Het politiek gebeuren in de Europese Gemeenschap in 1990

Res Publica ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 33 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 396-431
Author(s):  
Liesbet Hooghe

The democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe, the speedy unification process of the two Germanies, growing economic disarray in the Soviet Union and the Gulf War put great pressure on the European Community - and raised high expectations throughout 1990. The external challenges initially seemed to slow down the internal integration process. But by the end of 1990 the Twelve (including Britain after Mrs. Thatcher's resignation) committed themselves to further European political union (stronger institutions, common foreign and security policy, new competences) and European economic union culminating into a central bank and a common currency. The two intergovernmental constitutional conferences on EPU and EMU were installed on December 15. The execution of the internal market programme is on schedule with 70% of the directives adopted by late 1990, although the Commission expressed concern about timely transposition of the directives into national law. The EC's record on external relations is mixed : appreciation for its stepped-up cooperation with Eastern Europe, criticism for its tough stand on agriculture at the Gatt-conference, weak diplomatie performance during the Gulf War.

1995 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 510-532
Author(s):  
Christoph Bluth

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IS STILL IN A STATE OF FLUX. LIKE the other former republics of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation seeks to come to terms with being an independent state needing to define its national interests and foreign and security policy objectives.The principal element in the new frame of reference for Moscow is the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union itself. For forty years, most of the territories controlled by Moscow were adjacent to territories protected by the United States, or else to China. The Russian Federation is now virtually surrounded by former Soviet republics, all with deep political, social and economic problems, and some of which are highly unstable and subject to violent civil conflicts. The territory of the Russian Federation itself, about 75 per cent of the territory of the former USSR with about 60 per cent of its population, is still not properly defined, given that significant sections of the borders are purely notional, and the degree of control that Moscow can exercise over the entire Federation is uncertain.


Author(s):  
П. А. Sinovets ◽  
M. R. Nerez

The article is dedicated to the exploration of the Russian strategic culture and its influence on the major foreign and security policy trends of the Russian Federation. In particular, we suggest dividing Russian strategic culture into the three domains, taking roots from the historic, geographic, and religious foundations of the Moscow state. Those are, first, the Third Rome doctrine, having laid the background for the Russian imperial messianism, the immanent rivalry with the West as well as the Russian World idea and the further annexation of Crimea. Second, the “gathering lands” principle added the sacral meaning to the idea of strategic depth and the territory of Russia. As the result, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the enlargement of NATO to the East became the most painful episodes in Russian history, causing the reaction, which led to the confrontational role of Russia in the international system. And “the besieged fortress” principle serves as the element of integrating the Russian state and society as it is based on the idea that only the existence of rivals makes Russia the great state.


1994 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 494-514 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Pinder

Between The European Elections of June 1989 and those of June 1994, the voters had to digest an extraordinary diet of change. The cold war ended, leading to the unification of Germany and replacing one monolithic security problem by a diversity of problems, including, most agonizingly, Bosnia. The Soviet Union disintegrated. Recession brought unemployment above 10 per cent for the European Union as a whole. Many were bemused by the complexity of the Maastricht Treaty and the political conflicts engendered by some of its major elements. Foremost among these was the project for the single currency, promoted by France in order to anchor Germany yet more firmly in the Union. The idea of a ‘common defence’ as a backbone for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) also had this motivation.


1990 ◽  
Vol 263 (3) ◽  
pp. 120-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
William U. Chandler ◽  
Alexei A. Makarov ◽  
Zhou Dadi

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