scholarly journals Editorial: An empirical contribution to corporate governance issues

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 4-6
Author(s):  
Áron Perényi ◽  
Simone Terzani
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Business Management ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
And Control ◽  
Empirical Contribution

The new issue of Corporate Ownership and Control journal is composed by 15 articles focussing on a variety of topics in the field. Five papers present empirical evidence from banks and financial institutions, three focus on firm finances, four on governance and responsibility and a further three on the role of technology in terms of contextualising various business management activities.

scholarly journals Editorial: Interdisciplinary approach to corporate governance

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (3, special issue) ◽  
pp. 220-222
Author(s):  
Andrea Rey
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Interdisciplinary Approach ◽  
Research Trend ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
And Gender ◽  
And Control ◽  
A Company

To date, future research trends will certainly concern sustainability and entrepreneurship due to the post-COVID-19 crisis. Studies will focus on the determinants related to corporate governance, such as corporate ownership, or the role of institutional investors, or a company that aims to get public by an IPO as a possible answer to the crisis. A future research trend will surely concern environmental and economic sustainability. Another line of research will concern the protection of biodiversity and gender equality. With the regard to the content of this issue of the Corporate Ownership and Control journal, ownership structure is the most popular issue considered by the authors of the papers.

scholarly journals Editorial: Corporate governance and ownership: Changing towards an accountable, sustainable, responsible but profitable corporation

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria João Guedes
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
Socially Responsible ◽  
Corporate Scandals ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
And Control ◽  
Poor Management

In recent years, corporate governance has been a popular topic of research, especially in the aftermath of corporate scandals and financial crisis. These events highlighted the effects that weak corporate governance may have in corporations, resulting in poor management decisions and financial performance, and even ending in the collapse of some corporations. This new issue (volume 18, issue 1) of the journal Corporate Ownership and Control contains an interesting selection of articles, with contributions on the role of different types of ownership (e.g., family and state-owned enterprises) and corporate governance mechanism, from internal control to new forms of socially responsible accountability in order to enable the corporations to ensure a commitment to all stakeholders and a safe global environment for the future.

scholarly journals Can compensation committees effectively mitigate the CEO horizon problem? The role of co-opted directors

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Ruonan Liu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Research And Development ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Horizon Problem ◽  
Accruals Management ◽  
Compensation Committees

Purpose This study aims to examine whether compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in mitigating the CEO horizon problem. Design/methodology/approach The author uses a sample of 7,280 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2011. Findings In this study, the author finds evidence of opportunistic research and development (R&D) reduction and accruals management in firms with retiring CEOs and compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors. Moreover, it is found that R&D reduction and income-increasing accruals are less discouraged when determining the compensation for retiring CEOs by compensation committees that are dominated by co-opted directors. The results suggest that compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in adjusting CEO compensation to mitigate the CEO horizon problem. Originality/value The study reveals that co-opted directors are weak monitors. Moreover, the study adds empirical evidence to the debate of organizations’ CEO horizon problem. Finally, the study adds to the literature on corporate governance, revealing that compensation committees play an important role in mitigating an organization’s CEO horizon problem by adjusting CEO compensation.

scholarly journals Downward wage rigidity in American technology firms

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (4-1) ◽  
pp. 181-190
Author(s):  
Xiaoying Chen ◽  
Jasmine Yur-Austin
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Business Leaders ◽  
Wage Rigidity ◽  
Venture Capitalists ◽  
Technology Firms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
And Control ◽  
Dot Com

This study reviews the role of various corporate governance mechanisms to pay for performance in American technology firms. Compared to traditional business leaders, CEOs in technology firms possess stronger power for negotiating with shareholders; such power theoretically lowers the chance of interest conflicts between management and control but may increase CEOs’ wage rigidity during business downturns, especially in firms with poor corporate governance. We evaluate ownership structure; board composition; and the existence of independent compensation committees throughout the dot-com bubble and bubble-burst periods. We aim to examine during the business downturn period whether these CEOs cut their compensation effectively or exercise their negotiation power to protect their own benefit. Our empirical results provide strong evidence that given poor firm performance, CEOs with weak corporate governance negotiate higher cash-based pay rather than reduce their compensations. However, we find that venture capitalists play an important role in monitoring CEOs and revising compensation.

scholarly journals Corporate governance, ownership and control: A review of recent scholarly research

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Kostyuk ◽  
Yaroslav Mozghovyi ◽  
Dmytro Govorun
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
Board Diversity ◽  
Existing Problems ◽  
The Past ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Recent Trends ◽  
Performance Auditing ◽  
And Control

This manuscript is aimed at highlighting the most recent trends in corporate governance, ownership and control based on the manuscripts presented at the international conference “Corporate Governance, Ownership and Control” that took place in Rome on February 27, 2018. We have also used reputable papers published in the relevant academic journals in the past to support the arguments stated by the authors of the papers, presented at the conference. This paper covers a wide range of corporate governance topics in corporate ownership and control toward corporate governance mechanisms, such as board of directors, the board diversity, directors’ remuneration, firm performance, auditing and accounting, etc. We saw a growing interest of researchers to widen the scope of their major research to link it to corporate ownership and control issues. Currently, corporate governance research follows two major routs: classical empirical corporate governance research and multidisciplinary research aimed at findings non-conventional methods to solution of existing problems.

Vertical and Horizontal Problems in Financial Regulation and Corporate Governance

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan R. Macey ◽  
Maureen O'Hara
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Insider Trading ◽  
Financial Regulation ◽  
Fiduciary Duty ◽  
Federal Law ◽  
Regulatory Arbitrage ◽  
Holding Companies ◽  
The Third ◽  
And Control

This chapter discusses vertical and horizontal problems in financial regulation and corporate governance. More specifically, it examines three contexts in which efforts to mitigate systemic risk and moral hazard in capital markets and financial institutions clash with long-standing principles of corporate governance. The first issue relates to the so-called “vertical” challenge between financial institutions and the separately incorporated holding companies that own and control them. The second issue relates to the “horizontal” challenge, in which regulatory arbitrage occurs between the banking subsidiaries of complex holding companies and their less-regulated nonbank and shadow bank siblings. The third and final issue deals with the conflict between the conception of fiduciary duty in the federal law of insider trading and the concept of fiduciary duty in state law.

6. Company Management and Governance

2020 ◽  
pp. 100-120
Author(s):  
Imogen Moore
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Executive Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Code ◽  
Executive Remuneration ◽  
Questions And Answers ◽  
The Uk ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Relationship

The Concentrate Questions and Answers series offers the best preparation for tackling exam questions and coursework. Each book includes typical questions, suggested answers with commentary, illustrative diagrams, guidance on how to develop your answer, suggestions for further reading, and advice on exams and coursework. This chapter explores important issues in company management and corporate governance, starting by examining the role of directors and shareholders (and the relationship between them) and the separation of ‘ownership and control’. Since the early 1990s, the governance of listed companies has been dominated by self-regulatory codes (currently the UK Corporate Governance Code). This chapter examines how these codes operate and considers key themes in corporate governance, including the role of non-executive directors and auditors; the position of institutional investors; and executive remuneration.

When Financial Institutions Are Large Shareholders: The Role of Macro Corporate Governance Environments

2006 ◽  
Vol 61 (6) ◽  
pp. 2975-3007 ◽  
Author(s):  
DONGHUI LI ◽  
FARIBORZ MOSHIRIAN ◽  
PETER KIEN PHAM ◽  
JASON ZEIN
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Large Shareholders
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