The Clinton Administration and the Americas: The Postwar Rhythm and Blues

1996 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 99-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert A. Pastor

For 40 years, the United States was so fearful of a thermonuclear bang that it barely noticed the whimper when the Cold War ended. There was not even any agreement on the date of the war’s end. Still, the people of the United States sensed its eagle had completed a great adventure and was returning to its nest, and that’s where they wanted it.President George Bush was more sensitive to the shift in the balance of power in the Persian Gulf than to the swing in US mood. His quick success in the Persian Gulf lifted his popularity to a zenith, making his reelection defeat the next year all the more painful and seemingly inexplicable.

Author(s):  
Rob Ruck

Though the Cold War ripped apart the almost century-long sporting connection between Cuba and the United States, Major League Baseball’s (MLB) color line and interference in Cuban and Mexican baseball had already stressed this relationship to the breaking point. The Cuban Revolution triggered the island nation’s final departure from the sporting empire that MLB had created and opened the way for the Dominican Republic to become the most important source of talent in professional baseball. Cuba, however, set its own course, building a noncommercial alternative in which sport became a right of the people and a means of statecraft.


2020 ◽  
pp. 28-53
Author(s):  
Francine R. Frankel

The partition of India into the two independent states of India and Pakistan created strategic anomalies. India lost the advantage of its own geographic position, which had placed it across the Arabian Sea close to the sea lanes leading to the Persian Gulf in the west and astride the Bay of Bengal adjacent to Southeast Asia on the east. Pakistan, divided by one thousand miles of Indian territory, was considered virtually indefensible without a powerful ally—most obviously, the United States. As the Cold War took hold, India’s potential as a great power counted for less than Pakistan’s strategic location close to the oil fields of the Middle East. Nehru believed India’s decision to join the British Commonwealth protected India from sloping too much toward the United States.


2006 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Layne

The conventional wisdom among U.S. grand strategists is that U.S. hegemony is exceptional—that the United States need not worry about other states engaging in counterhegemonic balancing against it. The case for U.S. hegemonic exceptionalism, however, is weak. Contrary to the predictions of Waltzian balance of power theorists, no new great powers have emerged since the end of the Cold War to restore equilibrium to the balance of power by engaging in hard balancing against the United States—that is, at least, not yet. This has led primacists to conclude that there has been no balancing against the United States. Here, however, they conflate the absence of a new distribution of power in the international political system with the absence of balancing behavior by the major second-tier powers. Moreover, the primacists' focus on the failure of new great powers to emerge, and the absence of traditional “hard” (i.e., military) counterbalancing, distracts attention from other forms of counterbalancing—notably “leash-slipping”—by major second-tier states that ultimately could lead to the same result: the end of unipolarity. Because unipolarity is the foundation of U.S. hegemony, if it ends, so too will U.S. primacy.


Author(s):  
Vladimir PECHATNOV

The concluding results of the anti-Hitler coalition meeting in Yalta have long been criticized in the United States by the antagonists of Franklin Roosevelt’s policy. In recent decades, they have raised renewed criticism in Central and Eastern Europe and across the West. Though, the decisions of Yalta Conference were fully determined by the balance of power and the real military situation on the war theatre by spring 1945. Each of the Allies pursued their own interests, but they appeared able to achieve a mutually acceptable compromise of these interests for the sake of final victory over common enemy. The Yalta Conference manifested the last upsurge of the Allied cooperation and in no way it served a prologue to the Cold War as it is now being asserted.


2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-87
Author(s):  
P. Michael Rattanasengchanh

During the Cold War, u.s. and Thai leaders invested in public relations programs to win the hearts and minds of the people of Thailand. Changes in Thailand between the years 1957 and 1963, which gave rise to Thai General Sarit Thanarat and King Bhumibol Adulyadej to positions of political authority, strengthened u.s.-Thai relations. To project their power, Washington and Bangkok relied on practicing public diplomacy through the United States Information Agency (usia) to demonstrate the benevolence of the United States, the army’s paternalism, and the god-like image of the king. The period from 1957 to 1963 saw the beginnings of a strong u.s.-Thai relationship and the creation of a stable anti-Communist, military-monarchical government that lasted until the end of the Cold War.


2003 ◽  
pp. 133-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mirjana Radojicic

The nature of the international politics, after the Cold War directed by the U.S. as the only current super-power, are considered in the text. The author?s intention is to stress the main points of divergence between moralistic-valuable rhetoric and the foreign policy practice of the U.S. In that sense, the examples of the American stand, i.e. the active treatment of the Yugoslav crisis, on the one hand, and the crisis in the Persian Gulf, on the other hand, is considered. The author?s conclusion is that the foreign policy of the only current super-power is still directed by interests rather then by values. In the concluding part, the author presents an anthropologic argument in favor of reestablishing "balance of power" as the only guarantee for peace and stability of the world.


This book uses trust—with its emotional and predictive aspects—to explore international relations in the second half of the Cold War, beginning with the late 1960s. The détente of the 1970s led to the development of some limited trust between the United States and the Soviet Union, which lessened international tensions and enabled advances in areas such as arms control. However, it also created uncertainty in other areas, especially on the part of smaller states that depended on their alliance leaders for protection. The chapters in this volume look at how the “emotional” side of the conflict affected the dynamics of various Cold War relations: between the superpowers, within the two ideological blocs, and inside individual countries on the margins of the East–West confrontation.


Author(s):  
Anne Searcy

During the Cold War, the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union developed cultural exchange programs, in which they sent performing artists abroad in order to generate goodwill for their countries. Ballet companies were frequently called on to serve in these programs, particularly in the direct Soviet-American exchange. This book analyzes four of the early ballet exchange tours, demonstrating how this series of encounters changed both geopolitical relations and the history of dance. The ballet tours were enormously popular. Performances functioned as an important symbolic meeting point for Soviet and American officials, creating goodwill and normalizing relations between the two countries in an era when nuclear conflict was a real threat. At the same time, Soviet and American audiences did not understand ballet in the same way. As American companies toured in the Soviet Union and vice versa, audiences saw the performances through the lens of their own local aesthetics. Ballet in the Cold War introduces the concept of transliteration to understand this process, showing how much power viewers wielded in the exchange and explaining how the dynamics of the Cold War continue to shape ballet today.


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