scholarly journals The Future of Arms Control and Strategic Stability in the Indo-Pacific

2021 ◽  
pp. 53-63
Author(s):  
Heather Williams
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-102
Author(s):  
Nancy Jane Teeple

With a focus on the strategic competition between the United States and Russia, this paper explores the prospects for the future of arms control under an intensifying nuclear security dilemma. The end of stability-enhancing agreements such as the INF Treaty and Open Skies has accelerated the arms race. What is the future of New START and are we likely to see any extension beyond 2021? The relationship between arms control and strategic stability is part of this evaluation, particularly with respect to how states view the concept framed within their national security interests. The provocative role that offensive – deterrence by denial – capabilities play in contributing to strategic instability is central to this study. This work looks particularly at new systems designed for asymmetric advantage, including those that can defeat strategic defences, such as longer-range cruise missiles and hypersonic vehicles. Under conditions of modernizations and upgrades to nuclear arsenals, including the entanglement of conventional and nuclear systems that can threaten a first strike, this work considers how a dialogue on limiting dangerous systems could be initiated between the US and Russia. Could New START be revised – or a new treaty established – to limit advances in cruise missile technology, hypersonics, missile defences, and tactical nuclear weapons?


2021 ◽  
Vol 70 (4/2020) ◽  
pp. 123-149
Author(s):  
Marina Kostic

Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on measures for further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms (“New START”) is the last pillar of the arms control regime on which the end of the Cold War and the new world order rested. Its expiration on 5 February 2021 is a top security challenge and indicates a possible new strategic arms race. However, can the United States and Russia still preserve the existing strategic arms control by extending the Treaty for another five years? What are the prospects, the opportunities and obstacles for this extension? What are the most pressing issues USA and Russia face with in order to preserve strategic arms control and are they willing to do so? In order to answer to these research questions author analyses several key issues that are of paramount importance for extension of the New START: nuclear modernization processes, invention of new weapons and emergence of new warfare domains; transparency and verification and broader confidence building measures; missile defence and prompt global strike; tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and Asia; general US-Russia relations which include question of democratic capacity; and broader influence of this Treaty on nuclear non-proliferation regime. By using content and discourse analysis author concludes that, although it is obvious that the extension of the New START would be primarily in favour of Russia and that the USA has not much to gain, the character of strategic stability in the Third Nuclear Age gives reasons to believe that the New START will be extended for another five years.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 542-555
Author(s):  
Andrey Baklitskiy ◽  
Oleg Shakirov

Summary This essay focuses on three ways the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic influenced arms control and non-proliferation diplomacy. The pandemic affected the way diplomats were able to communicate with each other to negotiate on the arms control and disarmament issues. The initial response — postponing events or hosting them on makeshift platforms — was acceptable as a temporary solution but dedicated channels of communication will be needed to prepare for similar disruptions in the future. COVID-19 also had an impact on the implementation of the agreed arms control and non-proliferation accords. As on-site verification activities became impossible, remote monitoring proved its resilience, which could make it a more prominent arms control tool. Finally, the pandemic raised the profile of global health issues and led to their securitisation. This revived a discussion over international regulation of biological security through existing and new mechanisms.


Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-132
Author(s):  
James Cameron

Most analyses of arms control during the Cold War focus on its role in maintaining strategic stability between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, history shows that the superpowers' search for strategic stability is insufficient to explain the roots and course of negotiations. This essay argues that arms control was used as one tool in a broader strategy of war prevention, designed to contain a series of challenges to U.S. and Soviet dominance of the international system that both sides worried could upset bipolarity and increase the chances of conflict between them. At the same time, U.S. policy-makers balanced this joint superpower interest with Washington's extended deterrent commitment to its allies, which ultimately upheld the integrity of the system as a whole. The essay concludes that today's leaders should integrate arms control into a more comprehensive strategy of political accommodation fit for twenty-first-century conditions.


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