West European pacifism and the strategy for peace, The peace movements in Europe and the United States, Peace and survival: West Germany, the peace movement, and European security and Living with the wall: West Berlin, 1961–1985

1986 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 530-533
Author(s):  
Maurice Latey
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Peace Movement ◽  
West Germany ◽  
European Security ◽  
Peace Movements ◽  
West Berlin ◽  
West European

scholarly journals The Real Years of Europe? U.S.-West European Relations during the Ford Administration

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 136-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. Piers Ludlow
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Transatlantic Relations ◽  
West Germany ◽  
Ford Administration ◽  
Henry Kissinger ◽  
Policy Issues ◽  
The Real ◽  
West European

Little has been written about transatlantic relations during the presidency of Gerald R. Ford. This article shows that, contrary to what most of the recent historiography suggests, the brief period under Ford did make an important difference in U.S.-West European relations. During the Ford administration, the whole architecture of transatlantic relations was rearranged, creating structures and features that endured well after Ford and his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, had left office. In particular, the Ford years witnessed the emergence of a pattern of quadripartite consultation between the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany on foreign policy issues; and the advent of multilateral economic summitry. Each of these innovations transformed the pattern of U.S.-West European dialogue.

The Economic Strategies of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy during the Nixon-Ford Years

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jayita Sarkar
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
National Security ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Nuclear Reactor ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear Industry ◽  
West Germany ◽  
National Security State ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
West European

Abstract Much of international relations scholarship attributes the United States’ commitment to prevent the global spread of nuclear weapons as the outcome of US national security interests. Yet, US nonproliferation policy comprises a compelling set of economic goals and strategies, beyond economic sanctions. Without incorporating economic factors and actors, and their convergence with the Cold War US national security state, the understanding of US nonproliferation policy remains incomplete. The 1970s challenged US postwar economic preeminence through the “Nixon shock,” the end of dollar convertibility to gold of the Bretton Woods system, and the 1973 oil price shock. Concurrently, the United States’ market share in terms of global nuclear reactor sales declined while those of West European suppliers like France and West Germany increased. This essay argues that US nonproliferation efforts, which in the Nixon-Ford era took the form of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) after India's 1974 nuclear explosion, were guided as much by security concerns about proliferation as by Washington's aim to reclaim its market share to protect US nuclear industry against West European competition.

Perpetuating U.S. Preeminence: The 1990 Deals to “Bribe the Soviets Out” and Move NATO In

2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 110-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Elise Sarotte
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
The United States ◽  
West Germany ◽  
European Security ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
Alternative Structures ◽  
The North ◽  
Security Institution ◽  
The Cold War

Washington and Bonn pursued a shared strategy of perpetuating U.S. preeminence in European security after the end of the Cold War. As multilingual evidence shows, they did so primarily by shielding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from potential competitors during an era of dramatic change in Europe. In particular, the United States and West Germany made skillful use in 1990 of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's political weakness and his willingness to prioritize his country's financial woes over security concerns. Washington and Bonn decided “to bribe the Soviets out,” as then Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates phrased it, and to move NATO eastward. The goal was to establish NATO as the main post–Cold War security institution before alternative structures could arise and potentially diminish U.S. influence. Admirers of a muscular U.S. foreign policy and of NATO will view this strategy as sound; critics will note that it alienated Russia and made NATO's later expansion possible. Either way, this finding challenges the scholarly view that the United States sought to integrate its former superpower enemy into postconflict structures after the end of the Cold War.

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