scholarly journals Voluntary disclosure and free cash flow in family French firms

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (4, Special Issue) ◽  
pp. 391-398
Author(s):  
Meriem Jouirou ◽  
Faten Lakhal
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Voluntary Disclosures

This research investigates the governance role of voluntary disclosures especially in reducing agency problems measured by the level of free cash flow (FCF). In addition, it also shows the moderating effect of family ownership and governance mechanisms on this relation. Our research was conducted on a sample of 138 listed French firms between 2009 and 2013. To avoid the endogeneity problem caused by the voluntary disclosure variable we used the 2SLS regression method. The results show, on the one hand, that transparency provided by voluntary disclosures reduces the level of FCF and by the way agency problems. But family owners tend to accumulate FCF. On the other hand, the governance role of voluntary disclosure turns to be ineffective in family firms. This suggests a high risk of expropriation of minority shareholders by family ones. In addition, we demonstrate that governance mechanisms, especially board independence, gender diversity and audit committee independence, contribute to the strengthening of the governance role of voluntary disclosure.

scholarly journals Free Cash Flow And Earnings Management: The Moderating Role Of Governance And Ownership

2015 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mehdi Nekhili ◽  
Ines Fakhfakh Ben Amar ◽  
Tawhid Chtioui ◽  
Faten Lakhal
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

<p class="Default">The purpose of this paper is to analyze the moderating effect of corporate governance and ownership features in lessening earnings management practices in a free cash flow (FCF) situation. A simultaneous equations model is developed to address endogeneity of the FCF variable. Based on a sample of French companies belonging to the SBF 120 index from 2001 to 2010, the results highlight the opportunistic behavior of managers in presence of free cash flows. Particularly, managers engage in earnings management practices that increase reported earnings. Our results also show that corporate governance mechanisms such as audit committee independence and external audit quality, in addition to institutional investors and managerial ownership reduce the extent of earnings management. Corporate governance mechanisms are substitutive in their monitoring role of managers’ behavior to reduce earnings management in presence of a free cash flow problem. </p>

scholarly journals Surplus Free Cash Flow, Stock Market Segmentations and Earnings Management: The Moderating Role of Independent Audit Committee

2020 ◽  
pp. 097215092093406
Author(s):  
Ahmad A. Toumeh ◽  
Sofri Yahya ◽  
Azlan Amran
Keyword(s):  
Stock Market ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
The Body ◽  
Moderating Role ◽  
Independent Audit

Management engages in earnings manipulation for different reasons. This article argues that low-growth firms with high free cash flow will opt for income-increasing earnings management in order to obscure the low profits derived from their investments in negative net present value (NPV) projects. On the other hand, we argue that the listed companies might be interested in being listed in the first market due to its privileges and to preserve the competitiveness, through managing their earnings upwardly, so that they can satisfy the condition of achieving a particular earnings limit. This article should advance the body of earnings management literature in the Jordanian context by examining the effect of the moderating role of an independent audit committee (IAC) in the association between surplus free cash flow (SFCF) and income-increasing discretionary accruals (DAC). Further, this is the initial empirical attempt to investigate the moderation effect of IAC between stock market segmentations (SMS) and positive DAC. The results of this current study offer original and beneficial information for the Jordanian government and other countries with a similar institutional environment because the study promotes the application of applying IAC as an efficient tool to constrain management behaviour towards manipulation of the accruals. On top of that, this research offers information concerning the prevailing situation of earnings management practices and corporate governance in Jordan, in which shareholders, local and international investors, policymakers, regulators and academic researchers are interested. Finally, panel data analyses and various statistical techniques are employed to derive conclusions.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Voluntary Disclosure

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 82
Author(s):  
Erwin Saraswati ◽  
Alfizah Azzahra ◽  
Ananda Sagitaputri
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Corporate Disclosure ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Voluntary Disclosures ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
New Evidence

