Sheets v. Yamaha Motors Corp.

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (3) ◽  
pp. 580-583
Author(s):  
Peter J. Spiro

Plaintiff Sheets sought sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure against defendants, the Yamaha Motor Co. Ltd. (Yamaha Japan) and its wholly owned American subsidiary, Yamaha Motors Corp., U.S.A. (Yamaha U.S.A.), for misconduct in discovery and frivolous insistence that service on the foreign parent be made in conformity with the Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, better known as the Hague Service Convention. Plaintiff had effected service under the Louisiana long-arm statute, which permitted service on the subsidiary as involuntary agent for the defendant parent company in an action arising out of business transacted or tortious conduct occurring in the state. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana initially awarded $25,000 in sanctions to the plaintiff. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit remanded the decision for further findings by the district court on the grounds for imposing sanctions. The district court held (per Schwartz, J.): in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, involving a state service statute virtually identical to that of Louisiana, the defendants’ failure to waive service under the Hague Convention needlessly increased the cost of litigation and was properly the subject of Rule 11 sanctions.

Author(s):  
Anayit Khoperiya ◽  

The article analyses the refusal to recognize and grant permission to enforce awards of international commercial arbitration because of improper notification about the arbitration. The study concerns the new case law of the Supreme Court in cases of recognition and granting permission to enforce the awards of international commercial arbitration in cases where the party against whom the decision is made denies that it has been notified of the arbitration or appointment of an arbitrator. Particular attention was paid to the analysis of the decisions of the Supreme Court in cases No. 824/26/19 of November 28, 2019 and No. 824/69/19 of February 13, 2020 on the application of Jurginsky Mashzavod LLC on the enforcing of the decision of the Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation on debt collection from PJSC Pokrovske Mine Management. These decisions were assessed as a negative case law that does not contribute to the development of arbitration in Ukraine. It was concluded that in cases No. 824/26/19 and No. 824/69/19 the Supreme Court formulated two extremely negative opinions for the development of international commercial arbitration: 1) the need to inform the different jurisdictions parties of the arbitration proceedings, where in these jurisdictions the Hague Convention is binding, in form of provision of international legal assistance, which would harm the pace of arbitration proceedings; 2) the necessity to notify the parties by arbitration via mail with a postal description of the enclosed documents. The provisions of the Hague Convention regarding the requirement of arbitration notifications of the parties on the implementation of arbitration proceedings using the procedure of international legal assistance were analysed. It was established that the provisions of this convention cannot be interpreted as establishing an obligation for arbitration tribunals to notify the parties of the arbitration proceedings, which are situated in states-parties to this convention, through the procedure of international legal assistance only. The practice of the Supreme Court in other cases on the recognition and granting permission to enforce of international commercial arbitration decisions, where the party against which the decision was made denies that it has been notified about the arbitration or appointment of an arbitrator, was positively assessed. This practice is pro-arbitration. It was emphasized the importance of forming pro-arbitration practice of the Supreme Court, which ensures the image of Ukraine as a friendly jurisdiction for arbitration and for investment accordingly.


Author(s):  
Hartley Trevor C

This chapter discusses the ‘subject-matter scope’ of Brussels 2012, Lugano 2007, and the Hague Convention. ‘Subject-matter scope’ refers to the scope covered by a measure as regards its subject matter, that is to say the branches and areas of the law to which it applies. For the three legal instruments under consideration, the relevant provisions are contained in Article 1 of Brussels 2012 and Lugano, and Articles 1 and 2 of Hague. A review of case law shows that the distinction between a civil matter and public matter is far from straightforward. There is a significant grey area in which the Court of Justice of the European Union could legitimately go either way.


2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (5) ◽  
pp. 873-887
Author(s):  
Linda Silberman

The Supreme Court of the United States has decided four cases under the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of the International Child Abduction (hereinafter the Hague Convention), the most recent one coming this term in Monasky v. Taglieri. The Hague Convention, adopted in 101 countries, requires the judicial or administrative authority of a country that is party to the Convention to return a child who has been wrongfully removed or retained to the country of the child's habitual residence.The Convention also provides for a limited number of defenses to return. The obligation of return is a “provisional” remedy, in that the merits of any custody dispute will be determined by a court in the country of habitual residence. One of the most critical aspects of the Convention is this concept of “habitual residence,” which was the issue presented to the Court in Monasky.


2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-278 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theodor Meron

The centennial of the Hague Convention (No. II; No. IV in the 1907 version) on the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the fiftieth anniversary of the four Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War of August 12, 1949, present an opportunity to reflect on the direction in which the law of war, or international humanitarian law, has been evolving. This essay focuses on the humanization of that law, a process driven to a large extent by human rights and the principles of humanity. As the subject is vast, major issues must inevitably be left out of my discussion, including the impact of the prohibitions on unnecessary suffering and indiscriminate warfare on the regulation of weapons, the proscription of antipersonnel land mines and blinding laser weapons, and the progression of international humanitarian law from largely protecting noncombatants to protecting combatants as well.


