International Perspectives on Electricity Market Monitoring and Market Power Mitigation

2007 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
José A. García ◽  
James D. Reitzes
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Electricity Markets ◽  
Electricity Market ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Design Features ◽  
Disclosure Requirements ◽  
Market Monitoring ◽  
International Perspectives ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Bilateral Trading

We review the different market monitoring and market-power mitigation policies that arise in world electricity markets. Regulators for electricity markets apparently respond to differences in underlying market structure and design features when choosing between ex-ante (that is, rule-based) behavioral restrictions as opposed to ex-post enforcement (that is, investigations and sanctions) as the principal means for deterring abuses of market power. Particular design features that influence market-monitoring policies are whether the market is one-part (energy only) versus two-part (energy and capacity), and whether there is centralized or bilateral trading. Information-disclosure requirements also are a key element of market monitoring.

scholarly journals Competition in Power Generation: Ex-ante Analysis of Indonesia’s Electricity Market

Energies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (24) ◽  
pp. 6741
Author(s):  
Dzikri Firmansyah Hakam ◽  
Sudarso Kaderi Wiyono ◽  
Nanang Hariyanto
Keyword(s):  
Power System ◽  
Market Structure ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Electricity Markets ◽  
Electricity Market ◽  
Regulatory Reform ◽  
Optimal Number ◽  
Load Flow ◽  
Utility Company ◽  
Competitive Electricity Markets

This research optimises the mix and structure of Generation Companies (GenCos) in the Sumatra power system, Indonesia. Market power, indicating the ability to raise prices profitably above the competitive level, tends to be a significant problem in the aftermath of electricity market restructuring. In the process of regulatory reform and the development of competitive electricity markets, it is desirable and practical to establish an efficient number of competitor GenCos. Simulations of a power system account for multi-plant mergers of GenCos subject to a regulatory measure of the Residual Supply Index and the influence of direct current load flow and the topology of the system. This study simulates the Sumatra power system in order to determine the following: optimal market structure, efficient GenCo generation mix, and the optimal number of competitive GenCos. Further, this study seeks to empirically optimise the electricity generation mix and electricity market structure of the Sumatra power system using DC load flow optimisation, market power index, and multi-plant monopoly analysis. The simulations include generation and transmission constraints to represent network constraints. This research is the first to analyse the Sumatra power system using imperfect (Cournot) competition modelling. Furthermore, this study is the first kind to optimise the mix and structure of the Sumatra generation power market. The guidelines and methodology in this research can be implemented in other countries characterised by a monopoly electricity utility company.

scholarly journals Review of Information Disclosure in Different Electricity Markets

Energies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (12) ◽  
pp. 3424 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yang Yang ◽  
Minglei Bao ◽  
Yi Ding ◽  
Yonghua Song ◽  
Zhenzhi Lin ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Power Systems ◽  
Electricity Markets ◽  
Electricity Market ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Operation Process ◽  
Present Information ◽  
The World ◽  
Efficient Information ◽  
Deregulated Power Systems

Electricity markets have been established in many countries of the world. Electricity and services are traded in the competitive environment of electricity markets, which generates a large amount of information during the operation process. To maintain transparency and foster competition of electricity markets, timely and precise information regarding the operation of electricity market should be disclosed to the market participants through a centralized and authorized information disclosure mechanism. However, the information disclosure mechanism varies greatly in electricity markets because of different market models and transaction methods. This paper reviews information disclosure mechanisms of several typical electricity markets with the poolco model, bilateral contract model, and hybrid model. The disclosed information and clearing models in these markets are summarized to provide an overview of the present information disclosure mechanisms in typical deregulated power systems worldwide. Moreover, the various experiences for establishing an efficient information disclosure mechanism is summarized and discussed.

scholarly journals A New Model to Simulate Local Market Power in a Multi-Area Electricity Market: Application to the European Case

Energies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (11) ◽  
pp. 2068 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto Orgaz ◽  
Antonio Bello ◽  
Javier Reneses
Keyword(s):  
Power Systems ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Electricity Markets ◽  
Electricity Market ◽  
Imperfect Competition ◽  
System Analysis ◽  
Original Method ◽  
Local Market ◽  
The Status ◽  
New Policies

