scholarly journals Electronic commerce and the fashion industry: new challenges for competition law coming from the Digital Single Market

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 15-33
Author(s):  
Caterina Fratea
Keyword(s):  
Electronic Commerce ◽  
Industrial Revolution ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Single Market ◽  
Fashion Industry ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Online Sales ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Commercial Landscape ◽  
Market Strategies

Digital technology has changed our markets to an extent last seen during the industrial revolution and electronic commerce has been growing steadily over the last decade. This paper intends to assess how the development of online sales has affected market strategies and the application of competition law, with a particular focus on the selective distribution agreements within the fashion industry. Secondly, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union is analysed in order to show how certain new contractual clauses, that have become frequent in the digital commercial landscape, require competition rules to be read under a new lens. The final part is dedicated to the recent Geo-blocking Regulation which represents one the most significant measures within the Digital Single Market, highlighting both its coordination with antitrust provisions and its application when competition law does not apply.

2. The Competition Law and Institutions of the European Union

2019 ◽  
pp. 75-96
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin ◽  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
The Public ◽  
Directorate General ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
The Eu

This chapter sketches the history and functions of the EU and its institutions in order to set the EU competition rules in context. It then describes the competition provisions themselves and outlines the way in which the rules are applied and enforced, including the public enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 under Regulation 1/2003, the control of mergers with a European dimension under Regulation 139/2004, public enforcement by the national competition authorities of the Member States, and the role of private enforcement. It discusses the position and powers of the European Commission, particularly the role of the Competition Directorate General (DG Comp); the powers of the EU Courts; the significance of fundamental rights and the general principles of EU law in competition cases; the application of competition rules to particular sectors of the economy; and the application of the EU rules to the EEA.

Market Competition

2019 ◽  
pp. 99-130
Author(s):  
Anu Bradford
Keyword(s):  
Market Competition ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Critical Dimension ◽  
Single Market ◽  
Global Effect ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Regulatory Capacity ◽  
Key Aspects ◽  
The Eu

Chapter 4 discusses competition law, which offers one of the most prominent examples of the EU’s global regulatory hegemony. This chapter first introduces the key aspects of EU competition law. It then explains why the EU has chosen to build an extensive regulatory capacity in this area, illustrating how competition law forms a critical dimension of the EU’s broader, single market program. Following that, it offers examples of the de facto and de jure Brussels Effects pertaining to competition regulation. These examples illustrate that the de jure Brussels Effect has been extensive. At the same time, the occurrence of the de facto Brussels Effect often turns to the question of non-divisibility, at times enabling while at times limiting the global effect of EU competition rules.

III. Social Policy

2006 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 475-482
Author(s):  
Erika Szyszczak
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Social Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Holistic Approach ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Single Market ◽  
Merger Policy ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Lisbon Agenda

Social policy is undergoing review, the aim being to consolidate the fragmented nature of social policy law, and to provide for the integration of all Community policies. This is part of a larger where the EU is attempting to provide a holistic approach towards all policies, ensuring that they meet the demands placed upon governments, as well as private undertakings, in the enlarged single market. Of particular significance is the interaction between social policy law and competition law, especially in relation to state aid and merger policy. The Lisbon Process, now at mid-term, has not been successful in delivering the projected results. Thus throughout 2005 the European Union focused upon revitalizing the Lisbon agenda with the focus upon improving the quality of work as well as combating unemployment.1

scholarly journals EU Competition Law Put to the Brexit Test: What Impact Might the Exit of the UK from the Union Have on the Enforcement of the Competition Rules?

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (17) ◽  
pp. 7-27
Author(s):  
Arianna Andreangeli
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Future Development ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Competition Enforcement

This contribution examines some of the consequences of the UK’s exit from the European Union for the enforcement of the competition rules. It reflects on the impact that Brexit is going to have on future transnational antitrust litigation in Britain and Europe. Thereafter it analyses the challenges that Brexit is likely to present for cooperation in public competition enforcement and suggests solutions for future development.

7. EU competition law: introduction and Article 101 TFEU

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Business Practices ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules

Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibit anti-competitive business practices. The European Commission, national competition authorities, and national courts enforce Articles 101 and 102 under powers conferred by Regulation 1/2003. From time to time, the European Commission issues non-binding notices providing clarification of the competition rules. This chapter focuses on Article 101, but begins with an outline of Articles 101 and 102 and the rules on enforcement. In broad terms, Article 101 prohibits business agreements or arrangements which prevent, restrict, or distort competition within the internal market and affect trade between Member States.

scholarly journals PAY-FOR-DELAY AGREEMENTS UNDER EU COMPETITION LAW – A COMMENT ON PAROXETINE

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-178
Author(s):  
João Pateira Ferreira
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Generic Manufacturer ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Settlement Agreement ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Settlement Agreements