Corporate disclosure and corporate governance are two inseparable instruments of investor protection. This research sought to find evidence on how corporate governance mechanisms affect the extent of voluntary disclosures. Voluntary disclosures were measured using content analysis on published annual reports. The sample of this research consisted of 81 firm-year observations from 27 firms of consumer goods sector listed on Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2016 to 2018. Using multiple regression method, the result has shown that board size and board independence increase voluntary disclosures, indicating that the commissioners have effectively represented the interests of shareholders by monitoring and encouraging the management to increase disclosure. This research provided new evidence that family ownership increases voluntary disclosure, suggesting that family firms are more concerned by the costs of non-disclosure. Meanwhile, institutional ownership does not significantly affect voluntary disclosure. 

scholarly journals Earnings management, audit committee effectiveness and the role of blockholders ownership: Evidence from UK large firms

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 100-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Murya Habbash
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Effective Control ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Controlling Shareholders

The existing literature documents that the quality of financial reporting is higher when firms have effective audit committees. However, recent studies find that audit committees are not effective in family firms where agency conflicts arise between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. This study extends the previous findings by investigating the effectiveness of audit committees in firms with similar agency conflicts when one owner obtains effective control of the firm. Compared to firms with a low level of block ownership, high-blockholder firms face less agency problems due to the separation of ownership and management, but more severe agency problems between controlling (blockholders) and non-controlling shareholders (minority shareholders). Using a unique hand-collected sample, this study tests the largest 350 UK firms for three years from 2005 to 2007, and shows that firms with effective audit committees have less earnings management. This study also documents that the monitoring effectiveness of audit committees is moderated in firms with high blockholder ownership. The results are not sensitive to the endogeneity test and hold for alternative specifications of both dependent and independent variables. Overall, these findings suggest that audit committees are ineffective in mitigating the majority-minority conflict compared to their effectiveness in reducing owners-managers conflicts. These conclusions, along with some recent similar evidence (e.g., Rose, 2009 and Guthrie and Sokolowsky, 2010), may raise doubts about the monitoring role of blockholders asserted by agency theorists and widely accepted in corporate governance literature.

scholarly journals PENGARUH FREE CASH FLOW DAN LEVERAGE TERHADAP MANAJEMEN LABA DENGAN GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SEBAGAI VARIABEL MODERASI

AKUNTABILITAS ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-82
Author(s):  
Erma Setiawati ◽  
Mujiyati Mujiyati ◽  
Erma Marga Rosit
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
Leverage Effect ◽  
Purposive Sampling ◽  
Good Corporate Governance

This research aimed to examine the effect of free cash flow and leverage to earnings management.This study also examines the role of good corporate governance as measured by the index Government in moderating influence of free cash flow and leverage on earnings management. This research was conducted in the company are listed in the JakartaIslamicIndex(JII)from2015-2017 and unlisted in the Bursa Efek Indonesia(BEI).The sample is determined by purposive sampling with 45 samples. This analysis uses regression analysis moderation (MRA). The results of the research indicate where (1) free cash flow significant effect on earnings management, (2) no leverage effect on earnings management, (3) good corporate governance as measured by the index of corporate governance is not able to moderate the influence of free cash flow and earnings management

scholarly journals Are Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Corporate Strategy, and Corporate Financial Characteristics Related to Earnings Management?

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 48-57
Author(s):  
Clarissa Tonay ◽  
Paulina Sutrisno
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Corporate Strategy ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Operating Cash Flow ◽  
Financial Characteristics ◽  
Company Growth

