Power Transitions and Great Power War from Westphalia to Waterloo

1992 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Woosang Kim

This study extends recent research on the power transition and hegemonic stability theory to the preindustrial era. It improves on the original power transition theory by relaxing an assumption and by extending the empirical domain. Unlike the original power transition theory, the revised version is not restricted to the period after the industrial revolution and can therefore be applied to the preindustrial era. This study examines the empirical record prior to the industrial revolution to see whether the power transition and hegemonic stability theory holds for that period. The data for 1648 to 1815 indicate strong support for the power transition contention that a rough equality of power between rival sides increases the likelihood of war. That is, when the challenging great power, with its allies' support, catches up with the dominant power, great power war is most likely.

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-269
Author(s):  
Gamal M. Selim

This article seeks to analyse the emerging Sino-Russian strategic understanding on the Arab uprisings of late 2010 and beyond by investigating its underlying motivations and its implications for Middle East and international politics. Building on the assumptions of ‘power transition theory’ in explaining great power interactions, it is argued that the Sino-Russian strategic understanding on the Arab uprisings dovetails with their pre-existing strategic posture in relation to global politics, and was motivated by their joint rising dissatisfaction with US unilateralist and hegemonic policies in the region. Such policies, from a Sino-Russian perspective, tended to exclude, rather than accommodate, the interests of both powers in this pivotal part of the globe. This prompted Russia and China to capitalize on their growing military and economic power and join efforts in the form of a strategic understanding in an attempt to effectively challenge an intrusive and overreaching hegemon and secure their interests in the region. This strategic understanding has had significant implications for the configuration of great power relationships in the direction of challenging US regional hegemony and facilitating a shift in the regional and global balance of power.


2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Sobek ◽  
Jeremy Wells

Abstract.Power transition theory has been both theoretically and empirically developed in the context of a hierarchy (both global and regional). Yet the logic of the theory describes the interactions of a hegemon in relation to a rising challenger, which is essentially a dyadic interaction. As a result, we argue that power transition theory is a dyadic theory that can be examined across all dyads. We test power transition in a data set of all non-directed dyads from 1816 to 2001. Our results find robust evidence that dyadic power transitions increase the risk of militarized disputes. In addition, this result is not actually contingent on the dyad containing either powerful states or those with dissimilar preferences.Résumé.La théorie de la transition du pouvoir a été à la fois théorique et empirique développée dans le cadre d'une hiérarchie (à la fois mondial et régional). Pourtant, la logique de la théorie décrit les interactions d'une puissance hégémonique par rapport à un challenger en hausse, qui est essentiellement une interaction dyadique. En conséquence, nous soutenons que la théorie de la transition du pouvoir est une théorie dyadique qui peut être examiné à travers toutes les dyades. Nous testons transition de puissance dans un ensemble de toutes les dyades non-directifs 1816–2001 données. Nos résultats trouvent des preuves solides que les transitions de pouvoir dyadique augmentent le risque de conflits militarisés. En outre, ce résultat n'est pas réellement subordonnée à la dyade contenant soit des Etats puissants ou ceux qui ont des préférences différentes.


Author(s):  
Michelle Murray

How can established powers manage the peaceful rise of new great powers? With The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations, the author offers a new answer to this perennial question in international relations, arguing that power transitions are principally social phenomena whereby rising powers struggle to obtain recognition of their identity as a great power. At the center of great power identity formation is the acquisition of particular symbolic capabilities—such as battlesheips, aircraft carriers, or nuclear weapons—that are representative of great power status and that allow rising powers to experience their uncertain social status as a brute fact. When a rising power is recognized, this power acquisition is considered legitimate and its status in the international order secured, leading to a peaceful power transition. If a rising power is misrecognized, its assertive foreign policy is perceived to be for revisionist purposes, which must be contained by the established powers. Revisionism—rather than the product of a material power structure that encourages aggression or domestic political struggles—is a social construct that emerges through a rising power’s social interactions with the established powers as it attempts to gain recognition of its identity. The question of peaceful power transition has taken on increased salience in recent years with the emergence of China as an economic and military rival of the United States. Highlighting the social dynamics of power transitions, this book offers a powerful new framework through which to understand the rise of China and how the United States can facilitate its peaceful rise.


