Détente, East-West Trade, and the Future of Economic Integration in Eastern Europe

1976 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 568-589 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrzej Korbonski
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Economic Integration ◽  
Raw Materials ◽  
Economic Assistance ◽  
Economic Relations ◽  
East European ◽  
Before And After ◽  
The Impact ◽  
East West

The paper attempts to examine the impact of East-West trade on the process of economic integration in Eastern Europe, carried out under the aegis of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The discussion is focused on the proposition that, other things being equal, the continued growth of East-West trade is at the present time incompatible with the increase in the level of economic integration in that part of Europe.The problem is analyzed in the context of several factors: the process of regional economic integration; the attitude of the Soviet Union and of the East European political and economic elites toward both integration and East-West trade before and after détente; the influence of economic reforms in Eastern Europe; and the impact of the energy crisis and of the developing global shortage of raw materials.The conclusion emerges that, on balance, the chances of economic cooperation if not integration in the region are today better than in the past, albeit at the expense of closer economic relations between Eastern Europe and the West.

Interpreting the Soviet subsididzation of Eastern Europe

1988 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 639-658 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josef C. Brada
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Raw Materials ◽  
The Other ◽  
Economic Assistance ◽  
Gains From Trade ◽  
East European ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Mutual Economic Assistance ◽  
Trading Scheme

In trade among the members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), prices of raw materials are lower and those of manufactured goods higher than comparable world prices. Because the Soviet Union is a net exporter of raw materials to, and net importer of manufactures from, the other CMEA countries, it benefits less from CMEA trade than it would from trading with the rest of the world, and the other CMEA members benefit more. This redistribution of the gains from trade is generally seen as a form of subsidization. One explanation of these subsidies is that they represent Soviet payments for political and military benefits provided by East European regimes; another is that the subsidies compensate Eastern Europe for the economic burden imposed by central planning and extensive economic ties to the Soviet Union. I argue that neither of these explanations is consistent with the type of economic and political relations that one would expect of the Soviet and East European regimes. In their place I offer an alternative explanation based on the Heckscher-Ohlin model of comparative advantage. The distribution of CMEA subsidies is shown to reflect the distribution of gains from trade that would arise among any group of economies forming a preferential trading scheme. I also argue that the willingness of members to belong to CMEA, even at the expense of paying subsidies, is that CMEA can be viewed as a club that provides benefits to members while imposing costs that may to some extent be unequal and unpredictable.

The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part 3)

2005 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Kramer
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Political System ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
East European ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
External Context ◽  
Final Segment ◽  
Extended Analysis ◽  
The Impact

This is the concluding part of a three-part article that discusses the transformation of Soviet-East European relations in the late 1980s and the impact of the sweeping changes in Eastern Europe on the Soviet Union. This final segment is divided into two main parts: First, it provides an extended analysis of the bitter public debate that erupted in the Soviet Union in 1990 and 1991 about the “loss” of Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. The debate roiled the Soviet political system and fueled the hardline backlash against Mikhail Gorbachev. Second, this part of the article offers a concluding section that highlights the theoretical implications of the article as a whole. The article, as the conclusion shows, sheds light on recent literature concerning the diffusion of political innovations and the external context of democratization and political change.

East, West, and the Return of ‘Central’: Borders Drawn and Redrawn

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Lee ◽  
Robert Bideleux
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
Third Reich ◽  
The European Union ◽  
World War ◽  
The Third Reich ◽  
The Impact ◽  
East West

Western Europe has not only met but also married Eastern Europe, even if there are rumours that it was a marriage of convenience, consummated in ‘EU Europe’. Nevertheless, a significant outcome of the cohabitation has been the resurgence of debates about the status, location, and distinctiveness of ‘Central Europe’; the changing nature of borders and borderlands; and the emergence of ‘new’ East/West divides. Because World War II was predominantly fought on the Eastern Front, almost 95 per cent of Europe's fatalities of war and genocide were in Central and Eastern Europe (including Germany and Austria). These mass killings, combined with the paramount role of the Soviet Union in the defeat of the Third Reich, led to substantial reconfigurations of the borders and ethnic compositions of European states. This article examines the reconfigurations of European territories at the close of World War II, the drastic redrawing of European borders during 1945–1948 and again in the late 1980s and 1990s, the impact on European borders of the European Union and its ‘deepening’ and ‘widening’, and Europe's new East/West divide.

scholarly journals Kryzys ukraiński wyzwaniem dla rozwoju relacji gospodarczych Ukrainy z Unią Europejską

Politeja ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3(66)) ◽  
pp. 67-77
Author(s):  
Marta Labuda
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Economic Integration ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Entire Area ◽  
Economic Relations ◽  
Ukrainian Crisis ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Exploratory Strategy ◽  
The Eu

