The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment

2006 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Layne

The conventional wisdom among U.S. grand strategists is that U.S. hegemony is exceptional—that the United States need not worry about other states engaging in counterhegemonic balancing against it. The case for U.S. hegemonic exceptionalism, however, is weak. Contrary to the predictions of Waltzian balance of power theorists, no new great powers have emerged since the end of the Cold War to restore equilibrium to the balance of power by engaging in hard balancing against the United States—that is, at least, not yet. This has led primacists to conclude that there has been no balancing against the United States. Here, however, they conflate the absence of a new distribution of power in the international political system with the absence of balancing behavior by the major second-tier powers. Moreover, the primacists' focus on the failure of new great powers to emerge, and the absence of traditional “hard” (i.e., military) counterbalancing, distracts attention from other forms of counterbalancing—notably “leash-slipping”—by major second-tier states that ultimately could lead to the same result: the end of unipolarity. Because unipolarity is the foundation of U.S. hegemony, if it ends, so too will U.S. primacy.

2012 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 151-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul C. Avey

Many self-identified realist, liberal, and constructivist scholars contend that ideology played a critical role in generating and shaping the United States' decision to confront the Soviet Union in the early Cold War. A close look at the history reveals that these ideological arguments fail to explain key aspects of U.S. policy. Contrary to ideological explanations, the United States initially sought to cooperate with the Soviet Union, did not initially pressure communist groups outside the Soviet orbit, and later sought to engage communist groups that promised to undermine Soviet power. The U.S. decision to confront the Soviets stemmed instead from the distribution of power. U.S. policy shifted toward a confrontational approach as the balance of power in Eurasia tilted in favor of the Soviet Union. In addition, U.S. leaders tended to think and act in a manner consistent with balance of power logic. The primacy of power over ideology in U.S. policymaking—given the strong liberal tradition in the United States and the large differences between U.S. and Soviet ideology—suggests that relative power concerns are the most important factors in generating and shaping confrontational foreign policies.


1998 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter C. Soderlund ◽  
Ronald H. Wagenberg ◽  
Stuart H. Surlin

Abstract: The profound changes experienced by the international political system from 1988 to 1992, subsumed under the rubric ``the fall of Communism,'' suggest an opportunity for changes in the way North American television news would report on events in Cuba. This article examines major network news coverage of Cuba in Canada (CBC and CTV) and in the United States (ABC, CBS, and NBC) from 1988 through 1992. Given the different histories of Canadian-Cuban and U.S.-Cuban relations since the revolution, the extent of similar negative coverage of the island in both countries' reporting is somewhat surprising. Also, it is apparent that the end of the Cold War did not change, in any fundamental way, the frames employed by television news in its coverage of Cuba. Résumé: Les changements profonds dans le système politique international qui ont eu lieu de 1988 à 1992, et qu'on décrit généralement comme marquant la "chute du communisme", indiqueraient la possibilité d'un changement dans la façon que les chaînes nord-américaines auraient de rapporter les événements dans leurs programmes d'information sur le Cuba. Cet article examinera les programmes d'information des chaînes canadiennes les plus importantes (CBC et CTV) et de celles des États-Unis (ABC, CBS et NBC) de 1988 jusqu'à 1992. Étant donné l'évolution différente dans les relations Canada / Cuba et États-Unis / Cuba depuis la révolution cubaine de 1959, nous avons été frappés par le degré de ressemblance entre les reportages négatifs sur le Cuba faits par les chaînes des deux pays nord-américains. En plus, il est évident que la fin de la guerre froide n'a pas changé de manière fondamentale le point de vue des reportages télévisés sur les événements cubains.


Author(s):  
George W. Breslauer

Several theories are considered to explain the determinants of Cold War between the United States and the USSR, countries that had been allies until 1945. If Stalin, not FDR, had died in 1945, there might have been a greater prospect of continued cooperation between the two great powers.


2006 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 7-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keir A. Lieber ◽  
Daryl G. Press

For nearly half a century, the world's most powerful nuclear-armed states have been locked in a condition of mutual assured destruction. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the nuclear balance has shifted dramatically. The U.S. nuclear arsenal has steadily improved; the Russian force has sharply eroded; and Chinese nuclear modernization has progressed at a glacial pace. As a result, the United States now stands on the verge of attaining nuclear primacy, meaning that it could conceivably disarm the long-range nuclear arsenals of Russia and China with a nuclear first strike. A simple nuclear exchange model demonstrates that the United States has a potent first-strike capability. The trajectory of nuclear developments suggests that the nuclear balance will continue to shift in favor of the United States in coming years. The rise of U.S. nuclear primacy has significant implications for relations among the world's great powers, for U.S. foreign policy, and for international relations scholarship.


