Teaching International Relations: The Model Security Council or General Assembly

1949 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-98
Author(s):  
Robert E. Elder

The model session of an organ of the United Nations, whether it be the Security Council or the General Assembly, is probably the most dramatic method available today for teaching American students the practical problems of postwar international relations. Dormant during the war, model councils and assemblies have been reactivated and are now playing an important rôle in the international relations programs of many colleges and universities. Typical of the model international organizations are the Model General Assembly of the United Nations, sponsored by the American Association for the United Nations, and the Model Security Council of the United Nations, sponsored jointly by the colleges and universities of central New York State. Between forty and forty-five institutions in New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey participate in the model assembly, while eleven send delegates to the model security council.The reaction of students who have participated in sessions of such model international organizations has been enthusiastic. Not only do such sessions stimulate general interest in international relations, but in addition they build a knowledge of procedure and structure of international organizations, a familiarity with reports and documents of the United Nations, an understanding of international problems currently influencing relations of the Great Powers, and a recognition of the difficulties under which the United Nations must labor. The model security council or assembly is not just a rehearsal of past events in the Security Council or General Assembly of the United Nations, although such events must provide the foundation for all action taken by the model group. Instead, the sessions of the model international organs are creative and develop initiative, for they start with what has been done to date and attempt to arrive at new decisions, all the while functioning within the general framework of the over-all foreign policies of the states involved.

1953 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 128-130

In a letter dated November 10, 1952, the Secretary-General (Lie) requested that the President of the General Assembly (Pearson) include on the agenda the item “Appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations”. Mr. Lie stated that it had been his intention to submit his resignation as Secretary-General and he had delayed until the foreign ministers of the five permanent members of the Security Council were present in New York. The General Committee on November 12 recommended the inclusion of this additional item upon the agenda. The subject was not discussed prior to the adjournment of the first part of the seventh session.


1984 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 6-6
Author(s):  
J. Philipp Rosenberg

When I first began teaching an Introduction to International Relations course, I quickly saw that my students needed something more than just reading about and listening to lectures on the clashes of perception which are at the heart of international politics. How better to do this than to have them participate in a simulation in which those clashes of perception would surface. Although one could choose one of any number of international organizations to simulate, the U.N. Security Council is probably the best due to its size and geographic balance. Having decided to use a simulation, I was immediately faced with crucial decisions as to how the simulation would be run especially in terms of the complexity of the rules used and the choice of nations to be represented.


RölingB.V.A.051976231100103FerenczBenjamin B., Defining International Aggression. The Search for World Peace. A Documentary History and Analysis. With an Introduction by SohnLouis B.. Vol. I (558 pp.), Vol. II (626 pp.). Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, New York 1975, $75.Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press 19761976T.M.C. Asser PresspdfS0165070X0001682Xa.pdfdispartBook Reviews and Book Notices1.E.g. on the words “at the present stage” in the preamble. These words stem from an earlier Soviet draft, which omitted “indirect aggression” and started “at the present stage” with armed force. The French Government later interpreted these words as a reference to the present age, in which so many “weapons of mass destruction” are available (Vol. II, p. 22).2.Thus, Art. 5 has “are” instead of “is” (Vol. II, p. 45).3.RussellRuth B.: A History of the United Nations Charter, The Role of the United States 1940–1945, The Brookings Institution, 1958, p. 465.4.But it should likewise be pointed out that the Resolution, sub 3, is also addressed to all States and appeals to them “to refrain from all acts of aggression and other uses of force contrary to the Charter and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among states in accordance with the Charter of the U.N.”.5.Military force used in other cases may indeed be legitimate, as is the case with the force that is ordered or recommended by the Security Council, or recommended by the General Assembly. The United Nations may legitimise the use of force in cases other than the action against an “armed attack”, e.g. the Security Council in the case of “a threat to the peace” (the S.C. considered the continuation of the illegal racist regime in S. Rhodesia “a threat to the peace”). The General Assembly has conferred on peoples the right to use force against “apartheid” or colonial exploitation. The “auctoritas” from the classical “betlum justum doctrine” has here been transferred from the sovereign State to the United Nations.6.More about this in: RölingB.V.A., Die Definition der Aggression, in Recht im Dienst des Friedens, Festschrift für Eberhard Menzel, Berlin 1975, pp. 387–403.7.More about this in: RölingB.V.A., The Legal Position of Rebels and Rebellion

1976 ◽  
Vol 23 (01) ◽  
pp. 100
Author(s):  
B.V.A. Röling

2001 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 25-26
Author(s):  
Andrea Theocharis

The National Model United Nations claims to be the most realistic simulation of the United Nations in the world. Every year more than 2500 students participate in the NMUN in New York, which partly takes place inside the original UNbuildings. For five days, the students simulate the different bodies of the UN-framework (e.g. Security Council, General Assembly, ECOSOC) by using the original UN-Rules of procedure and negotiating to formulate and pass resolutions on various topics.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002085232199756
Author(s):  
Julia Gray ◽  
Alex Baturo

When political principals send agents to international organizations, those agents are often assumed to speak in a single voice. Yet, various types of country representatives appear on the international stage, including permanent representatives as well as more overtly “political” government officials. We argue that permanent delegates at the United Nations face career incentives that align them with the bureaucracy, setting them apart from political delegates. To that end, they tend to speak more homogeneously than do other types of speakers, while also using relatively more technical, diplomatic rhetoric. In addition, career incentives will make them more reluctant to criticize the United Nations. In other words, permanent representatives speak more like bureaucratic agents than like political principals. We apply text analytics to study differences across agents’ rhetoric at the United Nations General Assembly. We demonstrate marked distinctions between the speech of different types of agents, contradictory to conventional assumptions, with implications for our understandings of the interplay between public administration and agency at international organizations. Points for practitioners Delegations to international organizations do not “speak with one voice.” This article illustrates that permanent representatives to the United Nations display more characteristics of bureaucratic culture than do other delegates from the same country. For practitioners, it is important to realize that the manner in which certain classes of international actors “conduct business” can differ markedly. These differences in tone—even among delegates from the same principal—can impact the process of negotiation and debate.


