The real line in elementary submodels of set theory

2000 ◽  
Vol 65 (2) ◽  
pp. 683-691 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Kunen ◽  
Franklin D. Tall

The use of elementary submodels has become a standard tool in set-theoretic topology and infinitary combinatorics. Thus, in studying some combinatorial objects, one embeds them in a set, M, which is an elementary submodel of the universe, V (that is, (M; Є) ≺ (V; Є)). Applying the downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, one can bound the cardinality of M. This tool enables one to capture various complicated closure arguments within the simple “≺”.However, in this paper, as in the paper [JT], we study the tool for its own sake. [JT] discussed various general properties of topological spaces in elementary submodels. In this paper, we specialize this consideration to the space of real numbers, ℝ. Our models M are not in general transitive. We will always have ℝ Є M, but not usually ℝ ⊆ M. We plan to study properties of the ℝ ⋂ M's. In particular, as M varies, we wish to study whether any two of these ℝ ⋂ M's are isomorphic as topological spaces, linear orders, or fields.As usual, it takes some sleight-of-hand to formalize these notions within the standard axioms of set theory (ZFC), since within ZFC, one cannot actually define the notion (M;Є) ≺ (V;Є). Instead, one proves theorems about M such that (M;Є) ≺ (H(θ);Є), where θ is a “large enough” cardinal; here, H(θ) is the collection of all sets whose transitive closure has size less than θ.


2001 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 1766-1782 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Enayat

Abstract.A model = (M. E, …) of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZF is said to be 0-like. where E interprets ∈ and θ is an uncountable cardinal, if ∣M∣ = θ but ∣{b ∈ M: bEa}∣ < 0 for each a ∈ M, An immediate corollary of the classical theorem of Keisler and Morley on elementary end extensions of models of set theory is that every consistent extension of ZF has an ℵ1-like model. Coupled with Chang's two cardinal theorem this implies that if θ is a regular cardinal 0 such that 2<0 = 0 then every consistent extension of ZF also has a 0+-like model. In particular, in the presence of the continuum hypothesis every consistent extension of ZF has an ℵ2-like model. Here we prove:Theorem A. If 0 has the tree property then the following are equivalent for any completion T of ZFC:(i) T has a 0-like model.(ii) Ф ⊆ T. where Ф is the recursive set of axioms {∃κ (κ is n-Mahlo and “Vκis a Σn-elementary submodel of the universe”): n ∈ ω}.(iii) T has a λ-like model for every uncountable cardinal λ.Theorem B. The following are equiconsistent over ZFC:(i) “There exists an ω-Mahlo cardinal”.(ii) “For every finite language , all ℵ2-like models of ZFC() satisfy the schemeФ().



1995 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Steel

In this paper we shall answer some questions in the set theory of L(ℝ), the universe of all sets constructible from the reals. In order to do so, we shall assume ADL(ℝ), the hypothesis that all 2-person games of perfect information on ω whose payoff set is in L(ℝ) are determined. This is by now standard practice. ZFC itself decides few questions in the set theory of L(ℝ), and for reasons we cannot discuss here, ZFC + ADL(ℝ) yields the most interesting “completion” of the ZFC-theory of L(ℝ).ADL(ℝ) implies that L(ℝ) satisfies “every wellordered set of reals is countable”, so that the axiom of choice fails in L(ℝ). Nevertheless, there is a natural inner model of L(ℝ), namely HODL(ℝ), which satisfies ZFC. (HOD is the class of all hereditarily ordinal definable sets, that is, the class of all sets x such that every member of the transitive closure of x is definable over the universe from ordinal parameters (i.e., “OD”). The superscript “L(ℝ)” indicates, here and below, that the notion in question is to be interpreted in L(R).) HODL(ℝ) is reasonably close to the full L(ℝ), in ways we shall make precise in § 1. The most important of the questions we shall answer concern HODL(ℝ): what is its first order theory, and in particular, does it satisfy GCH?These questions first drew attention in the 70's and early 80's. (See [4, p. 223]; also [12, p. 573] for variants involving finer notions of definability.)



2001 ◽  
Vol 27 (8) ◽  
pp. 505-512 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Carlos Rodríguez Alcantud

We extend van Dalen and Wattel's (1973) characterization of orderable spaces and their subspaces by obtaining analogous results for two larger classes of topological spaces. This type of spaces are defined by considering preferences instead of linear orders in the former definitions, and possess topological properties similar to those of (totally) orderable spaces (cf. Alcantud, 1999). Our study provides particular consequences of relevance in mathematical economics; in particular, a condition equivalent to the existence of a continuous preference on a topological space is obtained.