Objective – This study aims to examine the effect of corporate governance and several factors of corporate financial characteristics on earnings management. Corporate governance mechanisms such as an independent board, board size, and audit committee size are expected to be able to limit the ability of management to carry out earnings management. Meanwhile, a company's financial characteristics such as corporate strategy, company age, operating cash flow, company growth, profitability, company size and leverage are predicted to affect earnings management. Methodology/Technique – Many previous studies have involved the examination of corporate governance mechanisms and corporate financial characteristics of earnings management however, the results of those studies give rise to inconsistencies. Hence, this study seeks to re-examine the existence of corporate governance mechanisms and corporate financial characteristics of earnings management. The sample in this research is non-financial companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange between 2016 and 2018. Findings – This data in this study is analysed using statistical methods such as multiple regression linear. The results of this study indicate that one mechanism of corporate governance, the size of the audit committee, has a positive effect on earnings management, while the financial characteristics of companies such as company size and operating cash flow negatively affect earnings management. Novelty – Other corporate financial characteristics such as corporate strategy, company age, operating cash flow, and profitability have a positive effect on earnings management. Meanwhile, the other variables such as board size, leverage, and company growth do not have an influence on earnings management. Type of Paper: Empirical. JEL Classification: G3, G34, G39. Keywords: Earnings Management; Corporate Strategy; Audit Committee Size; Company Age; Operating Cash Flows. Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Tonay, C; Sutrisno, P. 2020. Are Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Corporate Strategy, and Corporate Financial Characteristics Related to Earnings Management? J. Fin. Bank. Review, 5 (2): 48 – 57 https://doi.org/10.35609/jfbr.2020.5.2(2)

Do women perform better in family firms?

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio D’Amato
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Family Firm ◽  
Campania Region ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Panel Data Regression ◽  
Moderating Role

Purpose Empirical evidence on the relation between female involvement at the head of a company and firm performance remains inconclusive. This study aims to disentangle the existing evidence by exploring the moderating role of family firm status. Design/methodology/approach The study analyzes the moderating role of family firm status on the relation between gender diversity and firm performance among a sample of 88 Italian wine firms from Campania region during the 2007-2014 period. This work uses random effects panel data regression and tests the robustness of the results using alternative econometric techniques. Performance is measured in terms of profitability. Findings The findings reveal that women in top positions do not affect firm performance. However, it is found that this relation is significantly moderated by family firm status. Specifically, compared to high family-controlled firms, female involvement negatively impacts firm performance in low family-controlled firms. Research limitations/implications From a theoretical standpoint, the results enable a more nuanced interpretation of the relationship between female involvement and firm performance. From a managerial perspective, the results highlight conditions that may promote the role of women in business. Originality/value This paper provides insights into the relation between gender diversity and firm performance by exploring the moderating role of family firm status – a novel approach in the management and wine business literature.

Voluntary disclosures practices of family firms in Australia

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-294
Author(s):  
Judy Louie ◽  
Kamran Ahmed ◽  
Xu-Dong Ji
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Best Practice ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Current Knowledge ◽  
Strategic Decisions ◽  
Voluntary Disclosures ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Practice Recommendations ◽  
Good Corporate Governance

Purpose This paper aims to examine the voluntary disclosure practices of family and non-family listed firms and whether family firms have improved their disclosure practices following the introduction of the Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations in 2003 in Australia. Design/methodology/approach Voluntary disclosures are measured by constructing an index specifically for this study. Such indexes consist of corporate governance disclosure, strategic disclosure and future disclosures. They are then regressed on firm-specific variables while controlling for family and non-family firms. A total of 60 family firms and 60 non-family firms in Australia are randomly chosen from 2001 to 2006 for examining their disclosure practices. Findings The research findings show that family firms disclose information voluntarily to signal to the market regarding their growth potentials and abide by government regulations to improve their reputation. Despite the fact that compliance with the Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations was not compulsory, this paper finds that the recommendation encouraged family and non-family firms to disclose more corporate governance information. Practical implications The findings from this research will help investors and regulators make more strategic decisions on investments and regulations respectively in family firms. Originality/value There has been limited empirical evidence on the disclosure practices and their determinants of family firms in Australia. The study will thus significantly contribute to the current knowledge in this regard.

scholarly journals Dividend policy and corporate governance in Saudi stock market: Outcome model or substitute model?