2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack S. Levy ◽  
William R. Thompson

Scholars often interpret balance of power theory to imply that great powers almost always balance against the leading power in the system, and they conclude that the absence of a counterbalancing coalition against the historically unprecedented power of the United States after the end of the Cold War is a puzzle for balance of power theory. They are wrong on both counts. Balance of power theory is not universally applicable. Its core propositions about balancing strategies and the absence of sustained hegemonies apply to the European system and perhaps to some other autonomous continental systems but not to the global maritime system. Sea powers are more interested in access to markets than in territorial aggrandizement against other great powers. Consequently, patterns of coalition formation have been different in the European system and in the global maritime system during the last five centuries. An empirical analysis demonstrates that counterhegemonic balancing is frequent in Europe but much less frequent in the global system. Higher concentrations of power in the global system lead to fewer and smaller rather than more frequent and larger balancing coalitions, as well as to more frequent and larger alliances with the leading sea power than against it.


2021 ◽  
Vol 97 (5) ◽  
pp. 1317-1333
Author(s):  
Norrin M Ripsman

Abstract Commercial liberalism would suggest that whereas globalization was conducive to great power cooperation—or at least moderated competition—deglobalization is likely to ignite greater competition amongst the Great Powers. In reality, however, the picture is much more complex. To begin with, the intense globalization of the 1990s and 2000s is not responsible for moderating Great Power tensions; instead, it is itself a product of the security situation resulting from the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, while globalization did serve to reinforce cooperation between the United States and rising challengers, such as China, which sought to harness the economic gains of globalization to accelerate their rise, it also created or intensified fault-lines that have led to heightening tensions between the Great Powers. Finally, while we are currently witnessing increasing tensions between the US and both China and Russia, deglobalization does not appear to be the primary cause. Thus, geoeconomic conditions do not drive security relations; instead, the geoeconomic environment, which is itself influenced by Great Power politics, is better understood as a medium of Great Power competition, which may affect the character of Great Power competition and its intensity, but does not determine it.


1996 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 99-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert A. Pastor

For 40 years, the United States was so fearful of a thermonuclear bang that it barely noticed the whimper when the Cold War ended. There was not even any agreement on the date of the war’s end. Still, the people of the United States sensed its eagle had completed a great adventure and was returning to its nest, and that’s where they wanted it.President George Bush was more sensitive to the shift in the balance of power in the Persian Gulf than to the swing in US mood. His quick success in the Persian Gulf lifted his popularity to a zenith, making his reelection defeat the next year all the more painful and seemingly inexplicable.


2006 ◽  
Vol 100 (3) ◽  
pp. 525-550 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Michael Reisman ◽  
Andrea Armstrong

The claim by the United States to a right of what has come to be known as “preemptive selfdefense” has provoked deep anxiety and soul-searching among the members of the college of international lawyers. Some have feared that the claim signaled a demand for the prospective legitimation of “Pearl Harbor” types of actions, that is, sudden, massive, and destructive military actions “out of the blue,” by one state against another in the absence of a state of war, with the objective of militarily neutralizing or even eliminating a latent or potential adversary. Since some public intellectuals within the American political system had recommended such a strategy with respect to the People’s Republic of China in the midst of the Cold War, the anxiety could not be dismissed as entirely unfounded or even hysterical. Nor could it be ignored as if it were some sort of exclusively American aberration that could be tolerated as the idiosyncrasy of one state. From the earliest unilateral claims to a continental shelf, a copycat or mimetic dynamic in modern international law has taken shape whenever an enhancement of state power has become available, so that the possibility of similar claims to an expanded notion of preemptive self-defense by many other states could not be excluded. Indeed, while the United States may now have retreated somewhat from its 2002 broad claim to preemption, various other states (including some with nuclear weapons) have adopted the preemptive self-defense claim as their own. If the U.S. claim posed potentially destabilizing consequences for world order, how much more so would proliferation of the claim?


Worldview ◽  
1959 ◽  
Vol 2 (12) ◽  
pp. 3-5
Author(s):  
E. Raymond Platig

The Cold War objectives of both the United States and the Soviet Union are basic factors in any possible negotiation of differences. A third, perhaps more tangible, factor is the distribution of power between the two blocs. Ever since Sputnik I took to space there has been much speculation concerning the relative power positions of the Communist powers and the West.One immediate but not too well-defined reaction to Sputnik I was that we ought to get down to serious negotiations with the Soviet Union immediately, since we seemed to have lost the race for military power. This approach to foreign policy is as dangerous as that of the crusading moralist. For the proposition which lies behind this position is that we can successfully negotiate with the Soviets from weakness.


Author(s):  
Vladimir PECHATNOV

The concluding results of the anti-Hitler coalition meeting in Yalta have long been criticized in the United States by the antagonists of Franklin Roosevelt’s policy. In recent decades, they have raised renewed criticism in Central and Eastern Europe and across the West. Though, the decisions of Yalta Conference were fully determined by the balance of power and the real military situation on the war theatre by spring 1945. Each of the Allies pursued their own interests, but they appeared able to achieve a mutually acceptable compromise of these interests for the sake of final victory over common enemy. The Yalta Conference manifested the last upsurge of the Allied cooperation and in no way it served a prologue to the Cold War as it is now being asserted.


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