2013 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 11-15
Author(s):  
Bidyanand Prasad ◽  
BP Kumar

This paper is concerned with the introduction of an infinite positional game of pursuit and evasion over an ideal of a topological space. A topological game has been played over some new D-product and C-product spaces of two Hausdorff topological spaces. Perfect information, decisions and goals in a game may not be feasible. Hence, fuzzy set theory has been applied in this paper to obtain better results. Academic Voices, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012, Pages 11-15 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3126/av.v2i1.8278



Author(s):  
Colin McLarty

A ‘category’, in the mathematical sense, is a universe of structures and transformations. Category theory treats such a universe simply in terms of the network of transformations. For example, categorical set theory deals with the universe of sets and functions without saying what is in any set, or what any function ‘does to’ anything in its domain; it only talks about the patterns of functions that occur between sets. This stress on patterns of functions originally served to clarify certain working techniques in topology. Grothendieck extended those techniques to number theory, in part by defining a kind of category which could itself represent a space. He called such a category a ‘topos’. It turned out that a topos could also be seen as a category rich enough to do all the usual constructions of set-theoretic mathematics, but that may get very different results from standard set theory.



2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 38-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tutut Herawan

This paper presents an alternative way for constructing a topological space in an information system. Rough set theory for reasoning about data in information systems is used to construct the topology. Using the concept of an indiscernibility relation in rough set theory, it is shown that the topology constructed is a quasi-discrete topology. Furthermore, the dependency of attributes is applied for defining finer topology and further characterizing the roughness property of a set. Meanwhile, the notions of base and sub-base of the topology are applied to find attributes reduction and degree of rough membership, respectively.



Author(s):  
Tsau Young Lin ◽  
Rushin Barot ◽  
Shusaku Tsumoto

The concepts of approximations in granular computing (GrC) vs. rough set theory (RS) are examined. Examples are constructed to contrast their differences in the Global GrC Model (2nd GrC Model), which, in pre-GrC term, is called partial coverings. Mathematically speaking, RS-approximations are “sub-base” based, while GrC-approximations are “base” based, where “sub-base” and “base” are two concepts in topological spaces. From the view of knowledge engineering, its meaning in RS-approximations is rather obscure, while in GrC, it is the concept of knowledge approximations.



2016 ◽  
Vol 81 (3) ◽  
pp. 972-996 ◽  
Author(s):  
GUNTER FUCHS ◽  
RALF SCHINDLER

AbstractOne of the basic concepts of set theoretic geology is the mantle of a model of set theory V: it is the intersection of all grounds of V, that is, of all inner models M of V such that V is a set-forcing extension of M. The main theme of the present paper is to identify situations in which the mantle turns out to be a fine structural extender model. The first main result is that this is the case when the universe is constructible from a set and there is an inner model with a Woodin cardinal. The second situation like that arises if L[E] is an extender model that is iterable in V but not internally iterable, as guided by P-constructions, L[E] has no strong cardinal, and the extender sequence E is ordinal definable in L[E] and its forcing extensions by collapsing a cutpoint to ω (in an appropriate sense). The third main result concerns the Solid Core of a model of set theory. This is the union of all sets that are constructible from a set of ordinals that cannot be added by set-forcing to an inner model. The main result here is that if there is an inner model with a Woodin cardinal, then the solid core is a fine-structural extender model.



1994 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 461-472
Author(s):  
Garvin Melles

Mathematicians have one over on the physicists in that they already have a unified theory of mathematics, namely, set theory. Unfortunately, the plethora of independence results since the invention of forcing has taken away some of the luster of set theory in the eyes of many mathematicians. Will man's knowledge of mathematical truth be forever limited to those theorems derivable from the standard axioms of set theory, ZFC? This author does not think so, he feels that set theorists' intuition about the universe of sets is stronger than ZFC. Here in this paper, using part of this intuition, we introduce some axiom schemata which we feel are very natural candidates for being considered as part of the axioms of set theory. These schemata assert the existence of many generics over simple inner models. The main purpose of this article is to present arguments for why the assertion of the existence of such generics belongs to the axioms of set theory.Our central guiding principle in justifying the axioms is what Maddy called the rule of thumb maximize in her survey article on the axioms of set theory, [8] and [9]. More specifically, our intuition conforms with that expressed by Mathias in his article What is Maclane Missing? challenging Mac Lane's view of set theory.



1956 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-59
Author(s):  
Alan Cobham

It has been shown by Quine that an interpreted theory Θ, formulated in the notation of quantification theory, is translatable into a theory Θ′ in which the only primitive predicate is a dyadic F. In establishing this result Quine takes for the universe of Θ′ a set which comprehends the universe of Θ and has the property that if x and y are members then so is {x, y}. For this fragmentary set theory the distinctness of x from {x, y} and {{x}} is assumed. It will be shown here that, if a pair of somewhat more stringent restrictions are assumed for the set theory, then there is a symmetric dyadic predicate G definable within Θ′, i.e., in terms of F alone, in terms of which F is in turn definable. It follows from this extended result that the theory Θ is translatable into a theory in which the only primitive predicate is symmetric and dyadic.



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