INNER MODEL THEORETIC GEOLOGY

2016 ◽  
Vol 81 (3) ◽  
pp. 972-996 ◽  
Author(s):  
GUNTER FUCHS ◽  
RALF SCHINDLER
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Main Theme ◽  
Solid Core ◽  
Strong Cardinal ◽  
The Third ◽  
Inner Models ◽  
Inner Model ◽  
Basic Concepts ◽  
Woodin Cardinal ◽  
The Universe

AbstractOne of the basic concepts of set theoretic geology is the mantle of a model of set theory V: it is the intersection of all grounds of V, that is, of all inner models M of V such that V is a set-forcing extension of M. The main theme of the present paper is to identify situations in which the mantle turns out to be a fine structural extender model. The first main result is that this is the case when the universe is constructible from a set and there is an inner model with a Woodin cardinal. The second situation like that arises if L[E] is an extender model that is iterable in V but not internally iterable, as guided by P-constructions, L[E] has no strong cardinal, and the extender sequence E is ordinal definable in L[E] and its forcing extensions by collapsing a cutpoint to ω (in an appropriate sense). The third main result concerns the Solid Core of a model of set theory. This is the union of all sets that are constructible from a set of ordinals that cannot be added by set-forcing to an inner model. The main result here is that if there is an inner model with a Woodin cardinal, then the solid core is a fine-structural extender model.

scholarly journals Internal Consistency and the Inner Model Hypothesis

2006 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 591-600 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sy-David Friedman
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Regular Cardinal ◽  
Weak Sense ◽  
Large Cardinals ◽  
Model Method ◽  
Inner Models ◽  
Inner Model ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Universe ◽  
The Way

There are two standard ways to establish consistency in set theory. One is to prove consistency using inner models, in the way that Gödel proved the consistency of GCH using the inner model L. The other is to prove consistency using outer models, in the way that Cohen proved the consistency of the negation of CH by enlarging L to a forcing extension L[G].But we can demand more from the outer model method, and we illustrate this by examining Easton's strengthening of Cohen's result:Theorem 1 (Easton's Theorem). There is a forcing extensionL[G] of L in which GCH fails at every regular cardinal.Assume that the universe V of all sets is rich in the sense that it contains inner models with large cardinals. Then what is the relationship between Easton's model L[G] and V? In particular, are these models compatible, in the sense that they are inner models of a common third model? If not, then the failure of GCH at every regular cardinal is consistent only in a weak sense, as it can only hold in universes which are incompatible with the universe of all sets. Ideally, we would like L[G] to not only be compatible with V, but to be an inner model of V.We say that a statement is internally consistent iff it holds in some inner model, under the assumption that there are innermodels with large cardinals.

scholarly journals On the consistency strength of the inner model hypothesis

2008 ◽  
Vol 73 (2) ◽  
pp. 391-400 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sy-David Friedman ◽  
Philip Welch ◽  
W. Hugh Woodin
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Lower Bounds ◽  
Internal Consistency ◽  
Countable Model ◽  
Upper And Lower Bounds ◽  
Consistency Strength ◽  
Class Theory ◽  
Inner Models ◽  
Inner Model ◽  
The Universe

The Inner Model Hypothesis (IMH) and the Strong Inner Model Hypothesis (SIMH) were introduced in [4]. In this article we establish some upper and lower bounds for their consistency strength.We repeat the statement of the IMH, as presented in [4]. A sentence in the language of set theory is internally consistent iff it holds in some (not necessarily proper) inner model. The meaning of internal consistency depends on what inner models exist: If we enlarge the universe, it is possible that more statements become internally consistent. The Inner Model Hypothesis asserts that the universe has been maximised with respect to internal consistency:The Inner Model Hypothesis (IMH): If a statement φ without parameters holds in an inner model of some outer model of V (i.e., in some model compatible with V), then it already holds in some inner model of V.Equivalently: If φ is internally consistent in some outer model of V then it is already internally consistent in V. This is formalised as follows. Regard V as a countable model of Gödel-Bernays class theory, endowed with countably many sets and classes. Suppose that V* is another such model, with the same ordinals as V. Then V* is an outer model of V (V is an inner model of V*) iff the sets of V* include the sets of V and the classes of V* include the classes of V. V* is compatible with V iff V and V* have a common outer model.

scholarly journals THE CONSISTENCY STRENGTH OF LONG PROJECTIVE DETERMINACY

2019 ◽  
Vol 85 (1) ◽  
pp. 338-366 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUAN P. AGUILERA ◽  
SANDRA MÜLLER
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Consistency Strength ◽  
Axiom Of Determinacy ◽  
Woodin Cardinals ◽  
Inner Model ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Woodin Cardinal

AbstractWe determine the consistency strength of determinacy for projective games of length ω2. Our main theorem is that $\Pi _{n + 1}^1 $-determinacy for games of length ω2 implies the existence of a model of set theory with ω + n Woodin cardinals. In a first step, we show that this hypothesis implies that there is a countable set of reals A such that Mn (A), the canonical inner model for n Woodin cardinals constructed over A, satisfies $$A = R$$ and the Axiom of Determinacy. Then we argue how to obtain a model with ω + n Woodin cardinal from this.We also show how the proof can be adapted to investigate the consistency strength of determinacy for games of length ω2 with payoff in $^R R\Pi _1^1 $ or with σ-projective payoff.