Summary The Court of Justice of the European Union (“Court of Justice”) issued its first ruling on pay-for-delay agreements, in reply to a reference for a preliminary ruling from the UK’s Competition Appeal Tribunal (“CAT”) during its review of the appeal of a Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) decision applying a fine to GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) and five generic manufacturers for having entered into agreements settling patent disputes relating to GSK’s antidepressant paroxetine, on the basis that such agreements infringed competition rules. In its Paroxetine ruling of 30 January 2020[1], the Court of Justice found that patent settlements are not, by their very nature, anticompetitive; however, generic manufacturers can be regarded as potential competitors to the originator manufacturers when they have announced their intention to compete in the same market as the originator and, as such, patent settlement agreements are to be reviewed as horizontal agreements between competitors. Finally, a payment from the originator to the generic manufacturer in a patent settlement agreement is not enough to qualify such an agreement as a restriction of competition by object (the agreement is not anticompetitive by its very nature), unless there is no other justification for the payment other than to compensate the generic manufacturer for accepting to delay its entry in the market. In those circumstances, the Court finds that such an agreement will constitute a restriction of competition by object[2]. In this comment, we review the Court’s findings in relation to the issue of potential competition between the originator and the generics manufacturers and the qualification of this agreement as a restriction of competition by object. Keywords: pay-for-delay; restriction; competition; agreement; settlement; patent

scholarly journals Protection against competition law violations: Opportunities for compensation for damages in the Eurasian Economic Union and the European Union

Pravovedenie ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-380
Author(s):  
Elena V. Babkina ◽  
◽  
Natalia G. Maskayeva ◽  
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eurasian Economic Union ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Economic Union ◽  
Supranational Regulation

The article analyzes current legal regulations in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and European Union (EU) governing protection against integrated entities’ violations of their respective competition laws. The issues of the policies implemented in this area in accordance with EAEU law, the correlation of national and supranational regulation and their application (including the principle of non bis in idem), and the delimitation of the competence of national and EAEU bodies in this area are clarified in light of the provisions of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union (EEC) of May 29, 2014 and advisory opinions of the Court of the Eurasian Economic Union (of April 4, 2017; of December 17, 2018; of June 18, 2019). The absence of a legal ground for “private enforcement” of the EAEU competition laws, including its most important element — compensation for losses — is noted. In this regard, the authors analyze the experience of the European Union in this sphere, which is reflected in the Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of November 26, 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the member states and of the European Union. Its key provisions are considered in sufficient detail. Based on the results of the research undertaken, it is concluded that it is necessary to empower the Eurasian Economic Commission in the EAEU Treaty to calculate the damages caused by the infringements of the EAEU Treaty competition rules that have or may have a negative effect on competition in cross-border markets in the territories of two or more EAEU member states. In order to implement this, it is also proposed to vest the EEC with the competence to approve the procedure of recovery and methodology of calculating these damages. According to the authors, the development of such a procedure requires the study, inter alia, of the mentioned EU experience.

scholarly journals All's Fair in Sport and Competition? The Application of EC Competition Rules to Sport

2007 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 238-254
Author(s):  
An Vermeersch
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Economic Aspects ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Ec Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Sporting Activities ◽  
Trust Law ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Intense Debate

The commercialisation and internationalisation of sporting activities alongside ongoing European integration has put the relationship between the European Union and the sports world under strain. The Bosman case marked the start of an intense debate on an appropriate regulatory framework for this evolving relationship. Whereas the Community judges in previous sport related cases had consistently opted for settling the dispute on the basis of free movement provisions, the Piau and the Meca-Medina & Majcen cases entail the first rulings on the application of EC competition law to sport. This paper tackles the difficulty of separating the economic aspects from the sporting aspects of a sport and the consequences of anti-trust law for sporting associations. Whether the Court of Justice provided satisfactory guidelines to deal with upcoming legal actions and more generally, whether these guidelines on the application of competition law might influence the governance of sport in Europe, is also considered.

scholarly journals Antitrust Damage Claims: A View From Efta Court

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-170
Author(s):  
Agata Jurkowska-Gomułka
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Point Of Interest ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Damage Claims

Articles 101 and 102 TFEU have become a pattern for competition rules provided in Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement, which entered into force on 1 January 1994. Both EU competition law and EEA competition law can be enforced before national courts. Lodging damage claims in the EU was facilitated by Directive 2014/104/EU. The so-called Antitrust Damages Directive was highly inspired by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Although Directive 2014/104/EU has not been incorporated into the EEA law, damage claims resulting from violations of EEA competition rules are judged by national courts in the EEA Member States, which is why some aspects of private enforcement of competition law have become a point of interest for the EFTA Court, being – together with the Court of Justice of the European Union – the EEA court. Firstly, the article aims at checking if the EFTA Court jurisprudence on antitrust damage claims follows the guidelines formulated in the case law of the Court of Justice. Since the positive answer to this question is highly probable, secondly, the article aims at identifying the extent of the impact of EU jurisprudence in private enforcement cases on judgments of the EFTA Court. The article concludes that the EFTA Court’s activities regarding antitrust damage claims follow the route indicated by the Court of Justice of the European Union. Four identified judgments regarding – directly or indirectly – antitrust damage claims (Nye Kystlink, Fjarskipti, Schenker I and Schenker V), delivered by the EFTA Court, seem to strengthen its position as an institution that is able to guarantee a coherence between EEA and EU competition law. EFTA Court’s judgments in private enforcement cases are also a point of interest and reference for EU Advocates General and can become an inspiration for both EU and national case law.

2. The Competition Law and Institutions of the European Union

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Title Vii ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Academic Debate

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter sketches the history of the EU and its institutions in order to set the competition rules in context. It then discusses the competition provisions themselves, and explains the way in which those rules are applied and enforced. The EU competition rules are primarily contained in Title VII, Chapter 1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The two main competition articles are Article 101 TFEU, which applies to agreements between undertakings, and Article 102, which applies to the conduct of undertakings in a ‘dominant position’. Articles 101 and 102 are supplemented by Article 106 (public undertakings and undertakings with special or exclusive rights), and by articles concerned with powers and procedures.

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