The work presented in this article proposes an original method that models the medium-term market equilibrium under imperfect competition circumstances in multi-area electricity systems. It provides a system analysis considering multiple market splitting possibilities, where local market power may appear according to the status of the interconnections. As a result of new policies and regulations, power systems are increasingly integrating the existing electricity markets in unified frameworks. The integration of electricity markets poses highly challenging tasks due to the uncertainty that comes from the agents’ strategic behaviors which depend on multiple factors, for instance, the state of the interconnections. When it comes to modeling these effects, the purpose is to identify each strategy by using conjectured-price responses that depend on the different states of the system. Consequently, the problem becomes highly combinatorial, which heightens its size as well as its complexity. Therefore, the purpose of this work’s methodology is the reduction of the possible network configurations so as to ensure a computational tractability in the problem. In order to validate this methodology, it has been put to the test in a realistic and full-scale two-year operation planning model of the European electricity market that consists of a group of nine countries.

scholarly journals Essays on the Interaction  Between Risk and Market  Structure in Electricity  Markets

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Gabriel Godofredo Fiuza de Braganca
Keyword(s):  
Market Structure ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Electricity Markets ◽  
Electricity Market ◽  
Hybrid Approach ◽  
Spot Market ◽  
Spot Price ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Forward Markets ◽  
Electricity Spot Market

<p>This thesis proposes a new framework to jointly analyze electricity spot market and hedging decisions in an oligopolistic setup. Firstly, we find that, when exogenous, both quantity of electricity hedged by contract and vertical integration decrease the equilibrium spot price. Secondly, we use a hybrid approach and show that market structure can affect a generator’s decision to vertically integrate under uncertain demand. Thirdly, we consider uncertainty in costs and demand and show that concentration in the spot market, for a given hedge quantum, can increase forward prices and affect the slope of the forward curve. Our empirical results indicate that the model fits the New Zealand electricity market well. This evidence that market structure and hedging decisions are closely connected is further explored in a three period equilibrium model for the spot and forward markets, where hedging occurs prior to the submission of supply curves. Taking into account demand-side and supply-side uncertainties, we find that when hedging is endogenous, hedging quantities are affected by spot market parameters, but market power is itself mitigated in the conscious hedging choice of generators. We also show that forward markets can coexist with highly vertically integrated markets. The importance of our results is general. Our models can be used by policy makers to analyze investment and forward price implications of changes in the spot market structure. Our results also indicate that electricity generators, in equilibrium, face a trade-off between market power and hedging. Given that it is socially beneficial to manage risk, the equilibrium impact of their choices on welfare should not be considered in isolation by competition authorities.</p>

scholarly journals The Process of Liberalization of Electricity Market in Albania

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 50
Author(s):  
Helga Zogolli
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Electricity Markets ◽  
Electricity Market ◽  
Electricity Industry ◽  
Natural Monopoly ◽  
Market Forces ◽  
Power Monitoring ◽  
The Past ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Available Information

The motivation for electricity liberalization differs slightly between countries; however most of the countries share common ideological and political reasons regarding disaffection with the vertically integrated monopoly model of the past and a strong belief that the success of liberalization in other industries can be repeated for the electricity industry. The introduction of competition in the electricity industry has been justified by the perceived benefits of introducing market forces in an industry previously viewed as a natural monopoly with substantial vertical economies. Therefore the motivation behind electricity liberalization is to promote in the long run efficiency gains, to stimulate technical innovation and to lead to efficient investment.First the project is reviewing from the literature, the available information on market power monitoring in electricity markets. There are briefly explained definitions, strategies, indices and methods of mitigating market power as well as the several methods of detecting market power used from market monitors/regulators. After, the general features of the electricity industry are presented briefly as background for the analysis. The main aspects of the liberalization process of this industry and the role it has played in the creation of PX-s is described.

Competition in the Italian electricity market: The unforeseen social welfare losses of reform

2021 ◽  
pp. 75-91
Author(s):  
Maria Chiara D’Errico
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Electricity Markets ◽  
Electricity Market ◽  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Open Market ◽  
Power Sector ◽  
Market Prices ◽  
Welfare Losses

The worldwide wave of reforms investing power industry has created new challenges to both supply demand side management. After deregulation, electric utilities restructured their opera-tions from vertically integrated mechanisms to open market systems in order to establish a new competitive sector. Reform has involved also the Italian power sector, but competition, as lar-gely shown by the empirical literature particularly in the first years of reform, has been far to be reached, and the electricity markets has been characterized by conditions of oligopoly and exercise of market power. This paper aims to analyze welfare loss and deviation from the competitive equilibrium recorded in the day ahead Italian electricity market after the first wave of reforms was almost implemented. The study presents a theoretical and empirical model to construct a competitive equilibrium, estimating market power, both, on the supply and demand sides of the day ahead electricity market. Results show the effect of non-competitive equilibriums for the hourly markets in the period 2013-2014. In an ideal competitive market, prices would be lower than historical prices by about 2-5% and quantities would be higher by about 0.5-1%.

