International Sanctions and American Law

1925 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 505-516 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Whitla Stinson

Mr. J. Holmes had told us that the object of the study of law is to make the prophecies of precedent more precise, to generalize them into a thoroughly connected system; that that object is “the prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentalities of courts.” The framers of our constitutional jurisprudence were clearly concerned with the incidence of just principles upon governmental powers. Kent declares that when the United States ceased to be a part of the British Empire, and assumed the character of an independent nation, they became subject to that system of rules, which reason, morality and custom had established among the civilized nations of Europe, as their public law. It was recognized that the law of nations prescribed “what one nation may do without giving just cause for war, and what of consequence, another may or ought to permit without being considered as having sacrificed its honor, its dignity, or its independence.” Story avers that the general law of nations is “equally obligatory upon all sovereigns and all states." It is "the umpire and security of their rights and peace,” declared Jefferson. It is a law which “binds all nations,” declared the Supreme Court of the United States in 1794.

Author(s):  
Michael Lobban

The Anglo-American law of obligations was profoundly reshaped in the two centuries after 1800, driven by social and economic changes, and changes in legal institutions and doctrines. In contract law, nineteenth-century jurists increasingly sought to put the rules of law into a coherent rational framework (inspired by continental models resting on will theory), though they soon found that this theory could not explain many contractual doctrines. In tort law, jurists were also divided over whether unifying principles underlying tort could be uncovered, with formalist efforts to find such principles being challenged by Realists who argued that tort was in effect ‘public law in disguise’. The quest for underlying principles was also pursued by scholars of unjust enrichment, first in the United States and subsequently in England; though as in the other areas of obligations, by the end of the twentieth century, there was no consensus on whether this was possible.


1909 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-136
Author(s):  
Percy Bordwell

In the July number of the Journal is given the decision of the Court of Claims in Sanches v. The United States and of the Supreme Court in O’Reilly v. Brooke. Both cases involve the validity of the orders of military governors in former Spanish territory abolishing offices for which a price had been paid and which the holder claimed were private property and thus under the protection of the law of nations and the treaty of peace with Spain. In the Sanches case the office abolished was that of “ numbered procurador of the courts of first instance of the capital of Porto Rico;” in the O’Reilly case the office was that of high sheriff of Havana. In each case the opinion was expressed that the office had ceased with the extinction of Spanish sovereignty, but in the Supreme Court case this was not necessary to the decision, as General Brooke’s liability had already been denied on other grounds, while the opinion on this point was delivered without argument of counsel, without exposition, and without the citation of authority other than that of the Secretary of War in approving General Brooke’s order. It is the opinion of the writer that the holders of those offices were entitled to indemnification. The facts of the O’Reilly controversy will be gone into in considerable detail.


1961 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-135
Author(s):  
David Fellman

The personnel of the Supreme Court remained unchanged during the 1959 Term. From the point of view of the decisions rendered in the public law field, this was an undistinguished Term. Few of the constitutional cases are likely to hold an important place among the precedents, and a considerable number of well-argued decisions turned entirely upon private law questions. But there was no dearth of writing, during the period under review, about the Court as an institution and about the Justices who sit there.Note may be made at this point of the latest chapter in the long dispute over the so-called tidelands. In 1947 the Supreme Court had ruled that, as against the claims of California, the United States possessed paramount rights in lands underlying the Pacific Ocean seaward from the low-water mark. Similar rulings were made in 1950 as regards the claims of Louisiana and Texas in the Gulf of Mexico. But with the enactment in 1953 of the Submerged Lands Act, the United States relinquished to the coastal states all of its rights in all lands beneath navigable waters within the three-mile limit, and in excess of that limit within state boundaries as they existed at the time a state became a member of the Union, or as theretofore approved by Congress. The limit of the grant was three leagues (about ten and one-half miles) in the Gulf of Mexico and three geographical miles in the Atlantic and Pacific. The actual extent of the claims of the coastal states involved in the question was therefore left to be settled by litigation.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ann C. Hodges

The petitioners in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association seek to overturn longstanding law relating to union security in the public sector. A decision in favor of the petitioners will invalidate provisions in thousands of collective bargaining agreements covering millions of workers. Additionally, it has the potential to upend the labor relations system in the United States. To understand how this might be the case, this Issue Brief will review the history of union security and the Supreme Court decisions that upheld union security agreements in the public sector. The Issue Brief will then look at the Friedrichs case itself, engaging in an analysis of the case which concludes that the Court should reach the same result as in prior cases.


