scholarly journals Corporate governance in banking: A survey of the literature

2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 368-386
Author(s):  
Ilduara Busta
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
Concentrated Ownership ◽  
What Works ◽  
Principal Factors ◽  
Fiduciary Relationships ◽  
Managerial Shareholdings

The aim of this paper is to explain the particular characteristics of the corporate governance of banks and its role for good bank performance. In order to do that, it reviews the existing literature on this issue trying to answer three main questions: (i) Why are banks different? Existing research points at diverse features, such as, regulation, supervision, capital structure, risk, fiduciary relationships, ownership, and deposit insurance, that would make banks special and thereby influence their corporate governance. (ii) What is different about bank governance? According to past studies, banks’ boards of directors are larger, more independent, have a superior number of committees and meet more often, but seem to play a weaker disciplinary role. Executive compensation would be higher in banking, but pay-performance sensitivity appears lower. (iii) What works for banks? Larger boards, more concentrated ownership structures and certain levels of managerial shareholdings are the principal factors suggested by the empirical evidence to date that seem to lead banks to higher performance.

scholarly journals Executive compensation and board of directors’ disclosure in Canadian publicly-listed corporations

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 188-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Spraggon ◽  
Virginia Bodolica ◽  
Tor Brodtkorb
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Corporate Boards ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Information Transparency ◽  
Publicly Traded Companies ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Reporting Practices ◽  
Governance Regime

This article contributes to the growing body of literature exploring the important role that information transparency plays in strengthening the national corporate governance regime. We review the 2007 amendments to the Canadian reporting legislation with the particular emphasis on sections pertaining to executive compensation and boards of directors. Taking into consideration the specificities of the „comply-or-explain‟ system in Canada, we seek to uncover the extent to which publicly-listed firms comply with these newly amended standards of corporate governance reporting. Based on a comparison of 403 proxy circulars issued in the post-amendment period, we identified important cross-firm variations in the type and format of disclosed information on executive compensation and corporate boards of directors. In order to address the problems that inter-organizational disclosure discrepancies generate for governance researchers and analysts, we provide several recommendations on how Canadian publicly-traded companies can improve their reporting practices

Proliferation of corporate governance codes in the backdrop of divergent ownership structures

2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (5) ◽  
pp. 471-492 ◽  
Author(s):  
Umakanth Varottil
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
Shareholder Protection ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Corporate Governance Codes ◽  
Director Independence

In the backdrop of the convergence–divergence debate, the goal of this article is to examine the proliferation of corporate governance codes in the light of a single factor, namely varying corporate ownership structures across countries. While such codes emanated and became popular in the United Kingdom where companies largely display dispersed shareholding, the concept has been disseminated to countries that carry considerably different ownership structures, i.e. mainly concentrated shareholding. This is bound to give rise to incongruities in the implementation of these codes. In order to enunciate the claim made above, the article will consider two aspects that convergence advocates have focused on, namely (i) shareholder empowerment and (ii) self-regulation. For example, corporate governance codes place considerable emphasis on the structure and independence of the boards of directors of companies as a means to ensure shareholder protection. While this approach is meant to produce results in companies with dispersed shareholding, the same cannot be said of companies with concentrated shareholding where the empowerment of shareholders through director independence or other means would only embolden the already dominant controlling shareholders. Moving to self-regulation, a voluntary code operating on a ‘comply-or-explain’ basis can ensure sufficient adherence only if certain factors are present in the jurisdiction where it is applied. Relying upon available empirical evidence, this article finds that use of self-regulation in voluntary codes of corporate governance may generate different results depending upon the ownership structures of companies, thereby exhibiting signs of divergence on this count.

scholarly journals The Role of Institutional Investors in Improving Board of Director Attributes around the World

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 166
Author(s):  
Badar Alshabibi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Economic Conditions ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
Board Of Director ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

This paper investigates the role of institutional investors in the improvement of corporate governance for the companies in which they invest (investee companies) using evidence about the attributes of boards of directors across 15 countries. Furthermore, this paper examines the extent to which the activism of institutional investors is determined by the institutional environment, to include various economic conditions (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis), legal systems and ownership structures. Drawing from the agency theory and institutional theory, the results show that foreign institutional investors are the main promoters of board governance structures across the globe. This study also provides evidence that institutional investors promote the independence of a board and its audit and compensation sub-committees (but excluding its nomination committee). The study also demonstrates that institutional investors reduce board entrenchment, though it presents no evidence that institutional investors reduce board busyness. The results also suggest that institutional investors behave differently when operating within different economic conditions (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis), legal systems and ownership structures. This paper contributes to the growing literature on shareholder activism and comparative corporate governance mechanisms. The findings suggest that the activism of institutional investors is contingent on the institutional settings, to include economic conditions, legal systems and ownership structures.

