Legal Discrimination in the United States based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-59
Author(s):  
Mark C Miller

When the U.S. Supreme Court declared that same-sex marriage would be legal throughout the country, that decision did not end the possibility of other types of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. The U.S. Supreme Court has been very unclear about what standard to use when the courts face claims of discrimination based on these characteristics. In cases decided under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the Court has stated that lower courts should use one of three standards, based on the type of discrimination alleged. These three standards for review are known as rational basis, intermediate review, and strict scrutiny. This article, based on both empirical and normative analysis, will explore the proper legal standard that the Supreme Court should use in these cases. Since several states have begun to enact laws that encourage discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, this article will argue that the Supreme Court should use strict scrutiny in these cases because the LGBT community is clearly a discrete and insular minority subject to targeted discrimination.

2021 ◽  
pp. e1-e3
Author(s):  
Michael Liu ◽  
Jack L. Turban ◽  
Kenneth H. Mayer

Over the past decade, the United States has made substantial progress in advancing the rights of sexual and gender minority (SGM) people. In 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) decision in Obergefell v. Hodges provided same-sex couples the fundamental right to marry across the United States.1 In 2020, the landmark Bostock v. Clayton County decision extended the interpretation of “on the basis of sex” under title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to prohibit workplace discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.2 This sweeping decision sets the precedent that other sex-based antidiscrimination laws should be interpreted to include SGM people. However, explicit and broad protections based on sexual orientation and gender identity are not common features of federal laws, and existing SGM protections remain tenuous, as they rely on judicial interpretation. With recent shifts in the composition of SCOTUS, there is the increasing possibility that the hard-earned protections for SGM people in the United States will be reversed through recently argued and upcoming cases. Based on the available empirical evidence, we are concerned about the possible physical and mental health sequelae. (Am J Public Health. Published online ahead of print May 20, 2021: e1–e3. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2021.306302 )


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 200-215
Author(s):  
Kelsey R Ruszkowski

In the last few decades, US Supreme Court rulings have made strides for the advancement of the LGBT community. However, this community has yet to enjoy equality in the workplace due to its exclusion from Title VII protection. This article details the recent conflict between the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Department of Justice in interpreting Title VII and how this conflict may make it difficult for the Supreme Court to reach a broad ruling concerning sex discrimination under Title VII. The EEOC relies on Supreme Court precedent concerning sex stereotyping to extend Title VII protection to sexual orientation while the Justice Department employs a textualist argument to support a narrow interpretation of sex. However, changing societal norms and advancing neuroscientific research support the conclusion that sexual orientation, gender identity, and expression is included under “sex” even when using textualism to interpret Title VII. Given that the Supreme Court is unlikely to defer to the EEOC’s interpretation, these arguments stemming from the social sciences may provide the support the Court needs to justify a decision to end employment discrimination against the LGBT community and gender nonconformists in a way that is consistent with the positions of both the EEOC and the Justice Department.


2005 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 987-1009
Author(s):  
George M. Sullivan

In two consecutive national elections a conservative, Ronald Reagan, was elected President of the United States. When Justice Lewis Powell announced his retirement during the late months of the Reagan administration, it was apparent that the President's last appointment could shift the ideology of the Court to conservatism for the first time since the presidency of Dwight Eisenhower. President Reagan's prior appointments, Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia, had joined William Rehnquist, an appointee of President Nixon and Bryon White, an appointee of President Kennedy to comprise a vociferous minority of four in many instances, especially cases involving civil rights. The unexpected opportunity for the appointment of a conservative jurist caused great anxiety in the media and in the U.S. Senate, the later having confirmation power over presidential appointments to the Supreme Court. This article examines the consequences of the Senate's confirmation of Justice Anthony Kennedy to the Supreme Court. The impact, which was immediate and dramatic, indicates that conservative ideology will predominate on major civil rights issues for the remainder of this century.


