Market Competition

2019 ◽  
pp. 99-130
Author(s):  
Anu Bradford

Chapter 4 discusses competition law, which offers one of the most prominent examples of the EU’s global regulatory hegemony. This chapter first introduces the key aspects of EU competition law. It then explains why the EU has chosen to build an extensive regulatory capacity in this area, illustrating how competition law forms a critical dimension of the EU’s broader, single market program. Following that, it offers examples of the de facto and de jure Brussels Effects pertaining to competition regulation. These examples illustrate that the de jure Brussels Effect has been extensive. At the same time, the occurrence of the de facto Brussels Effect often turns to the question of non-divisibility, at times enabling while at times limiting the global effect of EU competition rules.

2021 ◽  
pp. 1019-1055
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter deals with four issues. First it will briefly examine three sectors of the economy that are wholly or partly excluded from EU competition law, namely nuclear energy, military equipment and agriculture; the special regime that once existed for coal and steel products under the former European Coal and Steel Community (‘the ECSC’) Treaty is also mentioned in passing. Secondly, it will explain the application of the EU competition rules apply to the transport sector. Thirdly, the chapter will consider the specific circumstances of four so-called ‘regulated industries’, electronic communications, post, energy and water, where a combination of legislation, regulation and competition law seek to promote competition. Last, but by no means least, the current debate concerning digital platforms is discussed where it is likely that ex ante regulatory rules will be introduced, both in the EU and the UK, to address concerns about anti-competitive conduct and a tendency towards the monopolisation of markets.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (19) ◽  
pp. 55-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katalin J. Cseres

In order to facilitate national competition authorities (NCAs) in their application of EU competition rules, the EU legislator adopted Directive 2019/1/EU. The Directive’s aim is to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers of competition law and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. The so-called ECN+ Directive introduces minimum harmonisation rules allowing competition authorities to have common investigative, decision-making (notably fining decisions) and enforcement powers. The Directive, furthermore, sets minimum safeguards for the NCAs’ independence, accountability and resources as well as harmonizes leniency programmes including the coordination of national leniency programmes with each other and with that of the European Commission. This paper critically analyzes the legal and policy developments that paved the way for the adoption of this Directive. Moreover, it examines the changes the implementation of the Directive is likely to generate in current Hungarian law and policy of competition protection. The focus of the paper’s assessment is on the institutional aspects of the Directive and the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, in particular the mechanisms for ensuring independence and accountability of the NCAs. Through the assessment of the Hungarian implementation, the paper aims to shed light on a broader context of the Directive and the enforcement of EU competition law in EU Member States. The paper shows that the implementation of the Directive may fail to translate into (more) effective enforcement without an effective institutional capacity on the side of the NCAs, and in the broader legal and constitutional context of competition law and its multilevel enforcement


Author(s):  
Katalin J Cseres

This chapter evaluates the functioning of the decentralized public enforcement of EU competition law. The analysis focuses on the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement, which relies on Rule of Law principles. It has been argued that Rule of Law principles are a prerequisite for effective competition law enforcement. Aside from that, assessing the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement framework also takes account of the problems of multilevel governance which have emerged as a result of the decentralization of enforcement powers and the creation of parallel competences for the Commission and national actors which made it essential to guarantee uniform and consistent application of the EU competition rules. Centrifugal pulls from the Member States towards their national legal systems and centripetal pushes from the Commission create uniformity and consistency in this multilevel system. Analysing these bottom-up and top-down approaches allows us to analyse decentralized enforcement as a specific governance model.


2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-151
Author(s):  
Albertina Albors-Llorens

The adoption of Directive 2014/104/EU on actions for damages for infringements of the competition rules has marked the beginning of a new era in the field of the private enforcement of the EU competition rules. The arduous legislative journey leading to the adoption of the Directive, the specific aspects pertaining to the exercise of damages actions covered by it and its attempt to establish an effective coordination between the systems of public and private enforcement have already received intense attention by antitrust scholars. However, this contribution will focus on the study of the Directive’s significance as a novel legal instrument in both the fields of EU competition law and EU law in general.


Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter examines the obligations of Member States in relation to EU competition law. Specifically, it considers the obligations that Article 4(3) TEU and Articles 37 and 106 TFEU place upon Member States. Article 4(3) requires all Member States to take all appropriate measures to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties, and to avoid any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the EU’s objectives. Article 106 particularly obligates Member States to refrain from enacting or maintaining measures contrary to the rules provided in Article 18 and Articles 101 to 109 of the TFEU. Article 37 is concerned with the procurement of goods.


Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter provides a brief overview of EU and UK competition law and the institutions involved in formulating, interpreting and applying competition law. It also explains the relationship between EU competition law and the domestic competition laws of the Member States, in particular in the light of Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003. The rules of the European Economic Area are briefly referred to, and the trend on the part of Member States to adopt domestic competition rules modelled on those in the EU is also noted. Three diagrams at the end of the chapter explain the institutional structure of EU and UK competition law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-508 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victoria Daskalova

This paper discusses the role that EU competition law can play in regulating the “new self-employed”—precarious workers formally considered to be micro-enterprises. Specific attention is paid to the newest type of “new self-employed,” namely those engaged via matchmaking platforms arranging for work to be contracted on demand. Despite their unequal bargaining position, self-employed individuals are barred from collective bargaining due to the EU competition rules. This Article argues that the problem will not be solved by modifying the respective tests for “worker” and “undertaking” in EU law, or by introducing exceptions under Article 101 TFEU. This Article then adopts a regulatory approach to canvass the different legal instruments available to address exploitation concerns in the context of the Uber economy, and discusses the role that EU competition law can play in such a regime.


Author(s):  
Konstantina Bania

ABSTRACT In recent years, buzz terms such as “geo-blocking”, “online content portability”, and “digital copyright” have been making rounds in EU policy circles. This is largely attributed to the “Digital Single Market Strategy”, an ambitious reform the objective of which is to ensure seamless cross-border access to online services. Pursuit of this objective appears to be largely driven by the assumption that limiting the exclusivity of copyright would stimulate intra-Union competition in content markets. Against the background of EU competence limitations in the field of copyright and the increasing popularity of global U.S. firms in European audiovisual markets, this paper argues that EU Competition Law has vainly been instrumentalized to complete a single market for content. More particularly, based on legal and policy developments, which appear to challenge widespread licensing practices, sector-specific economics, and the case law that sets the conditions under which competition enforcement may introduce limits to copyright protection, this study develops the following twofold argument: in an attempt to create a single market for copyright-protected broadcast content, the EU has stretched the boundaries of competition law in an excessive manner and such unjustified interference with copyright is simply inadequate to promote competition and market integration.


Author(s):  
P. Bernt Hugenholtz ◽  
Joost Poort

AbstractThis article discusses the role of territorial licences for feature films against the background of judicial and market developments in the EU. Currently, territorial licences are deemed a cornerstone of the exploitation and financing of films in Europe. However, current models of film financing are under increasing pressure both from market developments such as the turbulent growth of global online video platforms, and from developments in EU law aimed at removing national territorial barriers to the Single Market. Examples are the rule of Union-wide exhaustion of the distribution right, the EU Portability Regulation and the country of origin rules for satellite broadcasting and online simulcasting. EU competition law sets additional limits to grants of territorial exclusivity, and prohibits clauses in broadcasting and pay television licences that prevent or restrict “passive” sales to consumers/viewers in non-licensed territories. The freedom of right holders to preserve territorial exclusivity by way of contract is likely to become increasingly vulnerable to EU competition law, as underlying territorial rights no longer support territorial grants. For the film sector where territorial exclusivity remains indispensable, the European Commission could create specific competition law rules in the form of “block exemptions”. Language exclusivity – i.e. exclusive grants of rights for distinct language versions of a film – could provide a practical and legally more robust alternative to territorial licensing.


2021 ◽  
pp. 224-257
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter examines the obligations of Member States in relation to EU competition law. Specifically, it considers the obligations that Article 4(3) TEU and Articles 37 and 106 TFEU place upon Member States. Article 4(3) requires all Member States to take all appropriate measures to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties, and to avoid any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the EUs objectives. Article 106 particularly obligates Member States to refrain from enacting or maintaining measures, contrary to the rules provided in Article 18 and Articles 101 to 109 of the TFEU. Article 37 is concerned with state monopolies of a commercial character.


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