THE SOLIDITY AND NONSOLIDITY OF INITIAL SEGMENTS OF THE CORE MODEL

2018 ◽  
Vol 83 (3) ◽  
pp. 920-938
Author(s):  
GUNTER FUCHS ◽  
RALF SCHINDLER
Keyword(s):  
Core Model ◽  
Solid Core ◽  
The Core ◽  
Inner Model ◽  
Cohen Real ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Woodin Cardinal

AbstractIt is shown that $K|{\omega _1}$ need not be solid in the sense previously introduced by the authors: it is consistent that there is no inner model with a Woodin cardinal yet there is an inner model W and a Cohen real x over W such that $K|{\omega _1}\,\, \in \,\,W[x] \setminus W$. However, if ${0^{\rm{\P}}}$ does not exist and $\kappa \ge {\omega _2}$ is a cardinal, then $K|\kappa$ is solid. We draw the conclusion that solidity is not forcing absolute in general, and that under the assumption of $\neg {0^{\rm{\P}}}$, the core model is contained in the solid core, previously introduced by the authors.It is also shown, assuming ${0^{\rm{\P}}}$ does not exist, that if there is a forcing that preserves ${\omega _1}$, forces that every real has a sharp, and increases $\delta _2^1$, then ${\omega _1}$ is measurable in K.

scholarly journals IDEAL PROJECTIONS AND FORCING PROJECTIONS

2014 ◽  
Vol 79 (4) ◽  
pp. 1247-1285 ◽  
Author(s):  
SEAN COX ◽  
MARTIN ZEMAN
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Negative Answer ◽  
Large Cardinals ◽  
Normal Ideal ◽  
List Type ◽  
Type Number ◽  
Inner Model ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Open Question ◽  
Woodin Cardinal

AbstractIt is well known that saturation of ideals is closely related to the “antichain-catching” phenomenon from Foreman–Magidor–Shelah [10]. We consider several antichain-catching properties that are weaker than saturation, and prove:(1)If${\cal I}$is a normal ideal on$\omega _2 $which satisfiesstationary antichain catching, then there is an inner model with a Woodin cardinal;(2)For any$n \in \omega $, it is consistent relative to large cardinals that there is a normal ideal${\cal I}$on$\omega _n $which satisfiesprojective antichain catching, yet${\cal I}$is not saturated (or even strong). This provides a negative answer to Open Question number 13 from Foreman’s chapter in the Handbook of Set Theory ([7]).

Natural internal forcing schemata extending ZFC: Truth in the universe?

1994 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 461-472
Author(s):  
Garvin Melles
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Mathematical Truth ◽  
Unified Theory ◽  
Rule Of Thumb ◽  
Guiding Principle ◽  
Survey Article ◽  
Inner Models ◽  
Independence Results ◽  
Universe Of Sets ◽  
The Universe

Mathematicians have one over on the physicists in that they already have a unified theory of mathematics, namely, set theory. Unfortunately, the plethora of independence results since the invention of forcing has taken away some of the luster of set theory in the eyes of many mathematicians. Will man's knowledge of mathematical truth be forever limited to those theorems derivable from the standard axioms of set theory, ZFC? This author does not think so, he feels that set theorists' intuition about the universe of sets is stronger than ZFC. Here in this paper, using part of this intuition, we introduce some axiom schemata which we feel are very natural candidates for being considered as part of the axioms of set theory. These schemata assert the existence of many generics over simple inner models. The main purpose of this article is to present arguments for why the assertion of the existence of such generics belongs to the axioms of set theory.Our central guiding principle in justifying the axioms is what Maddy called the rule of thumb maximize in her survey article on the axioms of set theory, [8] and [9]. More specifically, our intuition conforms with that expressed by Mathias in his article What is Maclane Missing? challenging Mac Lane's view of set theory.

