An addendum to “The work of Kurt Gödel”

1978 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 613-613 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen C. Kleene

Gödel has called to my attention that p. 773 is misleading in regard to the discovery of the finite axiomatization and its place in his proof of the consistency of GCH. For the version in [1940], as he says on p. 1, “The system Σ of axioms for set theory which we adopt [a finite one] … is essentially due to P. Bernays …”. However, it is not at all necessary to use a finite axiom system. Gödel considers the more suggestive proof to be the one in [1939], which uses infinitely many axioms.His main achievement regarding the consistency of GCH, he says, really is that he first introduced the concept of constructible sets into set theory defining it as in [1939], proved that the axioms of set theory (including the axiom of choice) hold for it, and conjectured that the continuum hypothesis also will hold. He told these things to von Neumann during his stay at Princeton in 1935. The discovery of the proof of this conjecture On the basis of his definition is not too difficult. Gödel gave the proof (also for GCH) not until three years later because he had fallen ill in the meantime. This proof was using a submodel of the constructible sets in the lowest case countable, similar to the one commonly given today.

Author(s):  
John P. Burgess

the ‘universe’ of constructible sets was introduced by Kurt Gödel in order to prove the consistency of the axiom of choice (AC) and the continuum hypothesis (CH) with the basic (ZF) axioms of set theory. The hypothesis that all sets are constructible is the axiom of constructibility (V = L). Gödel showed that if ZF is consistent, then ZF + V = L is consistent, and that AC and CH are provable in ZF + V = L.


2007 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Akihiro Kanamori

Kurt Gödel (1906–1978) with his work on the constructible universeLestablished the relative consistency of the Axiom of Choice (AC) and the Continuum Hypothesis (CH). More broadly, he ensured the ascendancy of first-order logic as the framework and a matter of method for set theory and secured the cumulative hierarchy view of the universe of sets. Gödel thereby transformed set theory and launched it with structured subject matter and specific methods of proof. In later years Gödel worked on a variety of set theoretic constructions and speculated about how problems might be settled with new axioms. We here chronicle this development from the point of view of the evolution of set theory as a field of mathematics. Much has been written, of course, about Gödel's work in set theory, from textbook expositions to the introductory notes to his collected papers. The present account presents an integrated view of the historical and mathematical development as supported by his recently published lectures and correspondence. Beyond the surface of things we delve deeper into the mathematics. What emerges are the roots and anticipations in work of Russell and Hilbert, and most prominently the sustained motif of truth as formalizable in the “next higher system”. We especially work at bringing out how transforming Gödel's work was for set theory. It is difficult now to see what conceptual and technical distance Gödel had to cover and how dramatic his re-orientation of set theory was.


2016 ◽  
Vol 100 (549) ◽  
pp. 442-449
Author(s):  
A. C. Paseau

Metamathematics is the mathematical study of mathematics itself. Two of its most famous theorems were proved by Kurt Gödel in 1931. In a simplified form, Gödel's first incompleteness theorem states that no reasonable mathematical system can prove all the truths of mathematics. Gödel's second incompleteness theorem (also simplified) in turn states that no reasonable mathematical system can prove its own consistency. Another famous undecidability theorem is that the Continuum Hypothesis is neither provable nor refutable in standard set theory. Many of us logicians were first attracted to the field as students because we had heard something of these results. All research mathematicians know something of them too, and have at least a rough sense of why ‘we can't prove everything we want to prove’.


Author(s):  
John W. Dawson

The greatest logician of the twentieth century, Gödel is renowned for his advocacy of mathematical Platonism and for three fundamental theorems in logic: the completeness of first-order logic; the incompleteness of formalized arithmetic; and the consistency of the axiom of choice and the continuum hypothesis with the axioms of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory.


1951 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 161-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. C. Shepherdson

One of the standard ways of proving the consistency of additional hypotheses with the basic axioms of an axiom system is by the construction of what may be described as ‘inner models.’ By starting with a domain of individuals assumed to satisfy the basic axioms an inner model is constructed whose domain of individuals is a certain subset of the original individual domain. If such an inner model can be constructed which satisfies not only the basic axioms but also the particular additional hypothesis under consideration, then this affords a proof that if the basic axiom system is consistent then so is the system obtained by adding to this system the new hypothesis. This method has been applied to axiom systems for set theory by many authors, including v. Neumann (4), Mostowski (5), and more recently Gödel (1), who has shown by this method that if the basic axioms of a certain axiomatic system of set theory are consistent then so is the system obtained by adding to these axioms a strong form of the axiom of choice and the generalised continuum hypothesis. Having been shown in this striking way the power of this method it is natural to inquire whether it has any limitations or whether by the construction of a sufficiently ingenious inner model one might hope to decide other outstanding consistency questions, such as the consistency of the negations of the axiom of choice and continuum hypothesis. In this and two following papers we prove some general theorems concerning inner models for a certain axiomatic system of set theory which lead to the result that as far as a fairly large family of inner models are concerned this method of proving consistency has been exhausted, that no essentially new consistency results can be obtained by the use of this kind of model.


2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
ZACH WEBER

This paper begins an axiomatic development of naive set theory—the consequences of a full comprehension principle—in a paraconsistent logic. Results divide into two sorts. There is classical recapture, where the main theorems of ordinal and Peano arithmetic are proved, showing that naive set theory can provide a foundation for standard mathematics. Then there are major extensions, including proofs of the famous paradoxes and the axiom of choice (in the form of the well-ordering principle). At the end I indicate how later developments of cardinal numbers will lead to Cantor’s theorem, the existence of large cardinals, and a counterexample to the continuum hypothesis.


Author(s):  
John P. Burgess

The method of forcing was introduced by Paul J. Cohen in order to prove the independence of the axiom of choice (AC) from the basic (ZF) axioms of set theory, and of the continuum hypothesis (CH) from the accepted axioms (ZFC = ZF + AC) of set theory (see set theory, axiom of choice, continuum hypothesis). Given a model M of ZF and a certain P∈M, it produces a ‘generic’ G⊆P and a model N of ZF with M⊆N and G∈N. By suitably choosing P, N can be ‘forced’ to be or not be a model of various hypotheses, which are thus shown to be consistent with or independent of the axioms. This method of proving undecidability has been very widely applied. The method has also motivated the proposal of new so-called forcing axioms to decide what is otherwise undecidable, the most important being that called Martin’s axiom (MA).


1945 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 125-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raphael M. Robinson

Consider an axiomatic set theory in which there is a distinction between “sets” and “classes,” only sets being allowable as elements. How can one define a finite sequence of classes? This problem was proposed to me by A. Tarski, and a solution is given in this note. We shall assume the axiom system Σ used by Godei in his study of the continuum hypothesis, and shall use the same notation.1


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