The Political and Military Aspects of Creating Anti-Access/Area-Denial Systems (A2/AD): The Example Of China and Russia

Over the last two decades, China and Russia have been developing Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) systems mainly based on long-range Air Defense, ballistic and cruise missiles, supported by Electronic Warfare and cyber-attack capabilities. Initially, these systems were used for defense purposes, but over time. it was recognized they could be also applied for imposing military situation in the specific regions and create effective response to NATO countries and their concept of conducting military operations. The main aim of the article is to asses and present the impact of Chinese and Russian Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) systems on changes in global political relations and balance of military power. In the course of this study, the author used numerous analyzes, synthesis, comparisons and case studies methods mainly concentrated on presently operating A2/AD systems. This article undertakes the analysis of the Chinese bases located in the South China Sea and Djibouti, Russian A2/AD systems within Russia's borders with particular emphasis on Kaliningrad Oblast, and A2/AD systems in Crimea and Syria created as part of Russian military operations. This research allowed us to conclude that some of the A2/AD systems serve to defend borders, while the rest are created to influence the geopolitical and military situation or to gain an advantage in the area of military operations. It can be also evaluate that the use of these systems allow dominate future conflicts because they enable to establish a full control zones which are completely closed for opponents forces operations.

Seoul’s new assertiveness recasts Korean missile race

Significance On September 15, it launched two ballistic missiles from a train for the first time. Hours later, South Korea carried out its first official test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), becoming the eighth nation to develop this capability, and announced previously undisclosed tests of supersonic cruise missiles. Impacts Testing the SLBM while China's foreign minister was in Seoul signals defiance of Chinese pressure not to side with the United States. The unusually robust riposte to North Korean missiles should boost the ruling Democratic Party by showing it is not soft on Pyongyang. The North Korean tests demonstrate the continued advance of Pyongyang's capabilities, despite sanctions and economic crisis. Seoul's growing capabilities make it a more useful US ally, but also more able to act independently in ways Washington might not want. Further North Korean threats will play into Japan's upcoming prime ministerial election, favouring the more hawkish candidates.

Aerodynamics Analysis of Grid Fins Inner Lattice Structure in Cruise Missile

Grid fins are normally placed at the rear end of cruise missiles, rockets and other ballistic devices to control their trajectory especially at the final stage of flight. These fins provided fine control of the pitch, yaw and other lateral movements, allowing for higher stability and accuracy of the cruise missiles. This project investigates computationally the relation between grid fins inner lattice structures dimensionless parameters and the fins aerodynamics drag coefficient. The project gathered data from 12 different fins by varying the parameters of its internal lattice structure such as thickness, width and chord at various angles of attack (0°, 20° and 40°). The freestream was set at a constant speed of 150 m/s that gives Reynolds number > 1.7 x 106 . The results were experimentally compared by using a re-scaled model of a single fin in a sub-sonic wind tunnel, achieving a difference in results of not exceeding 6%. The results obtained that as the width-chord ratio increases, the aerodynamics drag coefficient increases for fixed thickness-width ratio. The results also demonstrated that as the angle of attack increases, the aerodynamics drag increases. The thickness-width ratio has the larger impact on the aerodynamics drag. The results can be used to improve the design of guided cruise missiles.

Offensive Weapons and the Future of Arms Control

With a focus on the strategic competition between the United States and Russia, this paper explores the prospects for the future of arms control under an intensifying nuclear security dilemma. The end of stability-enhancing agreements such as the INF Treaty and Open Skies has accelerated the arms race. What is the future of New START and are we likely to see any extension beyond 2021? The relationship between arms control and strategic stability is part of this evaluation, particularly with respect to how states view the concept framed within their national security interests. The provocative role that offensive – deterrence by denial – capabilities play in contributing to strategic instability is central to this study. This work looks particularly at new systems designed for asymmetric advantage, including those that can defeat strategic defences, such as longer-range cruise missiles and hypersonic vehicles. Under conditions of modernizations and upgrades to nuclear arsenals, including the entanglement of conventional and nuclear systems that can threaten a first strike, this work considers how a dialogue on limiting dangerous systems could be initiated between the US and Russia. Could New START be revised – or a new treaty established – to limit advances in cruise missile technology, hypersonics, missile defences, and tactical nuclear weapons?

Strategic Security in Northern Europe: The Implications of Russian Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategies in Developing Complex Threat Environments

Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) is a term that came into use to describe an environment in which an air and air defense force could use a combination of surface-launched ballistic missiles, surface and air launched cruise missiles and long-range surface-to-air missiles to prevent an opposing force from accessing or operating within a large airspace effectively. The descriptions and subsequent analyses of the penetrability of these environments often rests on assessments of the capabilities of just a few newly developed missiles and may fail to consider the additional complexity induced by the large array of the entire complement of air, land and sea launched missiles available to adversaries. This article will focus on Northern Europe as one example of the higher degrees of complexity that our air forces are likely to face should the need arise to fight and win in a 21st Century highly contested environment.

Bychkov V. V. Strategic concept for the development of non-strategic missiles - sea-based complexes

The creation of a specific missile system with sea-based cruise missiles is determined by the principles of construction, solved goals and tasks. The priority areas for the development of promising missile weapons are factors such as: a combination of small weight and size character-istics of the missile and its area of an effective reflecting surface; optimization of flight altitude at cruise and final sections, at homing of cruise missiles on target; provision of antiosenitic ma-neuver and high speeds of cruise missiles flight to trajectories and much more.

Cold Warfare

This chapter discusses America's ascent to great power status following the Second World War. It argues that the nation emerged out of the war with great wealth, unparalleled military capabilities and a series of bases spread around the world. The chapter then elaborates the key factors that compelled policymakers to aggressively defend US primacy in the new geopolitical context. It also discusses the profound militarization of US foreign policy and a new level of worldwide vicarious warfare following the onset of the so-called Second Cold War in the 1980s. Ultimately, the chapter presents fierce controversy that surrounds the question of responsibility for the onset of the Cold War. It then details the most potent and pervasive weapons system of contemporary vicarious warfare: the sophisticated unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), or drone, guided by advanced communications technologies and armed with precision-guided cruise missiles.