1977 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 270-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry J. Bourguignon

In an article published in this Journal in 1932, Professor Edwin Dickinson pointed out that the Supreme Court, in the first thirty years of its existence, dealt with 82 cases which raised questions of international law. The Court and counsel before it repeatedly cited the familiar writers on the law of nations: Grotius, Pufendorf, Bynkershoek, Burlamaqui, Rutherforth, and Vattel. As Dickinson pointed out, “It is an ancient doctrine of the Anglo-American common law that the law of nations is incorporated in and in some sense forms part of the national law.” Largely through decisions based on the principles expressed by the classical writers, the law of nations was early incorporated as part of the law of the United States.


Author(s):  
Kal Raustiala

At the turn of the last century Americans heatedly debated whether their constitution followed the flag. Did the United States possess a “home-stayin’ constitution,” as the satirist Finley Peter Dunne suggested at the time, or did its foundational rules extend wherever and whenever the federal government governed? Perhaps the newly muscular nature of American power in an overtly imperial age had changed the answer; perhaps the flag was now, in Dunne’s clever words, “so lively that no constitution could follow it and survive.” In the century that followed, of course, the flag became livelier than anyone at the time could have imagined. With the presidential election of 1900 couched as a referendum on the Constitution and the flag, the victory of William McKinley over the anticolonial William Jennings Bryan signaled a new American willingness to embrace empire in places like the Philippines. McKinley’s campaign had declaimed that the flag “has not been planted in foreign soil to acquire more territory, but for humanity’s sake.” McKinley nonetheless did not disappoint the substantial interests that favored more territory. The subsequent ratification by the Supreme Court of a peculiarly American form of imperialism facilitated this expansion. Yet by holding that only some rights applied in the new island possessions, whereas others lost their strength at the water’s edge, the early-twentieth-century Insular Cases cobbled together an odd and unstable marriage of imperialism and constitutionalism. Although it deeply polarized the United States at the time, this debate over the Constitution and the flag is now largely forgotten. Yet as the previous chapter detailed, a very similar debate emerged almost exactly a century later. Whether Guantanamo Bay was a “legal black hole” or a legitimate detention center for dangerous enemy combatants became a topic of often passionate argument the world over. Despite a very different political and legal context, the dispute over Guantanamo focused attention on the geographic reach of American law with an intensity not seen since the early 1900s.


1938 ◽  
Vol 32 (S1) ◽  
pp. 1-56

The Conference on the Limitation of Armament at Washington adopted at its sixth plenary session on the 4th February, 1922, a resolution for the appointment of a Commission representing the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan to consider the following questions:(a) Do existing rules of international law adequately cover new methods of attack or defence resulting from the introduction or development, since The Hague Conference of 1907, of new agencies of warfare?(b) If not so, what changes in the existing rules ought to be adopted in consequence thereof as a part of the law of nations?


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-156
Author(s):  
Sam Middlemiss

A considerable amount of attention has been given to the general law of victimisation under the Equality Act 20101 but scant consideration has been given to the equality aspect of victimisation relating to whistle-blowing in the United Kingdom, and the present article will address this. The term whistle-blowing relates to workers making certain disclosures of information relating to their employer’s activities in the public interest. Most workers in the public, private and voluntary sectors are protected from victimisation by making a protected disclosure under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. However, only qualifying disclosures (defined below) are protected by the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. The protection against victimisation covers unfair dismissal and an action for suffering a detriment. However, this article will concentrate on the latter. In the process of considering the legal rules in the United Kingdom, the human rights dimension of cases will be considered as will comparison with the law in the United States.


1930 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Brown Scott

There is no topic of present interest, involving as it does the status of men, women and children of various countries, and even of birth in the same country, as that of nationality. It bristles with difficulties! To begin with, various terms are used, apparently meant to mean one and the same thing, although unless they are carefully defined, they may refer to different aspects of the subject. For example, “ national” is used as a synonym for “ subject” or “ citizen,” yet one may be a national of a country, and subject to its jurisdiction, without, however, being a citizen—as in the case of the Filipinos, who are, indeed, subject to the Government of the United States and entitled to its protection abroad, although they are not citizens either in the sense of international, or of national law. Then there is a difference of opinion as to the branch of law to which the matter belongs—the Englishspeaking peoples regarding it as forming part of the public law of nations, whereas others consider it as more properly falling within the domain of private international law, to which, in turn, the English world gives the not inappropriate designation of conflict of laws.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document