2001 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Thomas

In the decade after 1952 France faced sustained United Nations criticism of its colonial policies in north Africa. As membership of the UN General Assembly expanded, support for the non-aligned states of the Afro-Asian bloc increased. North African nationalist parties established their permanent offices in New York to press their case for independence. Tracing UN consideration of French North Africa from the first major General Assembly discussion of Tunisia in 1952 to the end of the Algerian war in 1962, this article considers the tactics employed on both sides of the colonial/anti-colonial divide to manipulate the UN Charter's ambiguities over the rights of colonial powers and the jurisdiction of the General Assembly in colonial disputes.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 682-693 ◽  
Author(s):  
Víctor Genina

On September 19th, 2016, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted Resolution 71/1, the text of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (the “New York Declaration”). Resolution 71/1 is the outcome document of the high-level plenary meeting on addressing large movements of refugees and migrants, held at the UN headquarters. The New York Declaration reflects how UN member states have decided to address the challenge of large movements of people in two main legal categories: asylum seekers/refugees and migrants. Resolution 71/1 includes an annex titled “Towards a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration” (the “global compact for migration” or “global compact”). This document is comprised of several thematic issues related to international migration that will be the basis of a globally negotiated agreement on how member states should respond to international migration at the national, regional, and international levels, as well as to issues related to international migration and development. The global compact for migration is intended to be adopted at a conference on international migration and development before the inauguration of the 73rd annual session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. This paper addresses how UN member states should plan to address international migration in the future. It does not refer to refugees and asylum seekers: a global compact on refugees will be drafted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2018, and to be presented to the UN General Assembly for states' consideration during its 73rd annual session, which starts in September 2018.1 For those who have been involved in migration issues within the United Nations, the fact that member states have finally agreed to convene an international conference on international migration represents a major achievement. It is the result of an extended process that started decades ago and was made possible by a long chain of efforts by many state delegations and other stakeholders. The global compact for migration will not be the first outcome document dealing exclusively with international migration. A declaration2 adopted at a high-level meeting at the United Nations in October 2013, for example, paved the way for the 2018 conference. Nonetheless, the global compact represents a unique opportunity to address international migration comprehensively and humanely. This paper contributes to the discussion on the elements that should be included in the global compact for migration. The paper is divided into two sections. The first section analyzes the main elements of Annex II, “Towards a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration,” and the criteria that needs to be adopted in order to achieve a substantive outcome. In particular, participants in the negotiation process should aim to balance the concerns of states and the members of host societies, on one hand, with the needs and rights of migrants, on the other. The second section includes proposals to enrich the final global compact for migration and takes into account two documents written by two different actors within the UN system, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Migration, and the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants. In particular, the paper proposes that the global compact for migration: • sets forth principles that can inform the actions of governments in relation to international migration at all levels; • enunciates a clearer definition of state protection responsibilities in relation to migrants in crisis situations and so-called “mixed flows”3; affords a substantive role to civil society organizations, the private sector, and academic institutions in the global compact's follow-up and review process; • defines the institutional framework for the implementation and follow-up of the global compact within the United Nations, including through the work of the UN High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF); • establishes a mechanism to fund migration policies for states that lack enough resources to invest sufficiently in this task; and • builds a cooperation-oriented, peer-review mechanism to review migration policies. The paper has been conceived as an input for those who will take part in the negotiation of the global compact for migration, as well as those who will closely follow those negotiations. Thus, the paper assumes a level of knowledge on how international migration has been addressed within the United Nations during the last several years and of the complexities of these negotiation processes. The author took part in different UN negotiation processes on international migration from 2004 to 2013. The paper is primarily based on this experience.4


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 458-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingvild Bode ◽  
John Karlsrud

Since the failures of the United Nations of the early 1990s, the protection of civilians has evolved as a new norm for United Nations peacekeeping operations. However, a 2014 United Nations report found that while peacekeeping mandates often include the use of force to protect civilians, this has routinely been avoided by member states. What can account for this gap between the apparently solid normative foundations of the protection of civilians and the wide variation in implementation? This article approaches the question by highlighting normative ambiguity as a fundamental feature of international norms. Thereby, we consider implementation as a political, dynamic process where the diverging understandings that member states hold with regard to the protection of civilians norm manifest and emerge. We visualize this process in combining a critical-constructivist approach to norms with practice theories. Focusing on the practices of member states’ military advisers at the United Nations headquarters in New York, and their positions on how the protection of civilians should be implemented on the ground, we draw attention to their agency in norm implementation at an international site. Military advisers provide links between national ministries and contingents in the field, while also competing for being recognized as competent performers of appropriate implementation practices. Drawing on an interpretivist analysis of data generated through an online survey, a half-day workshop and interviews with selected delegations, the article adds to the understanding of norms in international relations while also providing empirical insights into peacekeeping effectiveness.


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