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amina Hamdouni
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Debt Policy

Theories suggest that corporate governance mechanisms affect corporate dividend policies. This study extends and tests the implications of two extant static agency models making opposite predictions. The outcome model predicts an increase in dividends when the corporate governance mechanisms improve, because shareholders are better able to force managers to disgorge cash. In contrast, the substitute model suggests that an improvement in the corporate governance mechanisms reduces the role of dividends in controlling agency costs, leading to a decrease in dividends. This paper investigates the dividend policy for firms listed on Saudi Arabia Stock Exchange. This is a case study of Saudi Stock Market, where the determinants of dividend policy have received little attention. This study use a panel dataset of non-financial firms listed on Saudi Arabia Stock Exchange between the years of 2007 and 2010. Based on a panel of 366 firm year observations of 99 Saudi firms, we provide evidence in outcome model or substitute model with ownership structure, board structure and debt policy. Three Tobit models are specified: In the first, we construct a governance index based on eight criteria: seven criteria which capture various aspects of a firm’s structure, policies and practices that constitute good governance and a criterion that examines the company’s compliance with Shariah law in all its activities. Therefore, we estimate the effect of corporate governance on dividend policy in the first model. In the second, we investigate how dividends interact with corporate governance mechanisms in a panel of data. We explore the relation between dividends and ownership structure (ownership concentration and managerial ownership), board structure (board size, Board independence and Chairman-CEO duality) and debt policy. In the final, another test of the substitute and the outcome models is built on the Jensen (1986) free cash flow theory, which states that dividend policy can extract surplus cash from management control by reducing free cash flow. In this third model, we examine how corporate governance improvements affect the dividends’ sensitivity to free cash flows by focusing on the coefficients on the interactive variables of the ownership structure, board structure, debt policy and the free cash flow. For the three models, we divide sample in two subsamples and we compare the results obtained by using criteria of company’s compliance with Shariah law. For the effects of corporate governance (measured by corporate governance score) on dividend levels, we find that dividend policy is a substitute model for good governance for all Saudi Arabia firms. When we select only Shariah compliant firms, results indicate also that dividend policy is a substitute model for good governance but results are insignificant. When we select only Non-Shariah compliant firms, results indicate the same conclusion. We find that governance is associated with fewer dividends, supporting the substitute model and indicating the influence of good governance by forcing less cash to be returned to investors. For the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on dividend levels, we find that the only variable affect the dividend levels for Non-Shariah compliant firms is the separation in the functions of chairman and of CEO supporting the substitute model. For Shariah compliant firms, dividend policy is an outcome for the separation in the functions of chairman and of CEO, and ownership concentration. Governance through the separation in the functions of chairman and of CEO and ownership concentration influences firms by forcing more cash to be returned to investors. For the effects of the corporate governance improvements on dividends’ sensitivity to free cash flow, our results support the substitute hypothesis for Shariah compliant firms regardless the board independence, board meeting, managerial ownership and debt. Improvements in these corporate governance mechanisms reduce firms’ need to force out the free cash flow through dividends. For Non-Shariah compliant firms, our results support the outcome model for managerial ownership and ownership concentration

scholarly journals PENGARUH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DAN FAKTOR LAINNYA TERHADAP MANAJEMEN LABA

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-194
Author(s):  
YULIANI ALMALITA
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Control Variable ◽  
Total Sample ◽  
Analysis Data ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
Managerial Ownership

The objective (s) of this research was verifying whether good corporate governance (size of audit committee, proportion of independent commissioner, institutional, managerial ownership, size of commissioner) leverage, free cash flow, profitability, losses, audit quality and market to book on earnings management and company’s size as control variable. Data analyze used in this research is secondary data and using purposive sampling where total sample are 69 listed companies on manufacture sector for period 2012-2013. Analysis data method that used in this research is multiple regression method with using SPSS version 19.0. The result of the research concludes that leverage and market to book have influence to earnings management. Whereas size of audit committee, proportion of independent commissioner, institutional, managerial ownership, size of commissioner, free cash flow, profitability, losses,

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