scholarly journals EMPATHY AND THE EMOTIONAL COEXPERIENCING IN THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

Author(s):  
JEFF MITSCHERLING ◽  

After briefly remarking on previous treatments of empathy in the philosophical and psychological literature, I outline Stein’s treatment of this concept in On the Problem of Empathy and Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, illustrating the problematic breadth of her application of the term ‘empathy,’ a breadth that Stein herself calls to our attention. After a brief discussion of Stein’s treatment of empathy and the experience of value, I turn to certain features of Roman Ingarden’s analyses of aesthetic experience found in The Literary Work of Art and The Cognition of the Work of Art that deal with what he refers to as the reader’s ‘emotional coexperience’ of situations and events represented in the work of art. I conclude by comparing Stein’s account of empathy with Ingarden’s account of aesthetic experience, both of which deal at length with the subjective activities of “feeling with” and emotional coexperience.

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-144
Author(s):  
Ioana-Eliza Deac

Developing a system that would reunite all the arts and account for their similarities and differences on the basis of a shared set of criteria was one of the main objectives of the aesthetic discipline, whose roots run deep into romantic philosophy. The diversity of modernist experiments poses a number of challenges to such systematisation and invites theoreticians to start anew. To illustrate some of the main difficulties arising from this situation, particularly in the case of the literary work of art, this article will focus on Gérard Genette’s two volume work L’œuvre de l’art (1994, 1997). Genette’s main purpose is to offer a conceptual framework for the description of the work of art that would find a place in the system for its material mode of existence. His objective is achieved at the expense of the coherence of the model since the structure of what he terms allographic and autographic works proves to be asymmetrical. Thus, the autographic works are presented as having a dual nature: transcendental and immanent (that is, physical), while the allographic works comprise three different levels: transcendence – immanence (understood as ideal) – and (physical) manifestation. After confronting Genette’s premises with the conclusions of several disciplines which study the same object of immanence from a different perspective, this paper will propose a revised and more coherent version of his system.


Author(s):  
Antoni B. Stepien

Ingarden was a leading exponent of phenomenology and one of the most outstanding Polish philosophers. Representing an objectivist approach within phenomenology he stressed that phenomenology employs a variety of methods, according to the variety of objects, and aspires to achieve an original cognitive apprehension of these objects. Its aim is to reach the essence of an object by analysing the contents of appropriate ideas and to convey the results of this analysis in clear language. Ingarden applied his methods in many areas of philosophy. He developed a pluralist theory of being and an epistemology which makes it possible to practise this discipline in an undogmatic manner and to defend the value of human knowledge. In the theory of values he developed an inspiring approach to the analysis of traditionally problematic areas. He was best known for his work in aesthetics, in which he analysed the structure of various kinds of works of art, the nature of aesthetic experience, the cognition of works of art and the objective character of aesthetic values. In general, he gave phenomenology a lucid and precise shape. In the interwar period Ingarden was the main opponent in Poland of the dominant Lwów–Warsaw School (Polish Analytic School), which had a minimalistic orientation. The main lines of his own investigations emerged largely as a result of his regular debates with Husserl, in particular those concerning Husserl’s transcendental idealism. Ingarden’s best-known work, Das literarische Kunstwerk (The Literary Work of Art) (1931a) has its origins in this debate.


Hikma ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (15) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfredo Hermosillo López

<p>Resumen:</p><p>Este artículo analiza la teoría de los cuatro estratos del filósofo polaco Roman Ingarden. Tiene el propósito de mostrar que sus conceptos sobre la lectura activa y la obra de arte literaria, además de ser el punto de partida de los estudios de recepción desarrollados más ampliamente por Hans-Robert Jauss y Wolfgang Iser, pueden utilizarse como fundamento teórico para el análisis de traducciones literarias.</p><p> </p><p><em>A</em><em>bstract:</em></p><p>This article analyses the theory of the four strata proposed by the Polish philosopher Roman Ingarden. Its main purpose is to show that Ingarden’s concepts regarding the active reading and the literary work of art, besides from being the starting point of the literary reception studies, developed more widely by Hans-Robert Jauss and Wolfgang Iser, can also be used as a theoretical foundation for the analysis of literary translations.</p>


