An Analysis on the College Admission Process in Taiwan

Author(s):  
Inseon Choi
2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 265-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hyun-Seok Shin ◽  
최보윤 ◽  
신원학 ◽  
엄준용 ◽  
정우진 ◽  
...  

2019 ◽  
Vol 101 (4) ◽  
pp. 43-47
Author(s):  
Yvonne Vissing

As students compete for college admission, some are tempted by invitations to join honor societies that promise learning opportunities, scholarships, and a leg up in the college admission process. Yvonne Vissing explains how these organization target millions of students each year, encouraging them to purchase “opportunities” that fail to deliver on their promises. The frauds are often difficult to spot, because many use the slick marketing tactics of lucrative businesses. Despite lawsuits and consumer complaints, they continue to proliferate, often forming partnerships with businesses that have a financial interest in marketing to or manipulating students.


2010 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 2156759X1001400
Author(s):  
Cheryl Holcomb-McCoy

This article describes an exploratory and descriptive study that examined the parental involvement beliefs, attitudes, and activities of 22 high schoåol counselors who work in high-poverty and high-minority schools. More specifically, this study examined school counselors’ beliefs and activities about involving parents in the college admission process. The results indicated that the participants believe that working with parents about college opportunities is a major part of their job. A majority of the participants also reported that they spend “some time” conferencing with parents about college admissions and a majority reported that they “never” organize parent volunteer activities. Implications for school counselor practice and future research are discussed.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (6) ◽  
pp. 21
Author(s):  
Joseph Rekus ◽  
Yixiao Jiang

This paper models the college admission process as a signaling game between the admissions office and a pool of heterogeneous applicants characterized by academic abilities and demonstrated interest. In the screening and selection process, applicants attempt to signal their private information through their performance on a standardized test (for academic abilities) and interview (for demonstrated interest).  We show, under general conditions, that a separating equilibrium exists in which it is incentive-compatible for applicants to reveal their characteristics truthfully, and thus the admissions office does not fall victim to the problem of information asymmetry. Furthermore, we delineate how this equilibrium can be induced by setting appropriate “scoring” thresholds associated with standardized tests and interviews.


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