2019 ◽  
Vol 05 (03) ◽  
pp. 317-341
Author(s):  
Serafettin Yilmaz ◽  
Wang Xiangyu

Dissatisfaction is a major concept in power transition theory, which postulates that a rapidly rising power tends to be dissatisfied with the international system and would thus attempt to reform or replace it, whereas the hegemonic power would, by default, be satisfied with and work to maintain the status quo. This paper, however, offers an alternative outlook on the reigning-rising power dynamics by examining the conditions for and implications of hegemonic dissatisfaction and rising power satisfaction. It argues that although China, as a potential systemic challenger harboring grievances against the existing global regimes, has been a recurrent subject for studies, it is the United States, the established hegemon, that appears increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo. The U.S. dissatisfaction is informed by a set of internal and external factors often justified with a reference to China as a challenger, and is manifested in a number of anti-system strategies, including unconventional diplomatic rhetoric, as well as withdrawal from various international institutions or attempts to undermine them. The U.S. discontent, as contrasted with China’s satisfaction as a rising power, has a number of potential geopolitical and economic implications at the bilateral, regional, and global levels, endangering the viability and sustainability of the universally accepted political and economic regimes.


China Report ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 484-500
Author(s):  
Mintu Barua

There is an ongoing debate whether China is a satisfied power or a dissatisfied revisionist power. On the basis of the concept of regime insecurity and power transition theory, this article argues that the resolution of this debate mainly depends on some essentially interrelated complex factors—China’s assertive behaviour, China’s core interests, China’s internal security, and China’s involvement in territorial disputes. Moreover, this article examines the validity of the usual claim of power transition theory that the dominant power is always satisfied with the status quo, and contrary to this idea of power transition theory, this article suggests that the dominant power can be dissatisfied and revisionist too if its hegemony is under threat.


Author(s):  
Jonathan M. DiCicco

Power transition theory and Graham Allison’s Thucydides Trap Project are discussed in tandem with two complementary aims: to highlight theoretical and empirical contributions of the power transition research program, and to provide critical perspective on the Thucydides Trap Project. Conventional-wisdom approaches of this sort are distinguished from power transition theory, the empirical international relations theory proposed by A. F. K. Organski and further articulated and tested by generations of scholars. The theory’s central elements—national power, stages of power transition, shifts in the distribution of power, international order and the status quo—are identified and discussed, with a focus on key variables used to explain war and peace among contending states. A comparative, critical examination of the Thucydides Trap Project is used as a lens for spotlighting key empirical contributions of the power transition theory research tradition and the value of adhering to norms of scientific rigor. Opportunities for further growth and development are noted, with special attention afforded to essential features of the power transition theory research program, including the study of (1) the timing and initiation of war; (2) rising powers’ dissatisfaction with the status quo, and a possible distinction between dissatisfaction and revisionism; and (3) reducing the risk of violent, revisionist challenges.


Author(s):  
Steve Chan

The idea of power transition, or power shift, has recently been much in vogue in scholarly, policy, and even popular discourse. It has, for example, motivated a resurgent interest in the power-transition theory and the danger of the so-called Thucydides trap. China’s recent rise has especially motivated an interest in these topics, engendering concerns about whether this development means that China is on a collision course with the United States. These concerns stem from the proposition that the danger of a system-destabilizing war increases when a rising power catches up to a declining hegemon and challenges the latter’s preeminent position in the international system. Thucydides’s famous remark about the origin of the Peloponnesian War, claiming that “it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable” in ancient Greece, has frequently been invoked to support this view. Whereas power shift is a generic term referring to any change in the balance of capabilities between two or more states, power transition is a more specific concept pointing to a reversal of positions whereby a rising latecomer overtakes a previous dominant power in the international system (or at least when this latecomer approaches power parity with the dominant power). Power-transition theory presents a contemporary version of Thucydides’s explanation of the Peloponnesian War. It calls attention to the changing power relationships among the world’s major states and provides a seemingly cogent framework to understand the dynamics that can produce war between these states and their respective allies. A careful reader will immediately find the preceding paragraph unsatisfactory as it contains several important ambiguities. For instance, what do we mean by “major states” or “great powers,” and what do we have in mind when we refer to changes in their relative “power”? Also, does the power-transition theory claim that war is likely to break out when there is a change in the identity of the world’s most powerful country? Or does it also say that war is likely to occur even in the absence of a late-rising state overtaking, and therefore displacing, an incumbent hegemon? If so, how closely does the late-rising state have to match the incumbent’s power capabilities before the power-transition theory predicts a war between them? Would the latecomer have to reach at least 80%, 90%, or even 95% of the incumbent’s power before an approximate parity between the two is achieved? Does the power-transition theory pertain only to the relationship between the world’s two most powerful states, or does it apply to other states? And if power transition is a necessary but insufficient condition for war, what are the other pertinent variables and their interaction effects with power shifts? Finally, what do we mean by war or systemic war? The answers to these questions are not self-evident. How they are dealt with—or not—is in itself suggestive of the power relations in the world being studied by scholars and these scholars’ positions in this world and their relations to it.


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