scholarly journals A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War

2002 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 819 ◽  
Author(s):  
Darren Filson ◽  
Suzanne Werner
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Model ◽  
War And Peace ◽  
Bargaining Model Of War

scholarly journals Simulating the Bargaining Model of War

2015 ◽  
Vol 48 (04) ◽  
pp. 626-629 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyle Haynes
Keyword(s):  
International Conflict ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Card Game ◽  
Bargaining Model Of War ◽  
Classroom Simulation

ABSTRACTThis article outlines a classroom simulation for teaching the bargaining model of war. This model has become one of the most important theories of international conflict, but the technical notation often used to illustrate it is troublesome for some students. I describe a simple card game that can be integrated into a broader strategy for conveying the bargaining model’s core insights. I also highlight ways in which the game can be modified to focus on different aspects of the model’s logic.

scholarly journals Zionism and Identity Crisis: Ethnic Conflict between Israelis and Palestinians

2021 ◽  
Vol VI (I) ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Muhammad Owais
Keyword(s):  
Content Analysis ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Ethnic Conflict ◽  
Qualitative Content Analysis ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Identity Crisis ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Complicated Problem ◽  
Peace Agreements ◽  
Bargaining Model Of War

The Palestine issue is attributed to be the most complicated problem in the region of the Middle East. However, few researchers analyze the problem through the lens of ethnic conflict. This research paper investigates that the use of Zionism as a metaphor for colonialism and its role in fostering an ethnic conflict between Israeli and Palestinians. Qualitative content analysis is used to analyze secondary data on ethnic conflict in present Israel. In addition to that bargaining model of war is used to identify the underlying issues of the ethnic conflict. The findings reveal that Zionism and identity contribute to accelerating the ethnic conflict between Israeli and Palestinians. Despite international interventions and signing many peace agreements, the problem remains unresolved due to a trust deficit between both ethnicities.

Bargaining Model of War

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Bargaining Model Of War

scholarly journals More dangerous than dyads: how a third party enables rationalist explanations for war

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Gallop
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Dyadic Analysis ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Commitment Problems ◽  
Bargaining Model Of War ◽  
State Preferences

For the bargaining model of war, in the absence of incomplete information and commitment problems, war is irrational. But this finding rests on a simple and rarely discussed assumption, that bargaining is between exactly two participants. When we relax this assumption, in a three-player bargaining game, war is an equilibrium. Thus, a key finding of the bargaining model, that there is always an agreement that all states prefer war, is an artifact of dyadic analysis. By removing this limitation, we can find new factors that affect the risk of war: the number of actors, divergence in state preferences, alliance dynamics, and the issue being bargained over.

5. The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace

2018 ◽  
pp. 72-88
Author(s):  
John Garnett ◽  
John Baylis
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Ethnic Conflicts ◽  
Causes Of War ◽  
Bargaining Model Of War ◽  
Just Peace ◽  
Inter State

This chapter examines theories that explain the causes of war. It considers ideas advanced by political scientists, sociologists, biologists and philosophers, showing that different explanations of war give rise to different requirements or conditions for peace. After highlighting the difficulties in studying war, the chapter discusses human nature explanations of war, citing such factors as frustration, misperception, misunderstanding, miscalculation, and errors of judgement as well as the role of human collectives including factions, tribes, nations and states. It then describes the bargaining model of war before turning to inter-state wars, intra-state conflicts, and ethnic conflicts. It also explores the debate over whether ‘greed’ or ‘grievance’ are the main causes of civil wars. The chapter concludes that identifying a single cause appropriate to all wars is an exercise in futility and that a worldwide ‘just’ peace is unattainable.

Exploring the Bargaining Model of War

2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Reiter
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Bargaining Model Of War

Aims, claims, and the bargaining model of war

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 344-374
Author(s):  
Kenneth A. Schultz ◽  
Henk E. Goemans
Keyword(s):  
Formal Model ◽  
Geospatial Data ◽  
Territorial Disputes ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Relative Power ◽  
Canonical Models ◽  
The Face ◽  
Bargaining Model Of War ◽  
State Preferences

AbstractAlthough in principle states can bargain over the entire extent of their combined territory, we observe historically that states bargain within far more limited confines defined by well-bounded claims. We argue that this observation stems from the fact that states generally have limited territorial aims due either to limited benefits of obtaining additional territory and/or the costs of absorbing and controlling new territories and their inhabitants. Using a formal model, we show that introducing states with limited aims over territory has strategic implications for bargaining that have not been appreciated in canonical models that do not consider heterogeneity in state preferences. Whereas traditional models generally imply that small demands undermine the credibility of a challenger's threat, the existence of states with limited territorial aims makes limited demands credible, effective, and stable in the face of shocks to relative power. We then employ geospatial data on the geographic extent of territorial disputes in the period 1947–2000 to establish two results: the size of claims is weakly related to the relative power of disputants and unaffected by dramatic changes in power, and smaller claims are associated with a higher probability that the challenger will receive any concession.

scholarly journals Streaming the Battlefield: A Theory of the Internet's Effect on Negotiation Onset

MCU Journal ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-196
Author(s):  
Anthony Patrick
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Communications Technology ◽  
Empirical Testing ◽  
Internet Connectivity ◽  
Communications Technologies ◽  
Bargaining Model Of War ◽  
Information Communications Technologies

This article explores the effects of social media penetration and internet connectivity on the likelihood that parties within a conventional intra-state conflict will enter negotiations. The proliferation of advanced information communications technologies, coupled with violent political collective action, calls for further examination of how these variables intertwine to affect conflict patterns. Beginning with a discussion on communications technology and the bargaining model of war, the author presents a theoretical model that seeks to create a foundation that can be used for future empirical testing.

Policy bargaining and militarized conflict

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 647-678 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Bils ◽  
William Spaniel
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Information Uncertainty ◽  
Major Purpose ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Spatial Policy ◽  
Militarized Conflict ◽  
Bargaining Model Of War

Studies of bargaining and war generally focus on two sources of incomplete information: uncertainty over the probability of victory and uncertainty over the costs of fighting. We introduce uncertainty over preferences of a spatial policy and argue for its relevance in crisis bargaining. Under these conditions, standard results from the bargaining model of war break down: peace can be Pareto inefficient and it may be impossible to avoid war. We then extend the model to allow for cheap talk pre-play communication. Whereas incentives to misrepresent normally render cheap talk irrelevant, here communication can cause peace and ensure that agreements are efficient. Moreover, peace can become more likely as (1) the variance in the proposer’s belief about its opponent’s type increases and (2) the costs of war decrease. Our results indicate that one major purpose of diplomacy is simply to communicate preferences and that such communications can be credible.

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