Author(s):  
Donald W. Rogers

This chapter traces Hague’s appeal through the Third Circuit Court of Appeals into the U.S. Supreme Court under Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, showing how the Hughes court’s inner dynamics explain affirmation of the district court injunction. Observing flux in court personnel and law, the chapter shows that both courts embraced the contemporaneous civil liberties revolution by defending worker speech and assembly rights, but it reveals the Supreme Court as divided over constitutional logic. Justice Owen Roberts’s plurality opinion upheld speech and assembly rights under the Fourteenth Amendment privileges and immunities clause, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone’s concurrence incorporated the First Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment due-process clause, and dissenters rejected federal jurisdiction. The ruling reflected the contentious evolution of civil liberties jurisprudence, not antiboss or labor law politics.


1997 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-166
Author(s):  

AbstractFinland ratified the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction in 1994. The Convention was implemented by making use of the so-called transformation techniques, i.e. by drafting and adopting Finnish internal law provisions deemed to be necessary for the proper implementation of the international obligations under the Hague Convention. The overall aim of the implementation provisions has been to make the practical application of the Convention as effective and speedy as possible and for this purpose to go even further than necessarily required. The most important features of these national arrangements are the following: – The Hague Convention rules on the return of an abducted child have been made retroactive. – Only one court, the Court of Appeal of Helsinki, is competent to receive applications and make orders for the return of children. Besides, an order for the return is always immediately enforceable, unless the Supreme Court, upon appeal, orders the stay of enforcement. – The `fundamental principles' exception in Article 20 of the Convention cannot be invoked against the application in Finnish return proceedings. According to Article 20 the return of the child can be refused where the return would not be permitted by the fundamental principles relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of the requested State. The first cases indicate that the retroactive application of the Convention provided by the Finnish Act has been less successful. The courts have shown obvious reluctance towards the ordering of the return in these cases whereas in the `new' cases the Court of Appeal as well as the Supreme Court have generally followed the spirit of the Convention in a loyal manner.


2014 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 350-396
Author(s):  
Keith Loken

On December 4, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom ruled in In the Matter of KL that a child brought to the UK pursuant to a U.S. district court order–subsequently overturned by a U.S. court of appeals–in a proceeding under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Hague Convention) must be returned to the United States. One week earlier, in a 9-8 decision issued on November 26, 2013, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), upholding the judgment of the ECHR Chamber below, ruled in X v. Latvia that the actions of the Latvian courts, ordering Ms. X to return her daughter E. to Australia under the Hague Convention, constituted an infringement of Ms. X’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Human Rights Convention). These cases provide an interesting contrast in approaches to the international abduction of children.


2021 ◽  
Vol 93 (4) ◽  
pp. 957-993
Author(s):  
Adis Poljić

The subject of the paper refers to the analysis of the exercise of the will of the contracting parties regarding the jurisdiction of the court in the law of the Hague Conference and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The exercise of the will of the contracting parties may be limited by the institute of lis pendens, which makes it impossible to conduct two proceedings between the same parties simultaneously for the same claim based on the same facts, giving priority to the first one, regardless of agreed-upon international jurisdiction. By agreeing on the jurisdiction, the contracting parties decide which court will resolve their dispute, which is extremely important for them. Based on the analysis of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, it is concluded that preference is given to proceedings before the chosen court, with certain exceptions when the agreement of the parties will not apply. The law of Bosnia and Herzegovina applies the rules of lis pendens which may prevent the application of the agreement of the parties.


2016 ◽  
Vol 118 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Mark A. Gooden ◽  
Terrance L. Green

Nathaniel Jones was born May 12, 1926, in Youngstown, Ohio, and served as the general counsel for the NAACP from 1969–1979. During that time, he litigated the Milliken v. Bradley I case before the U.S. District Court in 1971 and the U.S. Supreme Court in 1974. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter nominated Nathaniel Jones to the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and at 87 years of age, he still serves as a retired senior judge for the court. Our conversation with the Honorable Judge Nathaniel Jones entails his reflections about Milliken 40 years later, origins of his involvement in the case, and suggestions for school desegregation advocates in the 21st century. To begin, we briefly describe Milliken and how the conversation with Judge Jones came about. We organized our conversation around topical areas about the case, which reflect our interview questions. Our discussion with Judge Jones occurred on March 22, 2014, in Cincinnati, Ohio. This conversation concludes with Nathaniel Jones discussing what Detroit and other urban schools districts could potentially be like if Milliken would have been upheld by the Supreme Court.


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