Confronting Captivity: Britain and the United States and Their POWs in Nazi Germany

2005 ◽  
Vol 84 (6) ◽  
pp. 141
Author(s):  
Lawrence D. Freedman ◽  
Arieh J. Kochavi
1980 ◽  
Vol 22 (86) ◽  
pp. 162-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph L. Rosenberg

Éire was economically and militarily impotent, strategically significant, and the only European neutral behind allied lines in World War II. Although the Taoiseach, Eamon de Valera, refused to co-operate openly with his protectors in Britain and his friends in America or even to distinguish publicly between them and Nazi Germany, he wanted Anglo-American aid, and he wanted it without conditions. He wanted what the American minister at Dublin, David Gray, called a ‘free ride’On St Patrick’s Day, 1941, de Valera announced that he would send a special agent to purchase American food and weapons and expressed the hope that Ireland’s friends would help the mission. Acknowledging that the war was causing shortages, he repeated earlier claims that the belligerents, blockading each other, were blockading Éire, a land determined to avoid involvement in any ‘imperial adventure’


2014 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-133
Author(s):  
Peter Mauch

The Australian government in January 1940 appointed Richard Gardiner Casey minister to the United States. He sought both U.S. support for Britain in its war against Nazi Germany, and a U.S. guarantee to preserve Australian security in the face of an aggressive and threatening Japan. When Casey’s mission ended in March 1942, the United States had entered war in both the Atlantic and the Pacific. The limits to Casey’s ministerial influence were such, however, that one hardly can credit him with having delivered U.S. belligerency. The existing literature nonetheless locates merit in Casey’s ministerial mission, particularly in his highly effective public diplomacy and also in his ability to remain abreast of key U.S. decisions and strategy. This essay takes no particular issue with these findings. Instead, it finds value elsewhere in Casey’s mission, and in particular in the delicate balance he struck between his twin loyalties, to both Australia and the British Empire. It also departs from the existing literature insofar as it identifies a number of issues and episodes that call into question Casey’s accomplishments and acumen.


Author(s):  
Steve R. Waddell

With the outbreak of war in Europe, a growing fear of and ultimately a concerted effort to defeat Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany defined American involvement. Competing Allied national and strategic interests resulted in serious debates, but the common desire to defeat the enemy proved stronger than any disagreements. President Franklin Roosevelt, understanding the isolationist sentiments of the American public and the dangers of Nazism and Imperial Japan perhaps better than most, carefully led the nation through the difficult period of 1939–1941, overseeing a gradual increase in American military preparedness and support for those standing up to Nazi Germany, as the German military forces achieved victory after victory. Following American entry into the war, strategic discussions in 1942–1943 often involved ambitious American military plans countered by British voices of moderation. The forces and supplies available made a direct invasion of northern France unfeasible. The American desire to launch an immediate invasion across the English Channel gave way to the Allied invasion of North Africa and subsequent assault on Sicily and the Italian peninsula. The Tehran Conference in November 1943 marked a transition, as the buildup of American forces in Europe and the overwhelming contribution of war materials enabled the United States to determine American-British strategy from late 1943 to the end of the war. The final year and a half of the war in Europe saw a major shift in strategic leadership, as the United States along with the Soviet Union assumed greater control over the final steps toward victory over Nazi Germany. By the end of World War II (May 1945 in Europe and September 1945 in Asia), the United States had not only assumed the leadership of the Western Allies, it had achieved superpower status with the greatest air force and navy in the world. It was also the sole possessor of the atomic bomb. Even with the tensions with the Soviet Union and beginnings of a Cold War, most Americans felt the United States was the leader as the world entered the post-war era.


1969 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernest R. May

2021 ◽  
pp. 31-71
Author(s):  
Steve Chan ◽  
Huiyun Feng ◽  
Kai He ◽  
Weixing Hu

As its title suggests, this chapter discusses the sources of revisionism and the various conditions that influence its development. It introduces historical cases such as Wilhelmine and Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union during the Cold War and contemporary Russia, imperial Japan between the 1880s and 1940s, the United States during its years of ascendance and today, and China during the Maoist years and since its reform under Deng Xiaoping. Whether a state becomes revisionist is not in its genes but is in part dependent on how it perceives its treatment in the hands of other established countries. States’ domestic and foreign circumstances interact to shape their foreign policy orientation.


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