Inner models for set theory – Part III

1953 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. C. Shepherdson
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Original System ◽  
Axiom System ◽  
Complete Model ◽  
Universal Class ◽  
Inner Models ◽  
Consistency Results ◽  
Image Position ◽  
The Universe ◽  
New Hypothesis

In this third and last paper on inner models we consider some of the inherent limitations of the method of using inner models of the type defined in 1.2 for the proof of consistency results for the particular system of set theory under consideration. Roughly speaking this limitation may be described by saying that practically no further consistency results can be obtained by the construction of models satisfying the conditions of theorem 1.5, i.e., conditions 1.31, 1.32, 1.33, 1.51, viz.:This applies in particular to the ‘complete models’ defined in 1.4. Before going on to a precise statement of these limitations we shall consider now the theorem on which they depend. This is concerned with a particular type of complete model examples of which we call “proper complete models”; they are those complete models which are essentially interior to the universe, those whose classes are sets of the universe constituting a class thereof, i.e., those for which the following proposition is true:The main theorem of this paper is that the statement that there are no models of this kind can be expressed formally in the same way as the axioms A, B, C and furthermore it can be proved that if the axiom system A, B, C is consistent then so is the system consisting of axioms A, B, C, plus this new hypothesis that there exist no proper complete models. When combined with the axiom ‘V = L’ introduced by Gödel in (1) this new hypothesis yields a system in which any normal complete model which exists has for its universal class V, the universal class of the original system.

HODL(ℝ) is a Core Model Below Θ

1995 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Steel
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Transitive Closure ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Inner Model ◽  
Definable Sets ◽  
The Axiom Of Choice ◽  
The Universe ◽  
Do So

In this paper we shall answer some questions in the set theory of L(ℝ), the universe of all sets constructible from the reals. In order to do so, we shall assume ADL(ℝ), the hypothesis that all 2-person games of perfect information on ω whose payoff set is in L(ℝ) are determined. This is by now standard practice. ZFC itself decides few questions in the set theory of L(ℝ), and for reasons we cannot discuss here, ZFC + ADL(ℝ) yields the most interesting “completion” of the ZFC-theory of L(ℝ).ADL(ℝ) implies that L(ℝ) satisfies “every wellordered set of reals is countable”, so that the axiom of choice fails in L(ℝ). Nevertheless, there is a natural inner model of L(ℝ), namely HODL(ℝ), which satisfies ZFC. (HOD is the class of all hereditarily ordinal definable sets, that is, the class of all sets x such that every member of the transitive closure of x is definable over the universe from ordinal parameters (i.e., “OD”). The superscript “L(ℝ)” indicates, here and below, that the notion in question is to be interpreted in L(R).) HODL(ℝ) is reasonably close to the full L(ℝ), in ways we shall make precise in § 1. The most important of the questions we shall answer concern HODL(ℝ): what is its first order theory, and in particular, does it satisfy GCH?These questions first drew attention in the 70's and early 80's. (See [4, p. 223]; also [12, p. 573] for variants involving finer notions of definability.)

Inner models for set theory—Part I

1951 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 161-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. C. Shepherdson
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Large Family ◽  
Axiom System ◽  
Axiom Of Choice ◽  
Axiomatic System ◽  
Additional Hypothesis ◽  
Inner Models ◽  
Inner Model ◽  
The Axiom Of Choice

One of the standard ways of proving the consistency of additional hypotheses with the basic axioms of an axiom system is by the construction of what may be described as ‘inner models.’ By starting with a domain of individuals assumed to satisfy the basic axioms an inner model is constructed whose domain of individuals is a certain subset of the original individual domain. If such an inner model can be constructed which satisfies not only the basic axioms but also the particular additional hypothesis under consideration, then this affords a proof that if the basic axiom system is consistent then so is the system obtained by adding to this system the new hypothesis. This method has been applied to axiom systems for set theory by many authors, including v. Neumann (4), Mostowski (5), and more recently Gödel (1), who has shown by this method that if the basic axioms of a certain axiomatic system of set theory are consistent then so is the system obtained by adding to these axioms a strong form of the axiom of choice and the generalised continuum hypothesis. Having been shown in this striking way the power of this method it is natural to inquire whether it has any limitations or whether by the construction of a sufficiently ingenious inner model one might hope to decide other outstanding consistency questions, such as the consistency of the negations of the axiom of choice and continuum hypothesis. In this and two following papers we prove some general theorems concerning inner models for a certain axiomatic system of set theory which lead to the result that as far as a fairly large family of inner models are concerned this method of proving consistency has been exhausted, that no essentially new consistency results can be obtained by the use of this kind of model.

scholarly journals Determinacy in strong cardinal models

2011 ◽  
Vol 76 (2) ◽  
pp. 719-728
Author(s):  
P. D. Welch
Keyword(s):  
Strong Cardinal ◽  
Inner Models ◽  
Inner Model ◽  
Strong Cardinals

AbstractWe give limits defined in terms of abstract pointclasses of the amount of determinacy available in certain canonical inner models involving strong cardinals. We show for example:Theorem A. Det(-IND) ⇒ there exists an inner model with a strong cardinal.Theorem B. Det(AQI) ⇒ there exist type-l mice and hence inner models with proper classes of strong cardinals.where -IND(AQI) is the pointclass of boldface -inductive (respectively arithmetically quasi-inductive) sets of reals.

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