Author(s):  
Endre Kiss

Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy avoids the problem of literary objectiveness altogether. His approach witnesses the general fact that an indifference towards literary objectiveness in particular, leads to a peculiar neglect of par excellence literariness as such. It seems obvious, however, that the constitutive aspects of the crisis of literary objectiveness cannot be shown to contain the underlying intention of bringing about this situation. At this point, one can identify what could probably be the most important element in a definition of literary objectiveness. In contrast to ‘natural’ objectiveness and objectiveness based on various societal conventions, the legitimacy of a literary work is solely guaranteed by its elements being organized in accordance with the rules of literary objectiveness. Thus when the crisis of literary objectiveness intensifies, literariness will also find itself in a crisis. This crisis detaches new, quasi-literary formations from various definitions of literariness. When literary objectiveness ceases, however, to be understood as a system constituted by various objective formations aiming to correspond in one way or another to the ‘world’, scientific analysis of literary objectiveness will be rendered impossible. The crisis of literary objectiveness thus brings about the crisis of the theory of literature and the philosophy of art. Gadamer explicitly argues that the scientific approach proves to be inadequate in the analysis of artistic experience. This attitude results in the categorical rejection of a scientific orientation (and so in a complete indifference towards literary objectiveness), but he seems to overemphasize an otherwise correct thesis on the non-reflexive character of artistic experience. It is the anti-mimetic and Platonic character of Gadamer’s aesthetic hermeneutics that determines the status of literary (artistic) objectiveness in his system of thought. What is of crucial importance, however, is to point out that this aesthetics entails a fundamental reduction of the significance of literary objectiveness. As soon as the essence of aesthetic object-constitution is taken to be re-cognition (plus the emanating aesthetic possibilities), the absolutely natural interest in the original object represented by a work of art.Undoubtedly, Gadamer’s conception answers a number of questions that tend to be ignored by other theories. It is just as obvious, however, that Gadamer completes here the aesthetic devaluation of the objective domain. It is not the characteristics of the ‘original’ that constitute the image, but in effect the image turns the original into an original. Paraphrasing this claim one arrives at a near paradox: not objectiveness makes a work of art possible, but a work of art lends objects their objectiveness.


Author(s):  
Pau Pedragosa

El contenido de este artículo consiste en mostrar que la experiencia estética es la esencia de la experiencia de la obra de arte. Argumentaré en contra de la concepción del arte de Arthur C. Danto según la cual el arte moderno ya no requiere de la experiencia estética y este hecho determina el fin del arte. La experiencia estética permitiría dar cuenta del arte desde el Renacimiento hasta el siglo XIX pero el arte moderno del siglo XX solo puede ser explicado conceptualmente y, por tanto, la filosofía del arte es necesaria para explicitar ese contenido.Para defender el estatuto estético de la obra de arte mostraré que la experiencia estética se identifica con la experiencia fenomenológica. Esto quiere decir que la experiencia estética nos hace concientes de la diferencia entre el contenido de la obra (lo que aparece ) y el medio de la experiencia sensible en el que este contenido se da (el aparecer). El “aparecer” y “lo que aparece” se corresponden en la experiencia estética con los dos polos de la relación intencional y constituyen los dos estratos fundamentales de la obra de arte. A través de la aproximación fenomenológica intentaré mostrar que la obra de arte no excluye el contenido conceptual, pero este contenido ha de estar necesariamente incorporado. No es la filosofía la que tiene que comprender este contenido sino exclusivamente la experiencia estética.The subject of this paper is to claim that the aesthetic experience is the essence of the experience of the work of art. I argue against the view hold by Arthur C. Danto, according to which modern art does not require the aesthetic experience any more and that this fact means the end of art. The aesthetic experience allows explaining only the art made be-tween the Renaissance and the XIX century. The modern work of art of the XX century can only be explained conceptually and therefore a philosophy of art is required to make that content explicit and clear.To defend the aesthetic status of the work of art I will show that the aesthetic experience identifies itself with the phenomenological ex-perience. This means that the aesthetic experience makes us aware of the difference between the content of the work (what appears) and the sensible lived experience in which this content appears (the appearance). The “appearance” and “what appears” are the two poles of Intentionality and the two fundamental layers of the work of art. Through the phenomenological approach I will make clear that the work of art does not exclude the conceptual content at all. This content has to be necessarily embodied. It is not philosophy that has to disclose this con-tent but the aesthetic experience alone.


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