Why Credit Ratings Serve a Greater Role in Emerging Economies than Industrial Nations

2016 ◽  
pp. 115-133
Author(s):  
Marianne Ojo
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Emerging Economies ◽  
Credit Ratings ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
Concentrated Ownership ◽  
Governance Tools ◽  
Dispersed Ownership

The agency problem attributed to dispersed ownership is also principally regarded as being that of the control over powerful management. Whilst there are conflicting views in respect of the degree of agency problems which arise under dispersed and concentrated ownership structures, it appears that additional or greater agency problems will eventually necessitate the need for greater monitoring. In recommending the external auditor's expertise as appropriate for addressing agency problems, this chapter draws attention to the audit committee's roles, presenting them both as vital and complementary corporate governance tools.

Say-on-Pay and the Differential Effects of Voluntary versus Mandatory Regimes on Investor Perceptions and Behavior

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-29
Author(s):  
Kendall O. Bowlin ◽  
Margaret H. Christ ◽  
Jeremy B. Griffin
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Differential Effects ◽  
Say On Pay ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT Say-on-pay is a corporate governance mechanism through which investors cast a non-binding vote on executive compensation. The Dodd-Frank Act mandates say-on-pay for U.S. firms. Congress is currently considering changes to the legislation that would give boards much more discretion over say-on pay. Using an interactive laboratory experiment, we examine the relative effects of say-on-pay when it is mandated by law compared to when firms invite say-on-pay voluntarily, which is analogous to both the former U.S. regime and that proposed by current legislation. We find that boards voluntarily giving investors a say-on-pay, versus only offering it due to a regulatory mandate, improves investors' perceptions of the fairness of compensation-setting procedures, which leads to greater investor trust in boards of directors and increases their willingness to invest. We also find that investors react negatively when directors' compensation decisions do not conform to investors' expressed say-on-pay preference. JEL Classifications: M12; M48; M52.

scholarly journals Intellectual capital myths: Comments on literature review

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 169-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michail Nerantzidis ◽  
Nikitas – Spiros Koutsoukis ◽  
Petros A. Kostagiolas ◽  
Zoi Karoulia
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Corporate Boards ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Information Transparency ◽  
Publicly Traded Companies ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Reporting Practices ◽  
Governance Regime

This article contributes to the growing body of literature exploring the important role that information transparency plays in strengthening the national corporate governance regime. We review the 2007 amendments to the Canadian reporting legislation with the particular emphasis on sections pertaining to executive compensation and boards of directors. Taking into consideration the specificities of the „comply-or-explain‟ system in Canada, we seek to uncover the extent to which publicly-listed firms comply with these newly amended standards of corporate governance reporting. Based on a comparison of 403 proxy circulars issued in the post-amendment period, we identified important cross-firm variations in the type and format of disclosed information on executive compensation and corporate boards of directors. In order to address the problems that inter-organizational disclosure discrepancies generate for governance researchers and analysts, we provide several recommendations on how Canadian publicly-traded companies can improve their reporting practices.

THE EFFECT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE CULTURE ON FIRM MARKET VALUE TO IMPROVE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (6) ◽  
pp. 930-940
Author(s):  
Fathiyah Fathiyah ◽  
Mufidah Mufidah
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Performance ◽  
Corporate Culture ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Descriptive Analysis ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Company Performance ◽  
Financial Company

The purpose of this research is to analyze the effect of corporate governance and corporate culture  on firm market value to improve financial performance. Corporate governance  is measured by audit  committee,boards of directors, board meeting and nomination . Corporate culture is measured by Corporate culture promotion While financial  company performance is measured by return on assets.  This research was conducted on companies listed on the Indonesia Stock exchange on indexed LQ 45 for period of 2016-2018. The sample was selected for 25 companies. The method of analysis uses associate descriptive analysis with  path analysis. Based on the results of the study found that corporate governance and culture promotion indirectly effect on financial performance with firm market value as intervening variable.

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