The Ukrainian Crisis as a Challenge for Development of Economic Relations between Ukraine and European Union The present article is an attempt to look at European economic integration in terms of the Ukrainian crisis that not only Ukraine, but the entire area of Eastern Europe and the European Union must deal with. The purpose of the research is to demonstrate the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on economic integration of Ukraine with the EU. The research has been based on a mixed methodology due to the interdisciplinary subject of the article. The sequential exploratory strategy has been used. The research proves the Ukrainian crisis contributes to the trade exchange instability and causes disruptions in capital cooperation between the EU and Ukraine. The serious crisis shows how important a solid policy is to integrate this country with the EU.

The Economic Dimension of the East–West Conflict and the Role of Germany

1994 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-215
Author(s):  
Dietmar Petzina
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Industrial Country ◽  
West Germany ◽  
Federal Republic Of Germany ◽  
Economic Dimension ◽  
Economic Relations ◽  
East European ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Willy Brandt ◽  
East West

A survey of the economic problems in East–West relations during the era of the Cold War is of particular interest from the German perspective. First, no other Western industrial country played a comparable role in the economic relations with East European countries; and secondly, East–West trade, especially the economic contacts with the German Democratic Republic (GDR), became an outstanding feature of German Ostpolitik under the conditions of the divided country. It appears to be an acceptable proposition to say that this form of West Germany economic and trade policy was the equivalent of the militarily defined US policy towards the Soviet Union, in so far as the famous dictum of the former Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt, that the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was ‘an economic giant and a political dwarf only partly corresponded to reality. It therefore seems appropriate to discuss the economic dimension of the East–West conflict in the context of German interests and policies – not to the exclusion of all else, but with a certain priority.

Prospects for integration in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)

1976 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 631-648 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Marer
Keyword(s):  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Economic Integration ◽  
Eastern European ◽  
Economic Assistance ◽  
Mutual Economic ◽  
Economic Relations ◽  
Trade Blocs ◽  
Mutual Economic Assistance ◽  
Eastern European Countries ◽  
Centripetal Forces

In analyzing the future of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), it is useful to assess both the centrifugal and centripetal forces affecting regional economic integration. Centrifugal forces include the existing structure of production in Eastern Europe; problems of coordination; and inefficient price systems, among others. Centripetal forces include the worldwide energy crisis; Western inflation and recession; the growing importance of trade blocs; and numerous other factors contributing to the increasing hard-currency indebtedness of the Eastern European countries. Many of these external events have increased the attractiveness for CMEA countries of intrabloc economic relations and provided a momentum for CMEA integration. Analysis of the various forces leads to the conclusion that Soviet economic policy vis-à-vis Eastern Europe will remain crucial in determining the direction and speed of economic integration. Soviet economic involvement with Eastern Europe seems to have been costly for the USSR during the past decade and so it is not obvious that the USSR will attempt to push integration much further than it now stands.

United States Policy Towards Eastern Europe: Before and After Helsinki

1975 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 435-463 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert F. Byrnes
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
The United States ◽  
The West ◽  
East European ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Before And After ◽  
And Control

The signing in Helsinki of the agreement on security and cooperation in Europe has led to bitter criticism of President Ford and of the policy under which the United States drifted into recognizing Soviet acquisition of 114,000 square miles of Finnish, Polish, German, Czechoslovak, and Romanian territory, apparently sanctified as well Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, and recognized the “permanent” division of Europe. In return for endorsing these Soviet conquests, the Western states received some vague promises that the Soviet Union and the East European states would take a “positive and humanitarian attitude” towards applications from their citizens to rejoin their families in the West, would “facilitate the improvement of the dissemination” of publications from other countries, would provide three weeks' notice of large military maneuvers within 156 miles of frontiers, and assured that every European state would be free from “external influence.” All these phrases seem small recompense for such great concessions and from two years of negotiation by 492 diplomats, especially when hope in Western Europe in particular had been high for an end to jamming, censorship, and control over travel. Critics noted in particular that the formal summit agreement awarded the Soviet Union prizes it had sought since 1954, while the parallel discussion of reducing military forces in Eastern and Western Europe, in which the Soviet Union and its associates maintain immense superiorities, has long been stalled. Indeed, now that the West no longer has the lever of the Geneva talks, it has little pressure to persuade the Soviet Union to discuss mutual balanced force reductions. Many now fear that the Soviet Union will press instead for a collective security agreement, which would have no meaning, but which would totally demolish NATO, while leaving the Soviets on the commanding military heights in Eastern Europe.

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