New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition

1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (4) ◽  
pp. 927-930 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall L. Schweller

Realism is both a scientific research program and, more traditionally, a political philosophy. All realists share a pessimistic worldview that posits perpetual struggle among groups for security, prestige, and power and that denies the capacity of human reason to create a world of peace and harmony. Recent research by so-called neotraditional realists does not disconfirm Waltz's balancing proposition. Instead, these works have tended to add unit-level variables in order to transform Waltz's theory of international politics into one of foreign policy. The question is not whether states balance or bandwagon—history clearly shows that they do both—but rather under what conditions states choose one strategy or the other.

1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (4) ◽  
pp. 923-926 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Elman ◽  
Miriam Fendius Elman

We disagree that our correspondence (Elman and Elman 1995) regarding Schroeder (1994) supports Vasquez's (1997) verdict that the neorealist scientific research program is degenerating. We argue that Vasquez's conclusion is based on a misstatement of the Lakatosian criteria of appraisal and a mistaken conflation of the neorealist research program with the proposition that balancing is a common foreign policy. We do, however, welcome Vasquez's attempt to apply Lakatosian metatheory to international relations theory, and we hope that this conversation will encourage others to follow his lead.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sławomir Kalinowski

The article is an experimental study testing the expected utility theory axioms. Three of the experiments are a repetition of a previous test, while the other two are original. The repeated experiments were performed in slightly changed circumstances. The participants were incentivised with rewards, which did not happen in the tree replicated tests. The results confirmed degeneration of the expected utility theory as a scientific research program. The evidence that emerged from the tests supported the hypothesis on the cumulative prospect theory predicting facts not forecasted by the EUT.


1941 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-453
Author(s):  
Levi D. Gresh

The legal philosophy of Nelson is fundamentally a liberal doctrine. It is, on the one hand, opposed to the philosophy which places a supreme trust in human reason and which believes that man can sit down and codify a system of laws in which there will be no gaps; and, on the other, it is opposed to a belief in the necessary rationality of existing institutions in the onward sweep of human history, the idea which was so dear to the Historical School of jurisprudence.Nelson is a Naturrechtlehrer in the sense that he believes in the existence of metajuristic criteria of justice. That there are elemental principles of justice which are universal, and according to which laws are either just or unjust, decisions either right or wrong, Nelson believes cannot be denied. The moment we admit the injustice of a statute, or a judicial decision, we admit that we have used a criterion on which to base our opinion. The mistake we make, however, is to suppose that we can discover criteria, either empirically or logically.


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