  

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