2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-108
Author(s):  
Filip Mateusz Ciepły

The article contains arguments raised in Polish discussion on the problem of sexual orientation and gender identity as penalizing criteria of hate speech. The Author points out regulations of Polish criminal law providing conditions of criminal responsibility for hate speech and binding criteria of the penalization, draft amendments in this area presented in recent years, as well as Polish legal doctrine or Supreme Court reviews referred to the issue. The background of the analyzes are provisions of international and European law as well as selected European states.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (21) ◽  
pp. 97-160
Author(s):  
李順典 李順典

鑑於美國最高法院重新激活了專利適格性標的要件,其認為涉及發明的自然法則、自然現象或抽象概念,除非它們也包含「發明的概念」,否則不具專利適格性,因而引發了巨大爭議。因為新專利適格性原則不當削弱了美國在創新中的領導地位,而且它們已經給美國專利制度注入了巨大的法律不確定性,所以美國應重新思考生物技術產業創新的激勵措施生物技術公司的專利適格性在不同的國家面臨不斷的改變,故必須發展保護生物技術創新的全球策略,可行的發展策略應是根據國家的法律標準申請專利。In view of the United States Supreme Court has reinvigorated the patent-eligible subject matter requirement, holding that inventions directed to laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas are not eligible for patenting unless they also contain an ''inventive concept.'' As a result, the Supreme Court has sparked tremendous controversy. Since the new patent eligibility doctrine is undermining U.S. leadership in innovation, so the U.S. shall reconsider the incentives for innovation in the biotechnologyindustry. Biotech companies facing constant changes in patent eligibility in different countries have to develop global strategies for protecting biotechnology innovations, and a recommended strategy is to file patent applications tailored to the legal standards of the countries of interest.


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (4) ◽  
pp. 849-855

On June 10, 2019, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case in which the D.C. Circuit held that the United States could continue to detain an individual at Guantánamo Bay until the cessation of the hostilities that justified his initial detention, notwithstanding the extraordinary length of the hostilities to date. The case, Al-Alwi v. Trump, arises from petitioner Moath Hamza Ahmed Al-Alwi's petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his continued detention at the United States Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay. The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari was accompanied by a statement by Justice Breyer observing that “it is past time to confront the difficult question” of how long a detention grounded in the U.S. response to the September 11 attacks can be justified.


10.12737/903 ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-81
Author(s):  
Владимир Сафонов ◽  
Vladimir Safonov

The article reveals the problem of applying the principle of the social state in the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court.


1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 697-704 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori Fisler Damrosch

The U.S. Government’s position asserting nonjusticiability of the treaty claims raised by Paraguay in the domestic and international lawsuits is disturbing. The Government’s amicus filings at the court of appeals and the Supreme Court denied that Paraguay’s claims belonged in federal court (or indeed in any court at all); at die International Court of Justice, the United States admitted a treaty violation but denied the competence of that tribunal to enter a judicial remedy. At one or another phase of these proceedings, the U.S. Government pressed a variety of arguments that (if accepted) would rule out virtually any judicial consideration of a treaty-based claim. The haste with which the Supreme Court denied a stay in Breard’s case foreclosed adequate consideration of the justiciability of such claims in domestic courts and also effectively barred Paraguay from achieving the relief it sought on the international plane.


2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasmin Dawood

This article re-examines the distinction between the libertarian approach and the egalitarian approach to the regulation of campaign finance. The conventional approach (as exemplified by the work of Owen Fiss and Ronald Dworkin) is to reconcile the competing values of liberty and equality. By contrast, this article advances the normative claim that democracies should seek to incorporate both the libertarian and the egalitarian approaches within constitutional law. I argue that instead of emphasizing one value over the other, the ideal position is one that simultaneously recognizes the values of liberty and equality despite the irreconcilable tension between them. Rather than choosing one value over the other, or reconciling these values by redefining them, I claim that it is vital to maintain the tension between liberty and equality by instantiating the conflict in law. Democracy is better served when the law contains an explicit tension between these foundational values.After setting forth this normative framework, I then apply it to the campaign finance decisions of the Supreme Courts of the United States and Canada, respectively. I make two main claims. First, I argue that although the libertarian/egalitarian distinction is usually presented as a binary choice, the laws of a given jurisdiction often simultaneously display both libertarian and egalitarian characteristics. For this reason, I claim that the libertarian/egalitarian distinction is better conceived of as a “libertarian-egalitarian spectrum.” Second, I argue that in recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada, respectively, have privileged one value—liberty or equality—at the expense of the other. The U.S. Supreme Court has over-emphasized the value of liberty (most notably in its Citizens United decision), with the result that political equality is markedly undermined. By the same token, the Supreme Court of Canada’s commitment to equality has become too one-sided in recent cases (Harper and Bryan), with the result that there are significant impairments to free speech liberties. I argue that both of these approaches are detrimental to democratic participation and governance. Finally, this article offers a preliminary proposal for how courts and legislatures can allow for the conflict between liberty and equality to be instantiated in law.


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