scholarly journals The Trouble With Electricity Markets: Understanding California's Restructuring Disaster

2002 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 191-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Severin Borenstein
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Electricity Markets ◽  
Electricity Market ◽  
Production Constraints ◽  
Support Price ◽  
Wholesale Electricity Market ◽  
Price Responsiveness

In June 2000, after two years of fairly smooth operation, California's deregulated wholesale electricity market began producing extremely high prices and threats of supply shortages. The upheaval demonstrated dramatically why most current electricity markets are extremely volatile: demand is difficult to forecast and exhibits virtually no price responsiveness, while supply faces strict production constraints and prohibitive storage costs. This structure leads to periods of surplus and of shortage, the latter exacerbated by sellers' ability to exercise market power. Electricity markets can function much more smoothly, however, if they are designed to support price-responsive demand and long-term wholesale contracts for electricity.

scholarly journals Research on Funding Differences among Regional Electricity Markets in Northern China based on Thermoelectric Decoupling

2020 ◽  
Vol 185 ◽  
pp. 01017
Author(s):  
Sen Wang ◽  
Can Sun ◽  
Zhiyong Gan ◽  
Liansheng Zhou ◽  
Guilin Wang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Electricity Markets ◽  
Electricity Market ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Northern China ◽  
Spot Market ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Large Influence ◽  
Electricity Spot Market

With the development of China’s electricity spot market, planned power and market power will coexist for a long time. At the same time, by avoiding the risk of market price fluctuation through medium and long-term market, spot market guarantees electricity balance and secure operation of the grid. The electricity market mechanism has an increasingly large influence on the operation and dispatching model of power system. In spot market, decoupling operation model of market and non-market power has a large influence on both supply and demand sides and improper dredging mechanism may cause significant settlement deviation. To solve this problem, the paper, taking a city in northern China as an example, analyzes the electricity spot market, compares the sources of difference fund of market and non-market power under decoupling and non-decoupling models and compares the pros and cons of coupling and decoupling. The paper also studies the disparity of difference fund and proposes advice adapted to the electricity spot market development of northern China.

scholarly journals Essays on the Interaction  Between Risk and Market  Structure in Electricity  Markets

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Gabriel Godofredo Fiuza de Braganca
Keyword(s):  
Market Structure ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Electricity Markets ◽  
Electricity Market ◽  
Hybrid Approach ◽  
Spot Market ◽  
Spot Price ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Forward Markets ◽  
Electricity Spot Market

<p>This thesis proposes a new framework to jointly analyze electricity spot market and hedging decisions in an oligopolistic setup. Firstly, we find that, when exogenous, both quantity of electricity hedged by contract and vertical integration decrease the equilibrium spot price. Secondly, we use a hybrid approach and show that market structure can affect a generator’s decision to vertically integrate under uncertain demand. Thirdly, we consider uncertainty in costs and demand and show that concentration in the spot market, for a given hedge quantum, can increase forward prices and affect the slope of the forward curve. Our empirical results indicate that the model fits the New Zealand electricity market well. This evidence that market structure and hedging decisions are closely connected is further explored in a three period equilibrium model for the spot and forward markets, where hedging occurs prior to the submission of supply curves. Taking into account demand-side and supply-side uncertainties, we find that when hedging is endogenous, hedging quantities are affected by spot market parameters, but market power is itself mitigated in the conscious hedging choice of generators. We also show that forward markets can coexist with highly vertically integrated markets. The importance of our results is general. Our models can be used by policy makers to analyze investment and forward price implications of changes in the spot market structure. Our results also indicate that electricity generators, in equilibrium, face a trade-off between market power and hedging. Given that it is socially beneficial to manage risk, the equilibrium impact of their choices on welfare should not be considered in isolation by competition authorities.</p>

Ex post monitoring of market power in hydro dominated electricity markets

Energy Policy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 1500-1509 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Sandsmark ◽  
Berit Tennbakk
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Electricity Markets ◽  
Ex Post
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document